Clasificaciones relacionadas con el componente mensaje:

G adam er's philosophical herm eneutics, viz. his attem pt at providing a universal application of the herm eneutic claim to truth has often raised critical objections, mainly on the grounds that it allegedly reinfor. es an ill-conceived epistemological distinction betw een the natural and the social or -hum ane- sciences. Significantly, this objection has been raised b o th 144 145 * from within the herm eneutic camp, and from the current “representatives' of Critical Theory, while it triggered critical responses in the Anglo-Saxon tradition by proponents of Realism.

Specific instances of th is latter current, exemplify an affinity with the positions expressed by Critical Theory’s assessm ent of G adam er’s herm eneutics, since it com bines elem ents of H aberm as’s critique of G adam er with the epistemological principles of Critical Realism. Despite the indisputable m erits'45 of this approach, it can be also criticised on the grounds th a t it 144 Habermas’ (1986: 134) contention that Gadamer gives “the interpretive mode of Verstehen a peculiarly one-sided twist”, by allegedly remaining “bound to the experience of the plulologist who deals with classical texts” (loc.cit), appears at first glance as being in fundamental opposition to Ricoeur’s (1981: 68) view that Gadamer overlooks the importance of the “text and exegesis” in favour of the dimension of “history and historicity". Nevertheless, since Ricoeur understands this alleged precedence of the historical as an act of unacknowledged “fidelity to Dilthey” on Gadamer’s part, it can be argued that both criticisms mentioned above re-inscribe Gadamer’s hermeneutics to either a "methodical ’ or a “methodological” plane, form which it strived to escape. It has to be noted though, that in contradistinction to Habermas who in his Theory of Communicative Action discusses Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics as a specific instance of “understanding meaning” in the social sciences, Ricoeur rightly acknowledges Gadamer’s attempt at universalising (or de-regionalising) the hermeneutic claim but feels that Gadamer’s project somehow remains bound to both the Romantic tradition and to the fallacious distinction between

understanding and explanation as distinct -and ultimately mutually exclusive- modes of knowledge.

145 Hence, while recognising the universal scope of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, an i while dissociating it from merely methodological concerns Outhwaite (1987:67) paradoxically concludes in stressing the similarities between Habermas and Gadamer and seeing an allegedly anti-naturalist attitude as providing the starting point for both philosophical enterprises. It furthermore seems to me that Gadamer’s assertion that the existence of the “thing in itself’ distinguishes the natural from the human sciences, should not be understood as denying the existence of a “historical event in itself’ as Outhwaite (1987: 66) seems to suggest, but should rather be interpreted as postulating a degree of proximity wth the historical that does not apply to the human being's relationship with the realm of “nature”. It follows that if Gadamer can be

from the perspective of B haskar’s comparatively recent revo al of the positivist ideal concerning the possibility of naturalism146.

To no avail has G adam er stressed time and time aga., i147 148 that his version of herm eneutics as it is m ainly articulated in his maj-.vr work Truth and M ethod14*, should be understood neither as an intervention in methodological debates, nor as a revival of the nineteenth century Methodev.-.treit, but rather as a radicalisation of Heidegger’s unveiling of the “hermeneutics o f facticity", a accused of reproducing a dualistic conception of nature and history, this has t > be traced on a different plane than the one indicated by the aforementioned author.

J<’ Although the term has a long history and quite a few meanings attached to it, >n this context it primarily denotes the acceptance of the positivist principle on the unity of method between die natural and the human or social sciences. According to the positivist vision of science mathematical physics should provide the ideal for the development of all branches of science, which in some versions of logical positivism is seen as a unity for the addition, I reason that all empirical statements “can be expressed in a single language, [while] all states of affaiis are of one kind and are known by the same method' (Carnap, 1934: 32). The contemporary, "epistemological” significations of the term, which has been introduced in epistemology by Quine (Audi. 1995: 518-519) are quite alien to the meaning given to it by Kant (1787/1929) in his scandalously brief -or “cursory" as the philosopher himself opted to put it (lb I: 667)- "history of pure reason”, i.e. of metaphysics. Kant (Ibid: 668) distinguishes there between natur :!ist and scientific methods prevailing in the field of enquiry he has previously inscribed to the jurisprudence of pure reason. Importantly then in contradistinction with the contemporary epistemological connotations, Kant depicts somewhat derogatorily the “naturalist of pure reason” as adopting as “his principle that though common reason, without science, that is, through what he calls sound reason, he is able in regard to those most sublime questions which form the problem of metaphysics, to achieve more han is possible through speculation” (loc. cit).

1 7 See Gadainer's explicit statement that the hermeneutics developed in Truth an i Method “is not therefore a methodology of the human sciences, but an attempt to understand what the human sciences truly are, beyond their methodological self-consciousness, and what connects them with the totality of our experience of world" (Gadamer. 1989: xxiii- hereafter referred to as T&M). Equally enlightening is his contention that he “did not wish to elaborate a system of rules, to describe, let alone direct, the methodical procedure of the human sciences”, or to “revive the ancient dispute on method between the natural and the human sciences" (T&M: xxviii, xxix).

148 Ricoeur rightly highlights the concealed disjunctive dimension of the title, winch in his view “confronts the Heideggerian concept of truth with the Diltheyan concept of method" and wonders to what extent the work “deserves to be called Truth AND Method, and whether it ought not inste *1 to be entitled Truth OR

Method". Ricoeur makes this provocative proposal since he sees Truth and Mtriod as a whole mirroring

this conflict between Heidegger's fundamental ontology and the epistemological problematique posed by Dilthey. What is more, d Heidegger "was able to elude the debate with the human sciences by a sovereign moment of transcendence" -i.e. by postulating a cleavage between the antic and 'he ontological levels of inquiry, Gadamer is according to Ricoeur (1981: 60-61) bound to "plunge hinvtli into an ever more bitter debate, precisely because he takes Dilthey’s question seriously", and in this sense he is seen as effecting -in relation to Heidegger's work- “a movement of return from ontology towards epistemological problems" (Ibid: 60).

unaffected by Heidegger’s later philosophical "turn".

Indeed in view of this Heideggerian influence, it w eald be arguably as unwise to address G adam er’s herm eneutics from the perspective of contem porary epistemology, as it would be to interpret Heidegger's discussion of

Dilthey and Count Yorck in Being and Time as a contribution to Neo-Kantian

scholarship. One could be even tem pted to draw a further analogy with

Heidegger’s fundam ental ontology and call G adam er’s philosophy a fundam ental

hermeneutics, as Aylesworth149 seem s to suggest in his contrast betw een the herm eneutical projects of G adam er and Ricoeur.

G adam er's attem pt to go beyond the confines of epist- nological concerns can be arguably traced even in his interpretation of H usserl’s celebrated catchphrase150 "to the things themselves".

In this “comm on battle cry of all phenom enological researchers” that Heidegger

“still repeats” in Being arid Time151,G adam er prim arily discerns the designation

of “a program against the subtle argum entation of epistemologywhich sought to * 50

149 Indeed Aylesworth (1991: 63) successfully highlights Gadamer’s departure from the strict concerns of epistemology by providing a contrast with Ricoeur. In this brief yet elucidating account, hermeneutics is said to be for Gadamer “more fundamental than the methods of the Geisteswiss- ’ischaften" while proving “a corrective for the methodological alienation of their subject matter”. In contrast, Ricoeur is seen as championing the idea that "philosophical hermeneutics must serve an epistemological function vis-à-vis the human sciences, and must incorporate their critical practices into its own discourse”. Although as I will attempt to show below it is arguable whether Gadamer's hermeneutics ultimatrlv fails to account for the critical dimension allegedly characteristic of epistemology, the contrast drawn above is still valid in highlighting the importance attributed to the detachment from epistemological concerns in Gadamer’s philosophy.

50 Husserl’s overall philosophical trajectory, and especially the coinage of the concept of the lifeworld is - in hindsight- seen by Gadamer as expressing an antithesis with the “dominant philosophies of Neo- Kantianism and positivism", as a break with strict epistemic concerns, and consequently as an extension of philosophical claims and investigations “to the wide field of everyday experience" (Gadamer, 1969/1977: 183).

1,1 ‘Thus, the term ‘phenomenology’ expresses a maxim which can be formulated as ‘To the things themselves!’ It is opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings; it is opposed to taking over any conceptions wl ,ch only seem to have been demonstrated; it is opposed lo those pseudo-questions which parade themselves as ‘problems’, often for generations at a time” (B&T: 50).

1963/1977:144-145; Gadam er. 1991:14).

Of equal im portance is G adam er’s conviction that it would be absurd to interpret this slogan as signifying a sort of "phenomenological realism" and consequently G adam er attem pts to dissociate Max Scheier and Alexander Pfänder from interpretations th a t see in their usage of the term an opposition of

object and subject and a “realistic departure from idealism" (Gadamer.

1963/1977: 145).

The "things them selves” of phenomenology, G adar:vi argues, are not "objective entities posited as transcendent”, but rath er intentional entities experienced in the "filling out of intentional acts”: tney are therefore "immediately perceived", and not represented “by signs or symbols" (loc. Cit). Apparently, far from occupying itself prim arily with situating and clarifying H usserl’s philosophical project, this interpretation fundam entally concerns G adam er’s appropriation of his philosophical inheritance and consequently a disclosure of his own philosophical agenda. Arguably, rhis search for an alternative to the conceptual framework of m odem “m atnem atical" natural science, and the horizon of its “technical" applications and rules- w hat Husserl has term ed technization152 - characterises m ost versions of phenomenology, if in varying degrees.

In its negative, critical dim ension, this attitude of phenomenology provides us

with a m ost welcome link w ith so-called “critical” versions of social philosophy - 1,2 Husserl (1970: 46) employs this term to indicate the process whereby the “original experience” that in being directed at "the subject matter itself gave birth to a specific mode of theorising (say geometry or mathematics) becomes merely a “sort of technique”, performed “according to rules of the game” and thereby excluding the original act of thinking. Husserl, of course, posits the /■ ' rpose of science in pre- scientific life and thus to the lifeworld (Ibid: 50 ff).

especially with classical Critical Theory153- and m ost certainly with certain aspects of W eberian sociology. 1 do not merely refer to the < rucial role th a t the concept of the "progressive" rationalisation or disenchantm ent of the world played in the formation of the concept of instrumental ratio ality154, but to the overall attitude expressed by Max W eber in a good num ber oi his works.

For the purposes of the present study it should suffice to briefly refer to W eber’s (1991: 138) understanding of the "exact" sciences as “the m ost im portant fraction of the process of intellectualisation”, his attem pt to highlight calculation as the main principle Informing this techr.cal and therefore disenchanted perception of the world, and finally to his pao.sionate advocating of the irreducibility of the dim ension of m eaning and of all anim ate questions in general to the calculative functions of the technical/scientific apparatus155. 153 Thus, there are evident linkages between the criticisms raised by Husserl against the mathematical sciences and the interpretative twist given to Max Weber's sociology with the coinage of the concept of

instrumental reason by Adorno & Horkheimer. It is certainly not accidental rhat in their Dialectic of Enlightenment Adorno and Horkheimer (1986:25-emphasis added) introduce their discussion on

“objectified thinking" after having quoted a large passage form Husserl’s Crisis, where the philosopher discusses what he called the “Galilean mathematization of the world”. In their view then, mathematical procedure is seen as becoming ever since “the ritual for thinking”, thereby establishing itself as “necessary and objective”, by turning "thought into a thing, an instrument-v/hicb is its own rerm for it”. The affinity between Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse’s “critique of the positivist concept of modern science" to borrow Held’s description of the issue- and Husserl’s critical stance towards science as spelled out in The

Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, has not escape I the attention of scholars.

For a brief but substantial account on the issue see Held, 1990: 166 ff.

154 It has been remarked that the concept of "instrumental rationality” incorporate . both Weber’s concept of

disenchantment and his methodological concept of “ends-means" rationality, ¡.e. the ideal typical

construction that Weber introduced in order to describe the pursuit of practical nds with methodological accuracy and precise calculation of means performed by social agents in modern societies. In this respect the concept of instrumental reason is seen as depicting reason as being deprived r f its autonomy, given up its self-reflective power and being adapted to “successful operations, applications arid control similar to the applications of technological knowledge” (Teigas, 1995: 5-6).

Weber’s remarks on the issue are quite caustic: “Who- aside from certain bi-; children who are indeed found in the natural sciences”, asks the thinker in addressing his university audience, “still believes that the findings of astronomy, biology, physics, or chemistry could teach us anything about the meaning of the world"? I furthermore find indispensable both his insight regarding the impossibility of seeing science, or rather “the technique of mastering life which rests upon science” as the 'way to happiness" after Nietzsche’s “devastating criticism of those last men who invented happiness’ and his appropriation of Tolstoy’s answer to the question concerning the meaning of science, accord', g to which “Science is meaningless because it gives no answer to our question, the only question imp« itant for us: What should we do and how shall we live?" (Weber, 1991: 142-143).

science and technology does not necessarily'56 entail a sim ple rejection of science, or even a naive “faith” in the possibility of a “transcendence" of the horizon generated by technology.

This sort of attitude is a s uncharacteristic of G adam er as it is of Husserl and Heidegger, despite com m on wisdom’s conviction about the contrary being the case. It will be recalled th a t Heidegger (1993: 333) in his -for some celebrated, for others notorious- essay on technology explicitly rejects the view that m odem science and technology are "demonic”. More im portanl ly, Heidegger even refuses to theorise the technical apparatus as potentially de -.ructive, preferring to place instead both “danger” and "redem ption” within teen nology’s enfram ing power (Ibid: 334).

Indeed, the very conceptualisation of m odem technique in term s of an “enfram ing” shows th at Heidegger could not have even envisaged a simple “way out” of the technological “frame”. For how else are v e to interpret his contention that the am biguity of technology’s essence point- “to the m ystery of all revealing [and hence also of all concealing), i.e., of tru th ” (/bid: 338), if not as an acknowledgement th a t truth and falsity are in m odernity156 157 only possible within -and against- th is "enframing”?

156 Ii is true that very often the critics of modern science give the impression tha they unequivocally reject the “scientific worldview". Adorno and Horkheimer (1986: 30) for instance -cent to perceive science exclusively as a means of domination over both nature and human beings, while ,cientific reason is said to be “the mere instrument of all-inclusive economic apparatus...(which) serves a- a general tool useful for the manufacture of all o.her tools, firmly directed toward its end, as fateful u> the precisely calculated movement of material production, whose result for mankind is beyond all calculation”. This is an already “strong" anti-scientific statement, which becomes even bolder when the autho sarcastic remark that "at last” reason's "old ambition, to be a pure organ of ends, has been realised". In any case we should not fail in tracing the impact of the devastation caused by the historical advent of Nazn m behind the boldness of this statement.

1,7 I here use “modernity” in a quite conceptually "loose” manner. It has to be ¿ marked that Heidegger’s treatment of technology does not really square with a “historiological" understanding of the emergence of

Moreover, how should we Interpret Heidegger’s view '-iat technology Is essentially a mystery (Ibid: 334), which rem ains hidden in sj ite of the constant proliferation of the technical apparatuses and of our ever-in creasing familiarity with it? Is it not true th a t technology is thought as the destiny of hum an beings, albeit one that necessarily conceals the essence of being-hum an158, perhaps in the sam e m anner it conceals its own essence?

Furtherm ore, is it not of considerable significance that Heidegger (Ibid: 340- 341) points to the realm of a rt159 as th a t which, in being "fundam entally different” from technology b ut also "akin” to it, m akes possible our confrontation with technology’s elusive essence?

Although Heidegger's treatm ent of technology can only be roughly sketched here, it is still of great im portance, for it significantly shapes G adam er’s own claim regarding the universality of herm eneutics. This influence becom es even m ore apparent if one considers that the herm eneutic claim reaches its utm ost intensity right in the m idst of an era supposedly modern science. In a passage reminiscent of -and consonant with- the distinction between authentic historical science and common historiology in Being and Time, Heidegger ¡.'marks: “Chronologically speaking, modern physical science begins in the seventeenth century. In contrast, machine-power technology develops only in the second half of the eighteenth century. But mode rn technology, which for