Clasificación de uso y cobertura del suelo

The WTO’s main goal is the removal of discriminatory practices in international trade relations. The main rules are set out in GATT 1994, but there are similar rules in GATS and TRIPS. Contracting parties agree to apply two non-discrimination rules:

The most favoured nation (MFN) principle – no discrimination between foreign countries (subject to exceptions in GATT 1994 article XXIV and GATT 1994 part IV);

The national principle – no discrimination between foreign and domestic products (subject to exceptions relating to purchase of goods by governments and to subsidies paid by governments to domestic producers).

5.4.1. Interpretation of WTO most favoured nation rules

There might be a MFN violation if, indirectly, intra-EU imports and exports will be favoured over imports into the EU and exports from the EU. It is an empirical question whether this is really likely to happen. It does not appear likely that there would be a MFN violation.

If a specific tax scheme for the SE were to breach the MFN, it might be argued that the objective of fiscal support for the SE is greater economic integration. There is an exception to the MFN for economic integration, covered by article XXIV(4). The exception for economic integration covers a customs unions falling within XXIV(4(8)), and is generally understood to include the EU Customs Union but does not except preferential treatment. There is nothing in article XXIV to support the conclusion that economic integration arrangements are permitted when they impose trade barriers on other members.

If a specific tax scheme for the SE were found to breach the MFN, WTO case law suggests that the breach would not be justified by other balancing factors. The European Communities might argue that an EU operator would have the option of forming an SE, which would bring with it duties to make arrangements for the involvement of employees in management of the SE under Council Directive 2001/86/EC. In a US case concerning restrictions on the import of non-rubber footwear from Brazil (1992), the MFN forbad the balancing of more favourable treatment under certain procedures against less favourable treatment under other procedures.

In an Indonesian case concerning car production (1998), a preferential tax regime for imports including exemption from duty and luxury car tax was available where the car producer had contracted to produce a car in Indonesia. The panel held that the MFN required that such advantages could not be conditional upon such a contract.

This implies that article I(1) of the WTO Agreement will only apply to a specific tax scheme for the SE if it can be argued that it brings a selective advantage, favour, privilege or immunity to particular Community products.

5.4.2. National treatment on internal taxation and regulation for products

When considering the treatment of an imported and domestic product (the first sentence of III(1)), it is appropriate to ask:

Are the imported and domestic products alike?

Are internal taxes applied in excess of those applied to domestic products?

If competition was involved between, on the one hand, a product benefiting directly or indirectly from a preferential specific tax scheme for the SE and, on the other hand, a directly competitive or substitutable product which was not similarly taxed, then to identify an infringement of III(1) (the second sentence of III(2)), it is appropriate to ask:

Are the products directly comparable and substitutable?

If the products are not like products, are the products not similarly taxed?

If the products are not like products, is the measure applied so as to afford protection?

This implies that article III(2) will only apply to the introduction of a specific tax regime for the SE if it can be argued that the effect and intention of the scheme is to afford protection to Community products.

It is unlikely that article III(2) would be applied to a direct tax regime for the SE, as it speaks of taxes to which products are subject or that are applied to products.

A national treatment violation seems unlikely. As with the Most Favoured Nation principle, it is not possible to assess without empirical evidence whether SEs will sell more EU goods rather than imports with a significantly stronger predominance. There is no particular reason to conclude that this would be the case.

So article III(2) is unlikely to apply, and even if it did (or alternatively under article III(4), if applicable), there is no indication that there could be a violation.

5.4.3. National treatment tax carve-out for services

Although GATS contains a commitment to national treatment for services (article XVII), it also contains a broad carve-out for tax measures (article XIV).

There are few cases indicating how the tax carve-out in GATS might be interpreted by a WTO panel.

Drawing on panel reports on a similar provision in GATT, the purpose of the requirement in the carve out that measures are not applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable way is to prevent abuse of the carve- out (Gasoline case, US, 1998).

For the carve-out to be ineffective, the specific tax regime proposed for the SE would need to undermine the WTO agreement in such a way that threatened the security and the predictability of the WTO trading system (Shrimp-Turtle case, US, 1998). This seems very unlikely.