Capítulo II: Marco Teórico
2.3. Clima Organizacional
What is the nature of East Asian politics? For some social scientists and
philosophers oriented toward identifying particular political characteristics of the
East Asian world, such a question has been partly answered through the
observation of a political system centered around kingship and the lack of
constitutional elements, which had emerged in Europe from the seventeenth
century onwards. Also, they saw a rigid social hierarchy, which was reminiscent
of a political system of absolute monarchy that Europe had already overcome, or
at least a particular type of '(Oriental) despotism'. Many of them could not find
any form of democracy in the East Asian context. The elements of 'civil society'
ranged against the 'authoritarian' state that emerged in Europe in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, seemed to have no equivalents in East Asia.
However, CHO Hein (1997) refutes this conventional view on 'oriental' despotism
in Confiician political history for Chosun. For Cho, while the development of the
'check and balance' system among political parties is crucial for understanding the
origin of English civil society, and the role of Bildungsb,rgertum rather than the bourgeoisie, for understanding the German version, the Confucian literati in
Chosun represent the same political force for Korean civil society. He argues that
the Confucian literati class as bureaucrats, local influentials. the 'backwoods
literati' (A)^ ±#C), critics of state policies and monitors of the kingship, had
autonomous political power in the pursuit of righteousness in moral terms rather
than rights in legal terms. In addition, the diversification of political and ethical
visions within the literati class contributed to forming party politics from the
sixteenth century on. Cho's introduction of the traditional form of Korean civil
society from the comparative perspective as a corrective to the common view on
Confucian politics is widely accepted in Korean Studies.
In fact, it was usually the king who obeyed the officials rather than the other way around. Confucian officials were actually rendering the kingship obedient to them; they were doing the opposite of "obedience" to the king. One thing that most Western observers of Confucian thought have failed to recognize is the precept of remonstrance, which is linked to the precept of loyalty in Confucian tradition, (p. 29)
In fact, it would not be incorrect to identify the relationship between the kingship
and the Confucian literati class as a whole, on the one hand, and the internal
conflict among several groups of Neo-Confucian bureaucrats and literati, on the
other, as the key for understanding how Neo-Confucianism was practiced in
Chosun politics. However, in spite o f Cho's assertion of them as the historical origin of civil society in Korea, it remains questionable whether one can
conceptually reconstruct these traditional features within the theory of civil
society in the social sciences.8
It is misguided to suggest that the Confucian literati are more important than the
military group around LEE Sung-gye for the political destruction of Koryo and
the building of Chosun. The military group needed intellectual support, without
which their political revolt could not be justified. At the same time, the Confucian
Literati - who wanted a discipline-oriented social ethics based on Neo-
Confucianism, having distanced themselves from the Buddhist and Taoist ways of
social interpretation - also needed new power for the state. Thus, at the time of the
emerging Chosun, new political power .was wrested by the combination of
military power and intellectual knowledge. However, while the territorial
expansion to the North, the maintenance of a well-organized military power, the
development of a central administrative system, the full institutionalization of
bureaucracy, and the stability of kingship, emerged and considered in the 200
years after the emergence o f Chosun, the balance of power among the two groups
began to shift to the Neo-Confiician group of high bureaucrats, despite their
involvement in several struggles over the succession to the throne in the fifteenth
century. At the same time, military power became subsumed under the kingship
and the Neo-Confucian bureaucrats.
Ironically, this political tension between kingship and the Confucian bureaucrats
led to a much more symbolic role for both political actors within the
Neo-Confucian paradigm. This indirectly means that in any political debate on
state affairs, including royal rituals, the protagonists should present their
arguments according to Neo-Confucian principles in order to justify their claims.
8) For an understanding of the debate on civil society in Korean studies,
see SHIN Jong-Hwa (2000).
The king and members of the royal family had to have a comprehensive
knowledge of the Confucian Bibles - the sage kings of ancient China and their
achievements were regarded as the ideal prototype - upon which they should base
their political and ethical behavior, and according to which, the objections o f
bureaucrats and local literati could be refuted. Without this, they would be
subjected to a serious monitoring and interference regarding the 'ethical codes o f
kingship'. In the name of a better moral politics by the king for the people, the
literati also risked death in submitting any criticism on kingship. The political
clash at the same time meant an intellectual conflict with the Confucian text, with
kingship, the bureaucrats, and the backwood literati. The idea of the state as the
symbolic center of politics for the people, however, was never contested by them.
Political authority, which forced political actors to obey, came neither from the
physical power of the state, nor from the present form of kingship, nor from
economic power. Rather, it derived from ethical codes and taught morality for
disciplining individuals. In other words, all major political actors were trapped in
self-imposed values and disciplines. This meant that bureaucrats with a more
extensive knowledge of Neo-Confucian doctrines were more readily promoted in the state. The later entrance o fth e backwoods literati - Sarim (A\ ¡¿1 -\-kk1- in the
central state around the end of the fifteenth century, reflects their positions q,s
descendents of the Neo-Confucian Literati who had rejected participation in the
political revolt for Chosun at the end of Koryo, and who later turned their backs
on the central politics of the new state. They had economic backgrounds in the
Southern and Middle provinces, influenced Confucian ethics in their local areas,
and received wide normative support, especially when central politics was in
crisis. After a series of intellectual and political conflicts with the dominant
political chain of high bureaucrats - Hungu-pa - on ethical issues, royal ceremonies and other policy issues, they finally became the main political
and intellectual group from the late sixteenth century onwards.9
One of the most common criticisms of Chosun politics has been that the monarchy
system was the source of rigid class hierarchy. It is certainly true that autonomous
political activities with a democratic orientation could not be fully developed
towards a politics of the democratic constitution. For the Neo-Confucian literati
class, in order to make their own political roles, they had to limit their status
below that of the kingship. Above all, in the (Neo-)Confucian doctrines, the
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kingship should be firmly based on peoples' support, and the kingship was never
free from a dutiful contribution to the improvement of peoples' lives. The role of
the Confucian literati was that o f advisors, to deliver peoples' voices to the king
and to guide the kingship toward a moral politics. The literati and the people
accepted the higher political authority of kingship, but also expected and
demanded a 'qualified' political contribution for them. For the kingship, this
relationship could also be interpreted as a give-and-take process for receiving
fidelity from subjects, on condition that he should accept the premise that the
ultimate foundation of kingship comes from the people: his obligation is to
improve their lives. In spite of restricted political power, kingship was the symbol
of the state itself, which could not be doubted by any political actors until the late
nineteenth century. Some critical literati concluded that political problems in the
state did not arise from a monarchy that was too powerful, but rather, from the
lack of power of kingship in the face of serious factional politics and a disordered 9
9) HAN Yeong-U (1989: 258-262) differentiates Neo-Confucianism for
landowners from Neo-Confucianism for farmers. The Sarim group, is regarded as for the former, while JEONG Do-Jeon, the leading political
intellectual for the building o f Chosun state in the late fourteenth century,
is understood as the most prominent Confucian literatus for the latter.
Further, Han understands Silhak tradition in the late Chosun period as the extension of Neo-Confucianism for farmers.
social hierarchy. For example, Chung yak-yong (^j ^-§-) (1762-1836) proposed a
direct return to the ancient classics, rather than following the interpretation of the
Neo-Confucian tradition, so as to identify the genuine role of sage kings in ancient
China, and in order to improve the rigid bureaucracy and to end the factional
politics of the Confucian class (CHONG Yag-yong, 1997; KIM Tae-Young, 1997;
BAE Byung-Sam, 1996b, 1993). Also, many in the alternative intellectual flow,
the so-called practical learning school ('Jl - which will be dealt with
in chapter 2 - emphasized the economic contribution of kingship to peoples' lives,
distinguished from an idealized formality and social ethics, as the solution for
rescuing a kingship surrounded by Neo-Confucian adherents. Local people
directed their spleen toward the administrative officers and (Confucian) yangban
class in their community, rather than toward the kingship - one important
exception being the HongKyongnae Rebellion (1811-1812) - this political event will be investigated in chapter 2.