In the critical literature that the book stimulated, the supersession of imperialism by ‘Empire’ has been the subject of close critical analysis. So, too, has Hardt’s and Negri’s interpretation of imperialism. Amin argues that, in Empire,imperialism means the ‘extension of the formal power of the state beyond its own borders, thereby confusing imperialism with colonialism’ (Amin 2005: 1). For Amin, this opens the way to reaching the conclusion that with the ending of colonialism in the 1970s, imperialism must have disappeared, too (Amin 2005: 1). Simon Bromley also remarks on how the two authors view imperialism as mainly a political process, as an extension of sovereignty of the metropolitan nation-states throughout the rest of the world. Compared with imperialism, ‘Empire’ is not concerned with ‘direct imperial control of some political-territorial units over others’, but rather ‘Empire’ is an
‘essentially deterritorialised field of economic and cultural relationships’ (Bromley 2003: 18). The novelty of ‘Empire’ is its universality and the unhitching of its power from a territorial centre. Its power is anchored in a global constitution, which, in turn, means that the nature of power in this configuration is mainly cultural, not political (Bromley 2003: 18). The economic aspects of imperialism are noted by the two writers,but as Panitch and Gindin point out their rendition of the impulses that drove pre-First World War capitalism relies on underconsumption and, taking their cue from Luxemburg, the need for exports to non-capitalist countries (Panitch and Gindin 2002: 21-22). Additionally, Hardt and Negri bypass the crucial role of finance in the current form of global capitalism and they do not explore the uneven development of capitalism within social formations as well as between them (Panitch and Gindin 2002: 24).
Two other claims made in Empire have attracted substantial critical comment. First is the contention that, with the de-territorialising and de-centring that is the hallmark of the smooth space of ‘Empire’, borders and the system of states have been rendered redundant. Second is the claim that imperialism is now outmoded, attributable in large part to the ‘unique character of the US’ (Barkawi and Laffey 2002: 123). Regarding the overcoming of borders and the system of states – an assumption mainly based on the transformative effects of globalisation bringing about the ‘smooth space’ of ‘Empire’ – Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey point out the deficiencies of such a claim. In emphasising the increasing flows of information, money and goods, what Hardt and Negri and hyper-globalists overlook is the obverse of this coin. In other words, there has been a ‘massive effort to make it harder for undesirable flows – be they illegal economic immigrants, asylum seekers, illegal drugs, crime, or contraband – to cross borders’ (Barkawi and Laffey 2002: 123). A clear example of the continuing existence of the system of states and the leading role of the US state within that system is the arc of military bases across central Asia established by the US and various governments in those regions in the early 2000s. Such patron-client relations are redolent of ‘not only… past US engagements in the Third World but also with older histories of imperialism’ (Barkawi and Laffey 2002: 124).
The centrality of the US in the system of states runs counter to the proposal that ‘Empire’ is a smooth space with no real centre. This is a point that Panitch and Gindin make, too. Whilst the latter two agree with Hardt and Negri about
Madisonian ‘network power’ as a distinctive element in the American constitution (and therefore something that distinguishes the US state as perhaps unique), they disagree that such network power prefigured ‘Empire’. Panitch and Gindin explain:
far from anticipating the sort of decentred and amorphous power that Hardt and Negri imagine characterized the US historically (and
characterizes ‘Empire’ today), the constitutional framework of the new American state gave great powers to the central government to expand trade and make war (Panitch and Gindin 2002: 10).
The de-centred, borderless world thesis of Hardt and Negri not only obscures the continuing dependence of capital on many states, but also ‘the pre-eminent role of the American state in the making of global capitalism is marginalized’ (Panitch and Gindin 2005: 101).
The amorphous power of ‘Empire’, then, has not been especially well received by critics. What also has attracted criticism is the lack of development of the empirical claim that inter-state conflicts have been overcome by ‘Empire’ (Callinicos 2002: 320). Post-Cold War geopolitics has shown that interstate conflicts have continued with the Balkan wars of the 1990s (with NATO intervention), followed by
Afghanistan and Iraq in the new millennium. Interstate conflicts have continued but the inter-imperialist rivalry leading to conflict (central to Lenin’s theory of
imperialism) seems to have dissipated. On the evidence of current inter-state conflicts, it would be difficult to argue that ‘Empire’ has supplanted imperialism. Nonetheless, the precise nature of post-Cold War geopolitics remains contested. Barkawi, Laffey, Callinicos and Shaw all have debated about how to conceptualise the current era, an exchange prompted by their analyses of Empire (Barkawi and Laffey 2002; Callinicos 2002; Shaw 2002).
In their promotion of ‘Empire’, Hardt and Negri have been criticised for minimising the central role of the US in the global order and for minimising the ongoing role of the system of states in the maintenance of US hegemony in that global order. Such criticism stems from their assertions about the de-centred, de-territorialised nature of ‘Empire’. Furthermore, their understanding of imperialism has been called into question because of its narrow political and territorial focus, which sees them consequently passing over much of the economic side of imperialism. Another concern is their use of Lenin’s theory of imperialism as a partial precursor to
‘Empire’, which casts doubt on the two writers’ understanding and application of imperialism theory. Such comprehensive criticism leads to the conclusion that the world has not witnessed the supplanting of imperialism by ‘Empire’.
Conclusion
This chapter has scrutinised Hardt’s and Negri’s treatment of the three themes of globalisation, empire/imperialism and the state and the system of states in their provocative study titled Empire. It has argued that the concept of ‘Empire’ is predicated on a strong version of globalisation, which, acting in conjunction with social, political and cultural changes that pre-date the globalisation era (early 1970s onwards), dramatically transformed political economy and geopolitics. Hardt’s and Negri’s version of globalisation, however, does not explore the connections between the former and global capitalism to any real extent. Thus, the changes that they outline such as immaterial labour, the prominence of informatisation and so on may be just the typical revolutionising of the production process that is an essential feature of capitalism. Furthermore, the transformations that Hardt and Negri suggest have come with globalisation heralding a shift from modernity to postmodernity are not supported by enough evidence, a problem commented upon by critics such as Panitch and Gindin. Nevertheless, Hardt and Negri are right to claim that there have been changes in the global capitalist economy and in geopolitics in the globalisation era. Their hypothesis that, in the post-Cold War era a proper capitalist order has now been realised, challenges many assumptions of those on the left and right of the political spectrum. Another serious challenge, this time mainly to the left, is Hardt’s and Negri’s contention that imperialism has been made redundant by ‘Empire’. The challenges of Empire have motivated a ‘renaissance’ in imperialism theory. The smooth, de-centred nature of Empire, which demoted the state and the system of states from their positions as major actors in global politics, certainly generated a lot of critical commentary. After close examination of key elements in the book (and the critical literature it spawned), it was concluded that Hardt’s and Negri’s postmodern version of empire has not rendered imperialism irrelevant. The state and the system of states still are crucial elements of global politics and Hardt and Negri, in their enthusiasm for ‘Empire’, oversimplify the role of the state and the system of states in geopolitics. There are a number of problems evident in Hardt’s and Negri’s treatment of the three themes of globalisation, empire/imperialism and the state and the system of states.