CAPITULO II MARCO TEÓRICO
CITAS DE REFERENCIAS EN EL TEXTO
The Political Maneuvers of the CUP at the Brink of Armistice
Talat Pasha arrived at the Sirkeci Station from his Berlin trip on September 27. The Bulgar- ian surrender, which Talat had discovered at his stop in Sofia, was already the talk of the town in Constantinople. Talat informed his close associates in confidence about the details of the Bulgarian surrender.1 Mithat Şükrü (Bleda), the Secretary General of the Central Com- mittee of the CUP, belonged to those who received Talat soon after his arrival. On the morale of Talat, Mithat Şükrü wrote in his memoirs:
There were great differences between the Talat who went to Berlin and the Talat who returned from Berlin. It was as if Talat was now another Talat. He was depressed and exhausted as if he had suffered a severe illness for five or ten days. He wasn’t smiling, he couldn’t hold his head high. Nothing could solace the Talat who returned to us in this condition, and how could it […].2
Despite his depressed mood, Talat gave a press conference that day to calm the situation. The penetration of the Bulgarian front and the setbacks we are facing at our Southern front is not as important as assumed, told Talat the journalists. There also some good news. New forces have been formed from the Turks of the Caucasus and Central Asia, said Talat in hope appease the curious crowd. These will soon be brought to the aid of the fronts and stability will be reestablished. As I was in Berlin I solved all our conflicts with the Germans regarding the Caucasus.3 As soon as the journalists left, Talat revealed in private the gravity of the situation to Ahmet Emin (Yalman), a promising young journalist with a PhD from Columbia University: «What I told you all was to avoid a sudden outbreak of alarm and panic among the people. The truth is that everything is over, we’ve lost the war. Tomorrow is full of unknown probabilities.»4
Unlike Talat, Enver maintained his hopes. On the day of Talat’s return, Enver sent a tele- graph to Zeki Pasha at the German headquarters to convince the Germans to send German
1 Süleyman K. İrtem, “Bu Dünyadan Talat Paşa Geçti,” Akşam Gazetesi, March 6, 1943, reprinted in Osman
Selim Kocahanoğlu, ed., Hatıraları ve Mektuplarıyla Sadrazam Talat Paşa (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2008), 197–222, 199.
2 Mithat Şükrü Bleda, İmparatorluğun Çöküşu: İttihat ve Terakki Kâtibi Umumisi (İstanbul: Destek Yayınları,
2010), 155.
3 Ahmet Emin Yalman, Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim (İstanbul: Yenilik Basımevi, 1970), I,
305.
or Austrian troops to rebuke the Bulgarians.5 Although, the Bulgarians signed an uncondi- tional surrender on September 29, Talat apparently kept his poker face in front of the Ger- man officials at the embassy. Talat was according to chargé d’affaires of the German Embassy still «hopeful» on September 30. He even proposed to set up a coup d’état against the Bul- garian government with the help of Muslim Bulgarians in order to keep the alliance intact.6 Once again, Talat’s komitadji repertoire was delivering options—realistic or not. Talat said, if the Bulgarians make a deal that would enable an invasion of the Ottoman capital by the Entente forces, than it is a lost case for us. In this case I would resign for that I don’t want to conclude such a peace.7
Bulgaria was geopolitically very critical for the military defense of the Ottoman capital. The Bulgarian border lied only few hundred kilometers away from Constantinople and this was a cause for general concern within the government.8 In the words of Celal (Bayar), the later president of the Republic of Turkey and by than a young member of the CUP, «the catas- trophe was knocking on the door».9
Next morning, on October 1, even more terrible news reached the Ottoman capital. Damas- cus was lost to General Edmund Allenby’s Egyptian Expeditionary Force.10 Syria’s loss was probably expected by the Young Turk regime, but not the other news that reached the Grand Vizier’s ears. Talat Pasha received a telegram sent by the Ottoman ambassador in Vienna, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, reporting that also Germany was at the brink of calling an armistice. Talat, who was there in Germany and talked to the Kaiser, Hindenburg, and Ludendorff only few days ago, could not believe that the Germans were giving in for a separate peace agreement.11 With Germans surrendering, the war was finally lost for the Ottoman Empire. When Cemal Pasha was asked by his adjutant: «Sir, is everything over?» Cemal could not hide his tears. Few moments later recovered from the sorrowful feelings of loss and defeat,
5 Enver Pasha, letter (Constantinople) to Zeki Pasha (Spa), September 27, 1918, quoted in Şevket Süreyya
Aydemir, Enver Paşa: Makedonya’dan Orta Asya’ya, 3 vols. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1972), III, 435–436.
6 Waldburg, report (Constantinople) to Auswärtiges Amt, September 30, 1918, PA-AA, R 13804, 263. 7 Waldburg, report (Constantinople) to Auswärtiges Amt, September 30, 1918, PA-AA, R 13804, 263–64. 8 Gwynne Dyer, “The Turkish Armistice of 1918, Part I: The Turkish Decision for a Separate Peace, Autumn
1918,” Middle Eastern Studies 8, no. 2 (1972): 150.
9 Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdım: Millî Mücadeleye Gidiş, 8 vols. (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1966–1972), 5–7. 10 Matthew Hughes, Allenby and British Strategy in the Middle East, 1917–1919 (London: Cass, 1999). 11 Fethi Okyar, Üç Devirde Bir Adam, ed. Cemal Kutay (İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1980).
Cemal went being himself again; he was trying to convince the police director on the tele- phone to persecute Nüzhet Sabit for publishing an offensive pamphlet, as if nothing had ever changed.12 But things were indeed about to change rapidly and radically. On October 2, in a letter to his brother Nuri (Killigil) Pasha in the Caucasus, Enver Pasha also acknowledged that the war was now a lost cause and wrote: «Since we are concluding peace, it means that we’ve lost the game.»13
The «game» they played had come to a bitter closure. Now against the odds of a «tomorrow full of unknown probabilities»—as Talat Pasha put it beautifully—the CUP had to under- take urgent political maneuvers in order to take precautions and make preparations for the worst. The defeat and armistice meant the end of the CUP rule. Prosecutions and persecu- tions of the CUP cabinet for the war crimes they committed was on the horizon. The CUP leadership rejected to face the consequences of a future court martial. Fearing their own pros- ecution, they would opt to flight. They would leave the empire and go into exile. They had a heavy load of political baggage they were to carry to their exile, while leaving behind even a heavier legacy in Ottoman Turkey.
***
The broader picture of the events in late September 1918 makes the German surrender less surprising. The culmination of events on different fronts made the German military leader- ship’s expectations for the long-awaited victorious peace (Siegfrieden) disappear painfully. This sudden change of mind within the military leadership remained long disputed in the popular imagination making way for the right-wing and militarist conspiracy theories of the «stab-in-the-back legend» (Dolchstoßlegende). According to this «national myth», the armi- stice was a treacherous conspiracy of the—usual suspects—social-democrats, Jews, and Free- masons, who stabbed the undefeated German military in the back through a surrender. In reality, however, mutinies among the soldiers and sailors as well as strikes and desperation on the home front were emerging; there were no more reserve resources to continue prolonged fighting; and after the Western front was breached and the American forces appeared on the
12 Falih Rıfkı Atay, Zeytindağı (İstanbul: Pozitif Yayınları, 2009), 19.
13 Enver Pasha, letter (Constantinople) to Nuri Pasha (Caucasus), October 2, 1918, quoted in Aydemir, Enver
horizon, the disillusionment became inescapable. On September 29, Ludendorff revealed to the Kaiser at the War Council in Spa that the war was now a lost cause and it was time to maneuver into the armistice negotiations both diplomatically and domestically. Otherwise not only the defeat but also the annihilation of the remaining troops was at stake.14 Thus, Germany gave in for peace. The new German Chancellor Prince Max von Baden sent a tel- egram to Talat Pasha on October 9, writing that only the «unswerving determination for defense» will help the both defeated governments secure «honorable peace» conditions, but diplomatic courtesies did not much help to change the catastrophic situation.15 Talat’s cabi- net had already resigned on October 7.16 Germany, followed by Austria-Hungary and Otto- man Empire respectively, gave into Wilson’s principles, but the victorious Entente had less interest in granting concessions at this moment of victory.17
It was common wisdom that the defeat in World War I meant the defeat of CUP. In the last ten years since the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, the paramilitary rebels who ended up being imperial rulers had just realized—but, of course, without truly blaming themselves— that they had brought along the ruin of the empire they had originally sworn to save. The CUP leaders were up to their throat in trouble now—to say the least. The prospects of the upcoming armistice with the Allies was casting a dark shadow on the future of the CUP. The Young Turk triumvirate in particular has long been subjected to a strong antagonization— or even demonization—discourse by the Entente propaganda and the Ottoman opposition. Everybody knew that prosecutions and persecutions were awaiting the CUP. Their commit- ment to the Central Powers’ collective war effort and the ruthless handling of war and society would make a strong case against them at the military tribunals.
14 Eberhard Kessel, “Ludendorffs Waffenstillstandsforderung vom 29. September 1918,” Militärgeschichtliche
Zeitschrift 4, no. 2 (1968): 67–88; Michael Epkenhans, “Die Politik der militärischen Führung 1918:
‘Kontinuität der Illusionen und das Dilemma der Wahrheit’,” in Kriegsende 1918: Ereignis Wirkung
Nachwirkung, ed. Jörg Duppler and Gerhard P. Groß (München: Oldenbourg, 1999), 217–33; Michael
Geyer, “Insurrectionary Warfare: The German Debate about a Levée en Masse in October 1918,” Journal of
Modern History 73 (2001): 465; Jörn Leonhard, Die Büchse der Pandora: Geschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs
(München: C.H. Beck, 2014), 877.
15 Chancellor Max von Baden, telegraph (Berlin) to Grand Vizier Talat Pasha (Constantinople), October 9,
1918, BOA.HR.SYS.2459.60.
16 Ahmet Emin Yalman, Turkey in the World War (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1930), 267–
68. Talat’s cabinet remained in charge until the new cabinet was formed on October 14.
Fellow CUP members were indeed concerned about their prominent friends and encouraged them to get away before the arrival of the Allied forces. For instance, Rauf (Orbay) Bey and Enver’s adjutant Kazım (Orbay) Bey were both worried about Enver’s life and honor.18 Rauf Bey had also talks with Cemal Pasha about his security in those days.19 Kara Kemal was concerned about Talat Pasha and advised him to disappear for a while.20 Dr. Nazım told years later that the fear of retaliations from Greeks and Armenians was the major concern.21 Shakib Arslan tells that the CUP leadership heard of rumors that Sultan Vahideddin had a secret agreement with the British to persecute and execute the CUP leaders.22 Later Sultan Vahideddin denounced the CUP leaders for the Armenian massacres in an interview to the
Daily Telegraph.23 The personal safety and reputation of the CUP leaders was seen as a matter of national pride by many CUP members and precautions were needed to be taken. There were even rumors of a failed assassination attempt against Enver and Talat in the newspa- pers.24 There were three options on the table: Either they would hide and wait in Constanti- nople or they would retreat to Eastern Anatolia and start a resistance movement there. In the worst scenario, they would leave for exile and come back, when the conditions would allow it.25 Either way, they would escape the looming prosecutions.
On October 14, Field-Marshal Ahmet İzzet (Furgaç) Pasha was appointed as the new Grand Vizier.26 He was not a CUP member nor had he been in favor of the decision for war, but he
18 Rauf Orbay, Cehennem Değirmeni (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1993), 167–68. 19 Orbay, Cehennem Değirmeni, 165–66.
20 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Ahmet Eyicil, Osmanlı İttihat ve
Terakki Cemiyeti Liderlerinden Doktor Nazım Bey (1872–1926) (Ankara: Gün Yayıncılık, 2004), 325. See
also: Bayar, Ben de Yazdım, I, 123–124.
21 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 321. 22 Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa, ed. Erol Cihangir (İstanbul: Doğu
Kütüphanesi, 2005), 71.
23 G. Ward Price, “Interview with the Sultan of Turkey: Enver Pasha’s Crimes”, Daily Telegraph, December
12, 1918. See also: PA-AA, R 13805, 98. «‹It was a great sorrow that I learnt of the treatment which certain political committees in Turkey instigated against the Armenians.› replied the Sultan. ‹Such misdeeds and the mutual slaughter that occurred between sons of the same fatherland have broken my heart. As soon as I came to the Throne I ordered an inquiry to be made so that the fomenters of these troubles might punished with the greatest severtity. Various factors prevented my command being promptly carried out. But now this matter is being thoroughly gone into and followed up. Justice will soon be gone, and we shall never have a repetition of such ugly events.›» See also a similar interview with Prince Abdülmecid Efendi in “Interview with the Heir-Apparent: Enver’s Villany”, Morning Post, December 14, 1918.
24 Germany Embassy in Berne, letter to the Chancellor (Belrin), October 30, 1918, PA-AA, R 13805, 23. 25 Arif Cemil Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, ed. Yücel Demirel (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları,
1992), 14.
was a generally respected commander without any serious feuds with the CUP or the German military command.27 In forming the new cabinet, the CUP utilized some committee mem- bers with a rather unblemished record in war-time decisions, such as Rauf (Orbay), Fethi (Okyar) and Cavid in hopes to ensure an unnoticed continuation of the Committee’s influ- ence in the armistice.28 Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) Pasha was proposed as Minister of War, but the new Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha claimed this office for himself.29
Talat Pasha soon approached the newly appointed Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha, because he feared the Allied prosecutions after the armistice. İzzet Pasha’s promise was not much relief. «As long as I am in the cabinet, I will never turn you in to the enemy», he assured. «But who knows how long I will remain in the cabinet?» he rightly questioned.30 Talat’s concerns were not without a reason. Talat knew very well that he would be accounted for the extermination of Ottoman Armenians, once the Allies take over the Ottoman Empire or the long-sup- pressed Ottoman opposition becomes vocal again. On October 27, German Naval Attaché Grancy was reporting that the «radicals» were trying to replace the Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha with Tevfik Pasha «in order to make Talaat Enver and others accountable.»31
It was pretty much obvious that Talat and other CUP leaders and their murdering henchmen would end up at the gallows. Thus, the Central Committee of the CUP, consisting of Eyüp Sabri (Akgöl), Ziya Gökalp, Mithat Şükrü (Bleda), Kara Kemal, Bahaeddin Şakir, Dr. Nazım, Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) and others, decided to bring a number of CUP leaders into safety.32 Nonetheless, many accounts agree that Talat somehow accepted to face his fate. According to the accounts delivered by several CUP members, Talat remained long reluctant to run away.33 According to Mithat Şükrü, Talat’s initial reaction to the end of the war was:
27 See: Hans von Seeckt, letter (Constantinopel) to Dorothee von Seeckt (Germany), October 27, 1918, BA-
MA, N247/218
28 Bernstorff, elegram to Berlin, October 12, 1918, Das Verhältnis der Türkei zu Deutschland, August 15,
1918 – January 31, 1919, PA-AA, R 13758, 106f.
29 Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk İnkılabı Tarihi, 3 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991), III, part
4, 708.
30 Muhittin Birgen, İttihat ve Terakki’de On Sene: İttihat ve Terakki’nin Sonu, 2 vols., ed. Zeki Arıkan
(İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2006), 551.
31 Alexander Freiherr von Senarclens-Grancy, Telegramm an die O.H.L, October 27, 1918, BA-MA, RA
3/2965, 344.
32 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 323,
325, 326.
33 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 14; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Talat Paşa (İstanbul: Yedigün
«I have to answer to my country with a clear conscience. If they wish so, they should hang me…»34 Even until now Turkish nationalist scholars celebrate these words as a marker of Talat’s strong integrity and claim that he did not simply run away from his responsibilities.35 Talat was known for making such bold claims. For instance, when Portuguese Prime Minis- ter João Franco went into exile in 1909, the reaction of Talat Bey at the Ottoman Parliament was: «We do not leave the country; we work until we die.»36 As a remarkably smart politician, Talat knew very well when to say what. Therefore, his boldness should be read with caution. For instance, at the opening day of the final congress of the CUP on November 1, 1918, Talat held a shockingly straightforward speech about the harms committed during his gov- ernment such as the Armenian massacres.37 Although his apologia contains the blueprints of Turkey’s official arguments in rejecting the genocide claims, he presented himself as prepared and willing to account for the wrongs committed under his responsibility:
It’s not that I will deny the horrors. My desire is only to tell the truth and get rid of the exaggerations. The deportation incidents did occur, but none of those were enacted ac- cording to a premeditated decision by the Sublime Porte. One could not have tolerated movements during a great war that were disturbing the freedom of movement and threat- ening the salvation of the people and the security of the army by starting insurgencies behind the fronts. In Erzurum, there were Armenian paramilitaries obstructing the move- ment of the army. Whenever these got in trouble, they were receiving help and protection from the Armenian villages. The churches were stash houses for weapons. The deporta- tions were out of desperation. It’s not that I will argue that the deportations were exe- cuted orderly everywhere or that it didn’t cross the boundaries of the imperative. In many places, animosities broke out for this reason. Evil has been done that we had by no means anticipated. Certain officials enacted cruelties and violence beyond measure so that a great deal of innocents was victimized unjustly. I admit that it was the duty of the Gov- ernment to prevent them. In cases where the horrors could not be prevented, it was nec- essary to search, find, and punish the wrongdoers. Sometimes this has been done, but it wasn’t sufficient. It would have been appropriate to conduct general investigations and launch persecutions, but it wasn’t easy to do these in times of war. Among them there were some, who committed these cruelties without being carried away by any feeling of
34 Bleda, İmparatorluğun Çöküşu, 155.
35 The chapter on Talat Pasha’s murder has this quote as its chapter title in Hikmet Özdemir, Üç Jöntürk’ün
Ölümü: Talat, Cemal, Enver (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2007).
36 Quoted from the Ottoman parliamentary minutes in Erol Kaya, “İttihat ve Terakki Liderlerinin Yurtdışına
Kaçışları ve Bunun İstanbul Basınındaki Yankıları,” Erzincan Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi 10, no. 1 (2008): 185. See also: Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler III: İttihat ve Terakki (İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1989), 568.
37 According to Ahmed Emin’s account, the party conference took place on October 14–18. Yalman, Yakın
Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim, I 307. But this is wrong. As contemporary newspapers reported