been convened from time to time to discuss practical problems relating to Antarctic
125. The Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty system is edited by Dr John Heap o f the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, a long-time Antarctic diplomat (and scientist before that) of high standing.
126. In 1977 Poland indicated that it believed it had fulfilled the criterion required for consultative party status. In the absence of any rules in the Treaty on how to address this situation, the original signatories decided that it should not be automatic, but rather ‘awarded’ by the existing consultative parties. Their decision on this matter was, however, intended to take effect immediately rather than requiring the subsequent agreement o f all governments in accordance with article IX of the Treaty. As Bush observes (1982:337) this is representative of a more flexible decision-making approach.
activities.127 However, only experts from consultative parties may attend, unless unanimous agreement is reached to invite other experts who have no voting rights.128 Few steps were taken to establish cooperative working relationships with UN agencies or other international organisations.129 Where such relationships have proved necessary, the consultative parties have made it clear that they will not accede to the authority of any other organisation on Antarctic issues.
Matters which were inherently conflictive, or upon which consensus could not be reached because of their implications for the political and legal compromise of the Treaty, were quickly removed from the consultative agenda.130
There was continued resistance to any formal institutionalisation of the regime. The British observed at ATCM-I that they "had little doubt that when we come to consider our agenda we shall find it advisable to recommend to our governments that they establish some form of permanent administrative machinery however modest in scope, to facilitate inter-governmental cooperation in the intervals between Meetings of this group". This was not to be the case.131 Administrative responsibility was devolved onto the host government of each consultative meeting. Communication between meetings was to be conducted through bilateral diplomatic channels (recommendation I- XIV).132 The matter was discussed at the second consultative meeting and inscribed on, but subsequently dropped from the agenda of the third consultative meeting.133 It was not formally raised again until the 1980s and has still not been settled.
127. For example, on telecommunications.
128. The reports of such meetings are submitted to consultative meetings for final consideration. At the third consultative meeting, the New Zealand delegation (Doc/P13, 1964) argued that technical meetings convened by the consultative parties did not have the same status as consultative meetings.
129. The World Meteorological Organisation has been an exception to this (see Bush 1982:55-56; 122).
130. The Treaty has not totally depoliticised the Antarctic. In 1973 the President of Argentina took his entire cabinet to the Vicecommodoro Marambio station, declaring it to be the temporary capital of Argentina (Mitchell 1981:70). A baby was bom to an Argentine woman in Antarctica in January 1978, and marriage ceremonies have been conducted there. In January 1977 President Pinochet of Chile went to the Antarctic, taking with him a large chest of soil collected from various parts of Chile, as a symbol of Chilean unity. The Argentine press expressed surprise at his provocative behaviour in Argentinian territory: in Pinochet’s opinion he had never left Chile (Neilson 1977).
131. Their suggestion that the Australian government be entrusted, at least for the time being, with essential administrative services was not adopted. Australia had apparently been keen to have a secretariat established in Canberra and this was a bone of some contention at early consultative meetings.
132. The consultative parties have adopted a numbering system for recommendations which identifies the meeting at which it was adopted (the first part) and sequential numbering of recommendations for that particular meeting. For example, I-XIV is the fourteenth recommendation adopted at the first consultative meeting.
133. A seemingly less contentious New Zealand suggestion (P.13, 1962) that intersessional meetings be held at least quarterly at the Washington mission of the host government of the forthcoming consultative meeting, (later revised to refer only to the diplomatic mission of the host
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The question o f jurisdiction was one such issue even though it was specifically set down in the Treaty as one o f the issues on which parties could consult. The British raised it at the second consultative meeting.134 Although the item was listed in the draft agenda (Doc.1, 1962)135 it was not on the agenda included in the Final Report and there is no reference in the final report to it having been discussed.
The informal component: norms and standards of behaviour
Cooperation under the Antarctic Treaty has succeeded because the Treaty parties have continued to put their differences on the sovereignty question to one side. It points to the importance o f article IV (which allowed all Treaty states to maintain their position on the exercise o f sovereignty in the Antarctic) in the development o f the Treaty regime. As Young observes (1989a: 182) it serves to "clear away an otherwise intractable complex o f conflicting ... claims so that opportunities for cooperative ventures can be addressed in a spirit o f integrative bargaining and joint problem- solving".
Kimball (1988c: 15) notes that "every time [the consultative parties] seek agreement on a new measure, they must once again find a balance that preserves the positions of ... countries claiming territory in Antarctica and those that do not recognise any claims". Thus decision-making is often slow. However this imperative for compromise has been a major factor in the Antarctic Treaty system, sometimes to the detriment o f effective management.136
Negotiation and compromise are strengthened by the consensus process which is valued by the Treaty parties as essential to maintaining the regime. Thus consensus, once
government in the capital of any one of the Contracting powers) was unacceptable. So was a South African proposal (P.17, 1962) for the establishment of a working group, to carry out a variety of roles, in a capital where all Treaty parties were represented. Oddly, this document concludes that "the above measures are designed to eliminate the possibility of even the embryo of a permanent secretariat..." whereas it seems that it would do precisely that.
134. In an explanatory memorandum (Memo.Expl.6, 1962) the UK observed that while this was a very complex subject, for which reason the UK had refrained from raising the substance of the issue at Canberra, that is, at the first consultative meeting, it was an issue that ought to be addressed, before the problem arose in an acute form. They suggested that a Committee of Experts be convened to examine the position relating to jurisdiction in Antarctica and to formulate appropriate recommendations for further consideration (P .1 0 ,1962).
135. Documents from Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings are listed in a separate section of the bibliography.
136. Wyndham (1980:187) gives the example of the 1968 Conference on Antarctic Telecommunications convened by the Treaty parties which was unsuccessful in agreeing on a workable scheme for the transmission of Antarctic meteorological data to the World Weather Watch because some claimants were unwilling to allow another state - a rival claimant or a non claimant - to be the only designated source of data for their territory. Five sources were listed when two would have sufficed.