It is the intention of this chapter to outline the nature and dynamics of ‘incomplete modernity’ and the implications of this transition on the social and political constellations of modernity in Lebanon. It is, therefore, important to make some brief remarks on the pre-modern order and the instigators of the transition to modernity in Greater Syria in order to understand the transformation experienced in the socio-political context and social formation in Lebanon. It is important to note that, since the eighteenth century, Ottoman authority in Greater Syria gradually regressed allowing local elites to usurp power. Prominent families in Damascus, Aleppo and Tripoli capitalised on their feudal prerogatives to gain preferential access to the opportunities arising from the expansion of capitalism. This is especially true given that the port and market cities of Greater Syria were unevenly incorporated into the sphere of influence of more developed capitalist economies (Raymond, 2002). The incorporation of the so-called ‘Levantine’ elite in a regional economy in which Istanbul and Cairo were competing centres in the eighteenth century and in a global economy centred around European industrial-capitalism in the nineteenth century allowed notables to usurp power and establish autonomous neo- feudal regional governments corresponding to vernacular cultures and imagined communities. In the Syrian hinterland, for instance, notables combined their affluence with Ottoman recognition – hence, establishing themselves as hereditary governors.
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The elite in Mount Lebanon resorted to a more complex socio-political arrangement whereby local chieftains usurped tax-farming rights (iltizām) over large mountainous districts (muqāta‘a). In return for the autonomous administration of their iqtā‘ (fiefdom), muqāta‘jis paid fixed purses, supplied men to the imperial army and maintained order (Traboulsi, 2007:3). Crucially, muqāta‘jis were hereditary notables backed by religious establishments. Consequently, they rallied co-religionists into semi-autonomous fiefdoms and assured the relative sectarian homogeneity of their dominions in return for the support of their respective clergies.
This order was challenged by the disproportional increase in muqāta‘jis’ economic power, social affluence and political aspirations vis-à-vis the ageing Ottoman Empire. This was exacerbated by the expansion of commercial-capitalism which connected various notables with the capitalist economies of Turkey, Egypt and Italian city-states. This led to the emergence of semi-autonomous emirates under Ma‘ani (1516-1635) and Chehabi (1697-1842) emirs. The
iqtā‘ system was also undermined by the expanding authority of the pashas in Sidon, Acre and
Damascus. The Chehabis’ military victories against the muqāta‘jis of Jabal Amil12 in the south and Bechari, Batrun and Jbeil in the north however reinstated the autonomy of Mount Lebanon and restored its independence from the pashas of the city. Crucially, the Chehabis established themselves as hereditary middlemen interceding between the Sublime Porte and the muqāta‘jis (Traboulsi, 2007:9-10).
3.1.1 The Egyptian Invasion: Initiating Lebanese ‘Modernity’
The muqāta‘ji system continued to underpin socio-political order in late-medieval Mount Lebanon until the Egyptian invasion of 1831. Driven by the needs of a rapidly-industrialising Egypt, Mehmet Ali commissioned his son, Ibrahim Pasha, on a military campaign in Greater Syria. For Egypt’s pasha, the goals of the campaign were twofold: it secured Mehmet Ali’s position vis-à-vis the Sublime Porte and, crucially, provided Egypt’s nascent industrial sector with cheap raw materials and consumer markets (Lawson, 1999).
The Egyptian invasion coincided with and produced several socio-political transformations in Lebanon. Firstly, several prominent families were emerging as key actors within the Chehabi Emirate following the redistribution of iltizām. Secondly, chieftains emerged from within the Christian community which, hitherto, had lacked significant political representation. Thirdly, the administrative and tax reforms introduced by emir Bashir Chehab II (1788-1840) with the aim of centralising government deprived established Druze feudalists and, thus, empowered emerging Christian chieftains. Finally, the increasing weakness of Ottoman authority in Mount
12 Jabal Amil (‘Āmil) is the traditional name of the mountainous regions extending between Mount Lebanon
Lebanon paved the way for the Maronite Church which emerged as a key political actor in the early-nineteenth century. This was exacerbated in the aftermath of the ‘ammiya (commoners’) rebellion in 1820 which the Church had supported (Harik, 1968:212; Sharara, 1975).
Driven by a similar aspiration to centralise authority and break away from the Sublime Porte,
emir Bashir and Ibrahim Pasha joined forces to subdue Acre, Tyre, Saida, Beirut, Tripoli and
Damascus and introduce ambitious reforms aimed at strengthening the administration, fighting corruption, setting up representative conciliar governments and abolishing the confessional- feudal (muqāta‘ji) system. Moreover, Ibrahim Pasha encouraged commercial-capitalism and limited industrialisation (especially in sericulture), thus, boosting trade with Egypt (Makdisi, 2000:52; Traboulsi, 2007:12; Hallaq, 2009).
The Egyptian interregnum is also credited for its modernising urban reforms. In Saida, for instance, the Egyptian administration introduced large-scale infrastructural developments aimed at bolstering trade with Alexandria. Ibrahim Pasha also invested in Beirut, a nascent port city which, by the 1830s, had become merchants’ port of choice given its proximity to the Chehabi capital in Beitedinne and to the sericulture industry in Mount Lebanon. The Egyptian government under Mahmud Nami bey transformed Beirut from a “labyrinth of narrow streets and overhanging mansions with excessive filth [...] packed inside Crusader walls” to a cosmopolitan, commercial port-city akin to Alexandria. Significantly, a city council was established allowing affluent Sunni and Greek-Orthodox families to partake in the administration of early-modern Beirut (Mansel, 2010:91-93).
Nonetheless, excessive tax levies, forced labour in state monopolies and military conscription antagonised the population and resulted in widespread revolts against the predatory state in Jabal Amil, Tripoli, Acre and the Syrian hinterland. Former feudatories, popular rebel leaders and the clergy united in opposition to Ibrahim Pasha’s monolithic state. It must be noted here that a number of Christian muqāta‘jis gained the support of the Maronite Church and its Patriarch who perceived the centralisation of sovereignty a threat to the Church’s growing role in the public sphere (anon., 1927; Sharara, 1975; Makdisi, 2000:53-54).
This coalition gained the support of European powers whose merchants’ business interests in Greater Syria were expanding. Egyptian influence in the dominions of the ageing Ottoman Empire, therefore, posed a direct threat to British and French economic interests (anon., 1927, vol.2:7-8; Farah, 2000:35). British intervention in 1840, however, was instrumental defeating Ibrahim Pasha in Greater Syria and limiting Mehmet Ali’s suzerainty to Egypt and Sudan.
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3.1.2 Feudalism and Sectarianism in Late Modernising Lebanon
Although Ottoman authority over Greater Syria was reinstated in 1840, it was significantly diminished. The Egyptian interregnum, thus, caused significant socioeconomic and sectarian changes affecting the composition of the modern elite. The demise of the predominantly-Druze
muqāta‘jis in light of emir Bashir’s centralising reforms paved the way for new notable houses
enjoying popular and foreign support (anon., 1927; Farah, 2000).
It must be noted that, despite the ‘modernising’ interventions of Ibrahim Pasha, ‘the family’ continued to act as the essential unit of political and economic participation. Endogamous practices, Chevallier notes, underpinned the emergence of the patronymic bayt or jubb. It was through these essential units that feudalist prerogatives were preserved, relations with the emir conducted and political representation confined. By the mid-nineteenth century, this had given rise to a number of ‘notable families’ or ‘political houses’ which would dominate the political economy of early-modern Lebanon (Chevallier, 1971:66-89). The interdependence between the emerging elite and the religious establishment translated the rise of such prominent families as the Khazins (Christian) and Jumblats (Druze) into a system of sectarian-feudalism whereby neo-muqāta‘jis were not only fief-holders but also sectarian leaders (Traboulsi, 2007:10). Moreover, Ibrahim Pasha’s economic interventions changed the political economy in Mount Lebanon and altered the sectarian balance of power. The rapid development of sericulture in Mount Lebanon, for instance, allowed Christian peasants and farmers to overcome the aridity of their land and break loose of their Druze overlords (anon., 1927).
Another repercussion of the 1840 defeat was the incorporation of the Lebanese economy into global capitalism. Capitalising on their victory, European powers forced the Sublime Porte to expand the 1838 Anglo-Ottoman treaty of goodwill13 to include Egypt and Greater Syria. According to the treaty the Ottoman Empire committed to abolishing state monopolies and expanded the Capitulations whereby European nationals gained preferential access to Arabo- Ottoman markets and enjoyed impunity (Farah, 2000:33).
In other words, the military defeat of 1840 was translated into an economic defeat depriving Egypt’s nascent industrial sector of the protection and intervention of a developmental state. Instead, the industrial-capitalist economies of Europe flooded Arab markets with manufactured goods slowing down Egypt’s industrialisation and subduing its agricultural sector to European industrialists’ demand for raw materials.
13 The treaty was drafted by British diplomat in Istanbul, David Urquhar, and constituted an Anglo-Ottoman
In Mount Lebanon, this contributed to the rapid rise of predominantly-Maronite peasant and artisan communities whose skills were more in line with European commercial/financial interests to the detriment of mountaineering-militaristic Druze feudalists and pre-capitalist commerce and industry in predominantly-Sunni coastal cities (Traboulsi, 2007:15-16). The integration of Maronite notables in Lebanon’s emerging outward-oriented/dependent-capitalist economy entrenched institutional sectarianism amongst the Maronite confession in the mid- nineteenth century. It is in this vein that the Maronite Patriarchate emerged as a political actor in an unprecedented fashion championing the cause of ‘Maronite nationalism’: a political movement aimed at preserving the autonomy of Mount Lebanon and placing the Maronite confession at its ‘centre’ (Harik, 1968:254).
The collapse of the Chehabi Emirate in 1842 epitomised the break with the pre-modern
muqāta‘ji system and the birth of a hybrid political order incorporating aspects of the
‘traditional’ system which had never been fully deconstructed and the ‘modern’ system which had never been fully internalised. The double qā’im-maqāmiyyat system (1843-1861) divided Mount Lebanon into two administrative regions, marked the demise of the predominantly- Druze feudal elite and the rise of neo-feudal sectarian chieftains supported by the religious establishment, claiming leadership over confessional constituencies and retaining titles.
In light of these transformations in mid-nineteenth century Lebanon, the political superstructure adopted elements of institutional sectarianism. The two qā’im-maqāmiyyat marked the emergence of a mixed Christian-Druze district in the south and a predominantly- Christian district in the north. Each qā’im-maqām (governor) delegated fiscal and judicial authorities to two wakils (deputies) – one Christian and one Druze. Each wakil exercised his authorities over co-religionists only (Traboulsi, 2007:24).
It is evident, therefore, that the post-1840 socio-political order in Lebanon was taking on a sectarian form. Before discussing the constellations of political sectarianism in modern Lebanon however, it must be noted that Ibrahim Pasha’s defeat and the replacement of the
muqāta‘ji system with the qā’im-maqāmiyyat symbolised the irredeemable failure of
centralisation in Mount Lebanon. Essentially, the Egyptian interregnum failed to centralise authority, de-parcellise sovereignty or internalise the institutional constellations of modernity in the Lebanese body politic. Instead, the political system fragmented the polity – not only amongst neo-feudal families but also amongst confessions. The parcellisation of sovereignty in early-modern Lebanon distinguished the Lebanese transition to modernity from other Arab modernities despite perennial commonalities and their shared heritage and intellectual acumen as manifest in the Nahda. The following section, thus, will outline the key features which distinguish Lebanese modernity from other Arab modernities.
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