2 4
F i r t h (1964:208-9) suggests t h a t a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s g e n e r a l l y i n f e r the meaning of a c t i o n by observati on of
i t s antecedent and consequent. They ! t r e a t values as
s i g n i f i c a n t because of the systematic s o c i a l operations
which express them. There may be no way of a s c r i b i n g
meaning beyond the closed system, but w i t h i n i t behaviour can be "explained" in so f a r as i t can be given a c o n t e x t . * Whether or not there are a l t e r n a t i v e methods, t h i s
a s c r i p t i o n of meaning and the inference of motive from the context of a c t i o n is surely common p r a c t i c e in
p o l i t i c a l anthropology. For the most p a r t i t is i n s p i r e d
by the judgement t h a t , l i k e the ’group t h e o r i s t s * of
p o l i t i c a l science, we need only observe and describe what people do and can i n f e r t h e i r r e a l motivations from the means t h a t they employ; i t i s not our primary aim to
e s t a b l i s h t h e i r reasons f o r act i o n or t h e i r s t a t e d goals; t h e i r own f eel i n g s about t h e i r a c t i o n s need to be t r e a t e d with caution f o r t h e i r r e a l i n t e r e s t i s a simple f a c t observable in t h e i r behaviour.
As Winch has shown, * there is a powerful stream of
thought which maintains t h a t the ideas of p a r t i c i p a n t s must be discounted as more l i k e l y than not to be misguided
and misleading* (1958:95). Of course a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s f o r
decades have exercised methodological caut ion in r e l a t i n g i d e a l norms to a c t u a l behaviour but i n r ecent years the question of discrepancies between informants* views and s o c i a l r e a l i t y has, in some t h e o r i e s , ceased to be simply a matter f o r empirical i n v e s t i g a t i o n and has become a
c a r d i n a l pos t ul a t e on which res e a r c h s t r a t e g i e s are based. Nowhere i s t h i s form of behaviouralism more apparent than
in the p o l i t i c a l s tudies I have mentioned, where the actor*s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of his own behaviour i s r e g u l a r l y
r uled out of court. Thus Van Velsen ( l 96 7 : l 47 ) in-
app rai si ng s i t u a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s : *For the s o c i o l o g i s t
i n t e r e s t e d in s o c i a l processes there are no r i g h t or wrong views; there are only d i f f e r i n g views r e pr e s e n t i n g d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t groups, s t a t u s , p e r s o n a l i t y and so f o r t h . *
The p a r t i c i p a n t s 1 views on events are nothing but value
judgements whi c h V a n V e l s e n contrasts w i t h the 1 sociological evaluation* b y the expert o u t s i d e r who puts them in their existential perspective ( ibid:13^). Barnes (1958) drew a t t e n t i o n to T u r n e r 1s e x e m p l a r y ’emphasis on actors rather