Chinese national space policy documents indicate that it is open for international cooperation in various space explorations activities. There are however domestic factors that impede China’s ability to expand these partnerships. Two of these factors are the role of the PLA in China’s space activities and a policy encouraging CMI of technologies. The role of the PLA has consequences in communications and ideology; CMI has consequences for dual-use technologies and unwanted technology transfer.
The blurring between military and civilian space activities in China has created a lack of transparency. From what is known about the organizational structure the PLA has amassed significant clout over many of the main administrative and industrial actors in China’s space sector.112 The interpretation of China’s space ambitions has been to assume a significant military dimension to China’s civilian space activities.
It is important to consider that distorted information regarding Chinese ambitions in space stemming from ineffective communication are not necessarily deliberate i.e. misunderstandings do not originate from a lack of transparency. Much
miscommunication has occurred due to the difficulty for Western analysts to monitor and understand space-related organizational changes in China and to find reliable and well- translated Chinese sources.113 The consequence of this misunderstanding has led to confrontational interpretations that emphasize and exaggerate Chinese civilian space activities as only being part of a grand military space strategy,114 although this view has provoked criticism.115
The role of the PLA has also fuelled ideological differences that act as a major barrier to cooperation in the Sino-US case. Sino-US bilateral cooperation in space is effectively stalled as a consequence of section 1340(a) of NASA’s budget that prohibits NASA to spend funds “to enter into a contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or
112Defense Group Inc., pg.10-11. 113 Johnson-Freese (2009): 56. 114 For example see Tellis (2007) 115 For example see Zhang (2013)
coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company”.116 The
law was put forth by Congressman Frank Wolf and has clear ideological undertones: “I want to be clear: the United States has no business cooperating with
the People’ Liberation Army to help develop its space program. We also should be wary of any agreements that involve the transfer of technology or sensitive information to Chinese institutions or companies, many of which are controlled by the government and the PLA…there will come a day when the Chinese communist government will fall, repressive, totalitarian regimes always do. And when that day comes, books will be written about who helped sustain this government in their final days. Will U.S. companies feature in that narrative? Will the U.S. government?”117
It should be noted that this legal barrier does not prohibit Sino-US cooperation through multilateral mechanisms, as was clarified by the recent admission of Chinese scientists to a conference for US and international teams working on NASA’s Kepler space telescope program.118
A controversial policy guiding Chinese civilian space activities is the concept of CMI. CMI is an effort to leverage investments made in the civilian sector by finding an application for military potential. This principle was proposed by the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2003 and is known as Yujun Yumin (Locating Military Potential in Civilian Capabilities). As a result Western companies who cooperate with China understand that transfer of capital and technology may be used to exploit dual-use applications.119 The CMI policy is well advertised as major actors within the organizational and industrial infrastructure including the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), CASC, and CASIC all cite CMI as key components of their respective mandates on their organizational websites.
Military application of dual-use technologies has created concern from the international community towards China in part due to the secrecy that shrouds Chinese
116 National Aeronautics Space Administration. “Class deviation implementing NASA restrictions on
funding activity with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).” NASA. 8 February 2012. Web. Accessed April 14th 2013. http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/procurement/regs/pic12-01A.html
117 “Wolf: U.S. Should Not Cooperate With People’s Liberation Army to Help Develop China’s Space
Program”. 2 November 2011. Web. <http://wolf.house.gov/index.cfm?sectionid=34&itemid=1813>
118 Wolf Letter To NASA’s Bolden Correcting Record On Restrictions Involving Chinese Nationals. October
8, 2013. http://wolf.house.gov/press-releases/wolf-letter-to-nasas-bolden-correcting-record-on-restrictions- involving-chinese-nationals/
space activities.120 Dual-use technologies themselves however are not necessarily a
concern; indeed most space actors see dual-use as desirable is it as it avoids duplication and increases to rate of return on investments.121 Due to the fact that space exploration operates on the frontiers of science and technology there is an intrinsic acknowledgement that advances made in pursuit of these projects will likely embody potential for
alternative use. One of the most often cited benefits of space exploration activities are spinoffs applications. Problems arise when the actions of other actors are assumed to be malicious, as Johnson-Freese notes: “the U.S. assumption is that if dual use technology is being developed in China, it is for military purposes. While that assumption clearly overreaches, China is developing space technology for military as well as civilian purposes”.122
As was discussed in the introduction to this paper the challenge of unwanted technology transfer is addressed through export control regimes. An effective export control regime strikes a balance between a due diligence to non-proliferation efforts while reducing trade barriers to encourage growth of the commercial sector. In regards to China’s export control regime two major space powers – the US and the EU – have taken a cautious approach with China, albeit for similar yet different reasons. First it has been argued that the main problems of China’s export control regime are the lack of
transparency of China’s space ambitions and poor technology safeguards.123 Furthermore there has been criticism that China has not been proactive in participating in international non-proliferation regimes nor have they subscribed to an international code of conduct.124
The US posture towards China is informed by the Cox Commission Report in October 1998 that concluded US satellite manufactures violated US export control regulations by providing data and helping Chinese scientists resolve technical issues, despite the findings of this report having been questioned.125 In response the US imposed an ITAR export license ban that prohibits the export or re-export of satellites with US
120 Nardon, Laurence. “Developed Space Programmes” in The Politics of Space: A Survey by Eligar Sadeh.
(2011).
121 IFRI Security Studies Center, pg.8 122 ibid
123 Mineiro, Michael C. “An inconvenient regulatory truth: Divergence in US and EU satellite export
control policies on China.” Space Policy 27 (2011): 213-221.
124 Zhao and Bian (2011) 125 Mineiro (2011) pg.215
technology to China.126 From the perspective of the EU the main challenges to
collaboration with China are a lack of intellectual property rights protection and the potential of an undesired application of dual-use technology.127 To resolve these issues a reformed export control system is recommended to allow Europe to benefit from China’s rise while not alienating their relations with the US.
In response to these challenges China has been working towards ameliorating their domestic export control regime. Underlying the concerns noted above is that China does have a sophisticated legal framework supporting a domestic export control regime, however effective and efficient enforcement remain a challenge. 128 A second area needing progress is the level of Chinese participation in major multilateral
nonproliferation export control regimes. It is important to consider however that although China is not a member of many international non-proliferation regimes it has employed similar policies to control arms exports, including space items and missiles. Also the reluctance to adhere to the HCOC is due to the various security-related restraints that would impede China’s growth.129 Nevertheless greater participation with international efforts seems beneficial.
126 The ITAR export license ban however is considered to be a failed containment policy as European
commercial satellite manufacturers developed ITAR-free technologies to access Chinese launching services. In fact the ban has been more of an isolating force against US commercial launch service. See Mineiro (2011)
127 Stumbaum (2009)
128 Zhao and Bian (2011), pg. 111
129 Various scholars have researched China’s non-adherence to the code of conduct and have found three
factors: China disagrees with the restraint on the creation of ballistic missiles; moves towards transparency should be voluntary; and a disagreement of the advance notice for a ballistic-missile launch. For more information see Zhao and Bian (2011).