Clasificación: cofinanciado versus autofinanciado

Muslim enmity toward the United States is a long-standing phenomenon (Abdallah, 2003:

62). However, negative sentiment deepened following the military intervention and subsequent occupations of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), as demonstrated in periodic polling (Jackson and Towle, 2006: 17; Pew Research Center, 2013; 2007: 14-15; University of Michigan and Eastern Michigan University, 2006). Between 2003 and 2009, a majority of respondents throughout the Middle East expressed negative opinions of the United States (Telhami, 2009: 2; Zogby and Zogby, 2009: 2). Following the election of Barack Obama, the U.S. enjoyed marginal improvement in public opinion throughout the world, including the Middle East, although a majority of Arab/Muslim respondents in the latter region continued to hold an “unfavorable” opinion (77%) of the United States (Telhami, 2009: 2-9). This minor alteration in sentiment correlates with an expected change in Obama’s foreign policy style, as 51% of respondents in the MENA expected policy changes (Telhami, 2009: 2-9). Hence, there was an initial lull in popular sentiment, yet the MENA region continued to hold a predominantly negative opinion of the United States.

53 The use of the phrase North Africa in this text denotes the geographic region of northern Africa that borders the Mediterranean Sea. This region includes the recognized countries of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and Western Sahara. Because Egypt straddles the North Africa-Middle Eastern divide, it is included in both categories

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The adjustment in popular opinion following the election of Barack Obama was, nonetheless, temporary. BBC News (in collaboration with GlobeScan and Program on International Policy Attitudes [PIPA]), for instance, found no observable increase in regional opinion of the United States (BBC News and others, 2010). Contrary, they found a majority of respondents from Turkey (70%) and Egypt (52%) continued to express negative sentiment toward the U.S. (BBC News and others, 2010)⁵⁴. Follow-up surveys similarly demonstrate marginal fluctuation in general opinion of the United States throughout the region (Telhami, 2011: 24-27). For instance a 2011 study shows a continuation in the predominant trend of enmity toward the United States (Telhami, 2011: 3).

With a clear majority of inhabitants in predominantly Arab/Muslim countries throughout the MENA holding negative views of the United States for a prolonged period of time, we wish to examine the source of animosity. Root causes are generally divided into two categories: U.S. policy and cultural differences. On the one hand, some researchers suggest U.S. regional policy influences popular perceptions. In terms of policy objectives, surveys conducted between 2006 and 2008 found a majority of MENA respondents believe the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq sought: to control Iraq’s oil supply (Abdallah, 2003: 63; DeYoung, 2007; Telhami, 2009: 17; University of Michigan and Eastern Michigan University, 2006); to establish a permanent military presence in Iraq (Abdallah, 2003: 69-70; Kull, 2007: 7), and/or;

to acquire complete control of Iraq (Abdallah, 2003: 62; Tripp, 2007: 282). Popular suspicions were reinforced by U.S. policies during the occupation, such as the introduction of the CPA (chapter 1, section 3) and the protection of Iraq’s oil production facilities, rather than ensuring civil order (chapter 1, section 2). The sentiment qualified also mirrors that expressed by Iraqis outlined in chapter 2, section 1.7.

Later surveys conducted between 2009 and 2011 illustrate that regional respondents believed that U.S. interests in the Middle East were driven by the desire to control oil and protect Israel (Telhami, 2011: 31)⁵⁵. These perceived strategic objectives are problematic for U.S.-Middle East relations because they contradict Arab/Muslim economic, social, political, and religious needs and aspirations (Abdallah, 2003: 62). U.S. regional policy also lends credence to suspicion. For instance, the U.S. occupied Iraq, it maintains tight relations with oil producing countries, including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and it provides weapons and aid to Israel. For these reasons, it is logical that Arab/Muslims conclude corresponding interests

54 Exhaustive results of the survey are available at BBC News and others (2010).

55 Comparatively, Telhami (2009: 17) found respondents believed the protection of Israel (52%); controlling the regional supply of oil (43%); weakening the Muslim world (38%); and preserving U.S. regional and global dominance (24%) were priorities of the United States.

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drive U.S. policy; objectives that place the United States at odds with Arab/Muslim interests who generally desire for a complete withdrawal of U.S. influence from the region.

Centering our attention on perceptions of U.S.-Iraq relations, most Muslims believe the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was unjustified and detrimental to Iraq and its inhabitants (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 61). Negative perceptions were exacerbated by U.S. implementation of controversial policies such as de-Ba‘athification and the utilization of indiscriminate violence that claimed civilian lives and trampled (individual and collective) honor (Fontan, 2006: 220-227). Combined, U.S. policy contradicted the Bush administration’s stated objectives of providing humanitarian assistance, or promoting democracy and human rights in Iraq in the eyes of Arab/Muslims (Abdallah, 2003: 62; Kepel, 2004: 238). Contrary, the U.S. created a humanitarian crisis, institutionalized sectarianism, and violated basic human rights (incarceration and internment) during the occupation. Its policies, therefore, did not correspond to the stated intentions of the administration and increased regional suspicion.

The impact of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq on regional sentiment was profound. As observed during our analysis of public opinion in Iraq, the degree of macro level negative sentiment expressed toward the U.S. occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan led Arab/Muslims throughout the region to condone the use of violence against U.S. military forces to hasten their withdrawal (Kull, 2007: 7; Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2006: 2). Steve Kull (2007) qualifies Arab/Muslim endorsement of attacks against the U.S.-led coalition as follows:

On average … approximately half favored such attacks, with three in ten opposed, but there were substantial variations between countries.

Very large majorities in Egypt said they supported such attacks, as did robust majorities in Morocco. Pakistanis tended to be divided and Indonesians were mostly opposed (Kull, 2007: 7).

The condoning of violence throughout the MENA, as articulated in the quote, is dangerous and concerning since approximately half of the region advocated violence against U.S. targets.

These figures demonstrate the degree to which Arab/Muslims in the region were opposed to U.S. intervention and the magnitude of dissatisfaction and suspicion they felt.

Therefore, Telhami (2004) deduces that U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East is an influential referencing point when Arab/Muslim respondents formulate their opinions of the United States. Instructively, polling demonstrates that seventy-eight percent of Middle East respondents claim that their opinion of the United States is contingent on U.S. foreign policy rather than on what are (often ambiguously) described as “American values” (for instance, freedom of speech or the press) (Telhami, 2004: 38). Providing additional insight, polling

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conducted between 2009 and 2011 determines which U.S. policies respondents claimed would alter their perception of the United States. One study found that Arab/Muslims in the Middle East desire: 1) a withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq (25%) and, 2) a U.S. military withdrawal from the Arabian Peninsula (25%) (Telhami, 2009: 16). The third most popular policy change that respondents stated the U.S. could take to improve their opinion was to broker an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement (41%) (Telhami, 2009: 16). Others surveys likewise found that regional respondents’ favor reduced United States military presence in predominantly Muslim countries (BBC News, 2010d; Finel and Gell, 2007: 15-18; Funk and Said, 2004: 12; Telhami, 2011: 28). Combined, polling suggests that U.S. action influences regional opinion (Telhami, 2004: 38; 2011: 28; Zogby and Zogby, 2009: 6), which implies that the U.S could pursue policies that would reverse the degree of regional enmity expressed toward the United States.

On the other hand, there is a cultural element that must likewise be considered when contextualizing Arab/Muslim perceptions of the United States. Research, for instance, shows that most MENA inhabitants believed that U.S. policy in the Middle East was designed to

“weaken and divide the Islamic world” (79%) and to “spread Christianity” (64%) (Kull, 2007:

5). Therefore, Arab/Muslims perceive U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq as threatening to Islam and Muslims, or their identity (Abdallah, 2003: 67; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 134).

Such perceptions are disconcerting since they suggest the United States is an existential threat to MENA identity. Consequently, the sentiment is problematic for bilateral relations as identity impacts on perceptions and behavior, and has the potential to induce conflict continuation or escalation (Bloomfield and others, 2003: 13; Funk and Said, 2004: 6; Galtung, 2004: 141; Lederach, 1995: 18).

Reference to identity introduces complex evaluative parameters that include both positive and negative aspects in this particular instance. Abdallah (2003: 63) and Funk and Said (2004:

11), for example, acknowledge the complexity of perspectives in the MENA, as inhabitants view both positive and negative aspects of Western society and culture. Summarizing a dichotomy of “envy and fear, admiration and suspicion,” Funk and Said (2004: 11) state that

“Western technological, economic and political achievements are appealing, while the assertion of Western military, political, and economic power creates feelings of distrust and resentment.” The quotes emphasize that Arab/Muslims observe both admirable and distasteful qualities in the West (Abdallah, 2003: 63). One potential value of appreciating the complexity of Arab/Muslim perceptions of the West is that it demonstrates there are avenues for pursuing cross-cultural discourse, cooperation and practices for fostering improved relations (Funk and

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Said, 2004: 15-18). Pursuit of improved relations requires dialogue, defined here as a symmetrical discussion on issues which aids in the enhancement of mutual awareness and understanding, problem solving and increased trust (Head, 2012: 41), to determine which U.S.

actions would change attitudes and under which conditions and circumstances the region prefers to interact with the United States.

The potential for productive dialogue naturally necessitates stakeholders view the “other”

as a trustworthy partner. Unfortunately, as expressed above, regional experience and U.S.

duplicitous behavior has compromised bilateral trust (Funk and Said, 2004: 12). For example, there are obvious contradictions between U.S. policy and its stated policy objectives and values as evident in Iraq. Most notably, the George W. Bush administration’s rhetorical promotion of democracy and human rights (which Arab/Muslim populations admire) was contradicted through practices such as the use of torture and illegal detention (Abdallah, 2003:

66; Amnesty International, 2008; 2013: 12-13; Kepel, 2004: 237). Similarly, Abdallah (2003:

68-70) includes U.S. support for undemocratic and oppressive governments throughout the Middle East, which equally contradicts political assertions by U.S. leaders that they desire to proliferate democratic governance or human rights internationally. In this latter instance, U.S.

support for unpopular and undemocratic leaders in the Middle East, and mismanaged or misinformed policies, gives the impression of duplicity. Such sentiment, in turn, undermines Arab/Muslim popular trust because behavior does not correspond with rhetoric (Abdallah, 2003: 68-70; Calhoun, 2005: 104; Marsella, 2005: 665), giving credence to the perception that the United States is untrustworthy and not a respectable counterpart for conducting dialogue.

Exacerbating popular mistrust, the predominance of popular suspicion is often monopolized on by political or religious leaders and the media in the MENA, who aggravate or manipulate preexisting stereotypes of the U.S. to their advantage (Abdallah, 2003: 69; Funk and Said, 2004: 6; Gage and others, 2003: 3-4). For instance, Funk and Said (2004: 6) suggest: “Middle Eastern programming […] often provides grist for the mill of defeatist, conspiratorial theories of American foreign policy making.” Such propaganda, as outlined in the quote, is utilized to refocus attention away from Arab/Muslim leaders and onto the West (Funk and Said, 2004: 6-7). When MENA leaders and respected figures transfer responsibility for prevalent political-social conditions in the region to Western countries, focus and accountability is reallocated away from local representatives (Funk and Said, 2004: 6-7).

While not always accurate, such excuses are widely accepted by local populations, as they are consistent with preexisting stereotypes of the West and/or the United States (Funk and Said, 2004: 6-7).

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In summary, there is a high degree of distrust and suspicion in the MENA of the United States. These qualities undermine bilateral relations and appeals for dialogue, scuttling hopes of establishing trust and pursuing mutual understanding. It was, however, noted that MENA inhabitants recognize both admirable and deplorable qualities when contemplating the United States government and society. The existence of admirable qualities may provide avenues for pursuing improved relations across cultures, should they be examined and monopolized upon.