26 Acrónimos
Capítulo 3 | Ingeniería inversa Simulaciones
1.4 Circuito de potencia | Transistores de potencia
The hypothesis of this research was that China identifies itself geopolitically differently in the frames of BASIC and the US. The hypothesis was based on the assumption that on the other hand China is arguing to be a developing country and irresponsible for climate change as it has not been the cause for historical emissions and on the other hand, to show climate leadership for example in the field of renewable energy and with the Sino-American climate agreement 2014. The objective was to endeavor how China positions itself in the two frames,
recognize the similarities and differences between the frames and discuss why the positions are similar or different.
The results were confronting the hypothesis, as China positioned itself as a developing country in both frames. However, the developing country identity was negotiated stronger in the BASIC frame and less obvious in the US-China frame. The worldview of BASIC
countries were constructed on the dichotomy, lacked notions on the diversity of the large group of developing countries and focused to speak on behalf of all developing countries.
With the US, China positioned itself as being a developing country but perhaps revealed more about its versatile identity. It was no longer arguing or justifying its identity to the
international community but showing it with practices. The US-China frame tried to set an example for the rest of the world in climate politics, even though their actions could not necessarily be considered as the most ambitious. Negotiating with the US as a developing country, China is in a way creating a new way of being a developing country in the climate politics. Being a developing country but showing climate leadership on the global level has not occurred before on a scale like this. Thus, like Dalby (2016) suggested the climate agreement between these two nations has significance for the contemporary geopolitics. This can be argued not only because of the agreement but as a practice of constructing the
international negotiations. It is interesting that the cooperation between these two countries is especially strong in climate change compared to the other sectors.
If the geopolitical identity was not completely different in the two frames, the climate change discourses were. BASIC countries saw it as an inequality question that could be answered with financial support and technological transfers. The US and China constructed it as a pillar for their cooperation and a possibility for domestic problems, broader cooperation and
business.
What is interesting is that while the BASIC frame was more positioned under the Convention and the US-China off the UN-track, it could be argued that at the moment the BASIC
countries are on their part slowing the negotiation process of the UN-track. This is done by claiming similar kind of support for all of the developing countries. Though, they clearly negotiate under the UN-track, their geopolitical imagination differs from the development of the UNFCCC. Also, the INDC targets differ within the coalition. In the BASIC frame the solution for climate change was considered to be produced within the UNFCCC but brought
in from outside in the US-China frame. The climate negotiations are slowly abandoning the traditional form of dichotomy and introducing more bottom-up defined processes. This was not recognized in the geopolitical climate mental map of BASIC countries. However, though the US-China frame was further from the UN process their geopolitical view of developing countries was more diverse recognizing the least developed nations, the small island
developing states and the African nations. This development is in line with Agnew’s (2010) critique of the modern geopolitical imagination and could thus be considered more post-modern questioning the “norm” of the traditional way of being a developing country.
These two frames are both present in China’s INDC document but from the quantitative targets the China frame can be positioned closer to China. Also, the ambition in the US-China frame corresponded with US-China’s National Climate Change Programme and five year plans better. Development is seen as stages in the China’s INDC document and in the five year plans, China efficiently plans the path for the next level in both. The development of arguments in the US-China documents can be considered to support these plans. The argumentation in the BASIC frame remained rather similar in 2012-2016. Therefore, from this perspective, the hypothesis can be said to be partly right as it was negotiating differently in the two frames. Because of the number of actors in 21st century climate politics, it is unlikely that one discourse or regime will manage to overrule the others (Castree 2008). This makes it useless for China to try to argue with only one discourse or within one frame as according to post-structuralism one needs to accept the variety of alternative discourses (Burr 2000).
The discourse-practice regime of BASIC countries can be considered based on the documents as one-question coalition whereas they could have potential to broaden their cooperation. The US-China frame aims for more comprehensive cooperation, it seemed that they have or want to compromise on more questions. The two frames similarly did not construct climate change directly as an environmental question. Thus, it seemed that China’s identity in the two frames was guided by the discourses to justify its concerns of legally binding targets in the BASIC frame and the economic and cooperation possibilities in the other. By being included in both frames, China is labeled as “us” by both frames.
The dichotomy of Kyoto Protocol has proven to be surprisingly persistent. Burr (2000) explains that some discourses are considered as the “truth” because they are in the interests of
relatively powerful groups to justify the possible power inequalities appropriate. Though it could be argued that as the dichotomy of development is slowly changing or at least its diversity is becoming more acknowledged, a research of developing country identity could be considered to be irrelevant. However, these identities are also shaping the negotiations on a global level. A good example is that the definition of national circumstances in the
differentiation process was considered too difficult to be defined. As a consequence, the definition was left somewhat unanswered by changing the process more bottom-up. This has changed the political grouping within the climate negotiations. A case in point is also the construction of Paris Agreement in the two frames: the other one discusses it as a follower of Kyoto and the other one as a totally new agreement. This is a good example of how language constructs the worldview. The US would have hardly agreed on an agreement which would have been discussed as a Kyoto follow up.
The ambition mechanism of the Paris Agreement and the INDC documents still needs to be defined because of the gap in ambition between the submitted targets and the agreement (Rogelj et al. 2016). As the national contributions are now defined to “reflect nation's highest possible ambition” in addition to national circumstances (Paris Agreement 2015), it will be interesting to see how this constructs the discourses of ambition. National circumstances has not really produced competition in climate change of which country has more capacity.
However, when the discussion is framed to be the question of ambition, it could be suggested that no country wishes its image to be unambitious. This development could be thought to support the potentiality of modern geopolitics of power to transform into the direction of
“postmodern world of images and influence” (Marklund 2015). It could also be argued that ambition of the actions, though difficult, but could still be easier than comparing the national circumstances.
Climate change negotiations is highly relative as the actions by other Parties have an
influence on the others. For example, there is a clause in the end of India’s INDC document saying “they reserve the right to make additional submissions on Intended Nationally
Determined Contribution as and when required”. This could be considered as a reservation to withdraw or change their contributions in case for example the developed countries were not proving to take care of their responsibility. Especially because the document builds on the trust among developed and developing countries which is created by ambitious actions of
developed countries. This relativity is also present in the considerations of what will China do if US would to withdraw from the Agreement with the new President (Kemp 2016).
This discussion is interesting because though China is now argued to attract most attention in climate politics because of its emissions (Chen 2012), what happens when or if China’s emissions will peak? Will the next focus point be India if at that point it has not peaked with its emissions or will the target of 2℃ or 1.5℃ guarantee that China will remain in the focus for longer than the growth of its emissions? As the geopolitical identities are constantly rewritten in relation to other geopolitical climate discourses and practices (Castree 2008;
Dalby 2016), one cannot effort to find access to real, static truth but to improve the
understanding of the process. This is why researching the relativity in climate politics will remain interesting as climate politics is also a product of climate politics.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen for the inspiring suggestions and discussion during the process. Thank you for being so encouraging with my topic since the beginning. I wish also thank my other supervisor Dr. Paola Minoia for her advice and patience though the process has been long. In addition, I am thankful for Professor Sami Moisio for his guidance in my theoretical frame.
I have received fruitful feedback from the other Master and PhD students in Russia’s Energy Politics seminar group. I wish also thank Mikael Wide, Saara Paavilainen, Vuokko
Heikinheimo, Henna Puustinen and my family for their valuable comments and support throughout the process.
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