The idea of self-control usually invokes thoughts of someone consciously resisting temptation, which is actually correct, but this is only one type of self-regulation10. More broadly self-regulation
encompasses non-conscious behaviors and automatic processes, both psychological and physiological (e.g. the regulation of body temperature, heart-rate, and breathing). Human life is replete with self-regulatory situations, some more easily recognized than others. As intimated above, self-regulation involves one’s ability to assert themselves in overriding habitual or automatic behaviors; dispensing of opportunities for instant gratification when long-term goals are at stake; following social norms rather than pleasing one’s self. In other words, we can frequently get by on auto-pilot by just being ourselves with no need to regulate our behavior (acting naturally), but we are often confronted with situations that require the recognition of our natural tendencies and a course- correction (James 1890). Thus, successful self-regulation requires the presence of some standard, the recognition of that standard, and the adjustment of one’s behavior toward conformity with that standard (Carver and Scheier 1981, 1982, and 1998).
Self-regulatory failure (or the failure to control/regulate one’s behavior) is of great interest to this study. On the clinical side of psychology failures of self-regulation often result in self- destructive behaviors. This is evidenced by a large, and growing, body of literature interested in the efficacy of substance abuse rehabilitation and health psychology. Not every dieter is able to stick to their program (Bagozzi, Moore, and Leone 2011; Herman and Polivy 2011), many recovering addicts of alcohol and other drugs (especially of tobacco products) relapse (Polivy 1976; Baumeister, Heartherton, and Tice 1994; Baumeister and Heatherton 1996; Muraven and Baumeister 2000), and
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not everyone finds it easy to commit to an exercise regime. Social and cognitive psychologists further emphasize that:
“effective self-regulation is also necessary to restrain selfish wishes that could threaten group interests, to curb aggressive impulses that can undermine prosocial goals, and to overcome natural proclivities that are inherently self-interested for a greater collective good” (Bauer and Baumeister 2011, pp 65).
This passage enumerates several areas of interest for political scientists: group interests, prosociality, and collective goods. But the perspective offered by self-regulation theory has not yet been applied to political science. We know that people often fail to contribute their fair share to the provision of a public good (Dawes et al 1986; Ostrom 1998), but, in theory, at least some of the time these self- serving individuals are simply failing to effectively self-regulate. And in many political contexts, effective self-regulation is necessary in order to overcome collective action problems: in democratic society, citizens are often asked to make self-sacrifices of some kind for the collective good. Some of these behaviors, like paying taxes, are compulsory, other behaviors are more elective (e.g. engaging in conservation, volunteering in civic associations, voting), but effective self-regulation should be important for both.
Self-regulation theorists have studied several components of self-regulatory behavior: norms and self-monitoring behaviors are two major areas of research in this field that have gained some traction in political science research. Collectively the presence and recognition of social norms, the ability to self-monitor behavior, and availability of sufficient stores of cognitive resources constitute the prevailing model of self-regulation11. While norms and self-monitoring are both separately
11 In this unified model of self-regulation, social norms or personal goals provide a standard of behavior for which an individual aspires to attain, however specific or general. Self-monitoring refers to the capacity individuals have to recognize their own behavior and assess if it is consonant with the norm or goal in question, and cognitive resources
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important, this chapter is interested in what is known as the [limited] strength model of self- regulation. The limited strength model of self-regulation posits that, holding norm recognition and self-monitoring behaviors constant (or ignoring their explicit role by randomly assigning participants to different resource conditions), an act of self-regulation relies on the use of psychological, or cognitive, resources. The cognitive resources used to regulate behavior are finite and renewable and research “suggests that some form of energy or strength may be involved in acts of volition” (Baumeister et al 1998). Indeed, research since the late 1990’s has eliminated much of the doubt regarding the presence and consumption of these cognitive resources and research has more recently turned to the ways in which human behavior is influenced by the presence or absence of this source of psychological energy.
A common analogy depicting this concept is the use of a muscle: using a muscle requires the expenditure of stored energy and once that energy is consumed the muscle will fail to function at optimal levels until restored. Self-regulatory behavior has been documented to work in a similar fashion. Exercising self-control leaves fewer resources available for subsequent acts of self-control (Baumeister et al 1994; Muraven et al 1998) and this resource can be restored by rest/refreshment, affirmation, and incentive as well as trained by the formation of habits through repeated encounters with a regulatory situation (Muraven et al 1999; Oaten and Cheng 2006; Gailliot, Plant, Butz, and Baumeister 2007; Baumeister and Tierney 2011). But what happens when the “gas tank” is empty? According to the strength model of self-regulation, when an individual is cognitively fatigued their ability, and their willingness, to self-regulate should be compromised (what Glass, Singer, and Friedman (1969) called a psychic cost). The main prediction derived from the strength model of self-regulation is that those who have experienced a depletion of these cognitive resources will underperform those who have not experienced such depletion in domains of self-regulation
provide the energy necessary to keep one’s behavior in line with a norm or goal in the face of selfish impulses or to adjust one’s behavior if necessary. Each of these concepts is normally studied independently of the others.
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Most people are not oblivious to personal and social standards, but they often fail to “live up” to those standards. Take concerns about climate change and conservation behaviors for example: not everyone is fully aware of their impact on the environment and some refuse to believe climate change is real (Lubell et al 2007; Bolsen et al 2014). But most are aware of climate change and many want to alter their behaviors regarding water or energy consumption and recycling. These individuals are particularly susceptible to self-regulatory failures as they will undergo a period of behavioral modification; a period in which they are trying to change old habits and develop new ones. For these people, failing to turn-off the lights when leaving a room, or forgetting to separate their garbage would constitute examples of self-regulatory failure12. There are many reasons why
this may be, but some of the time self-regulatory failure occurs simply because the individual lacks the cognitive resources necessary to act as they intend. This should be the case in domains of prosociality, as explained further below, and an individual’s propensity to cooperate with others.