Climatología

The creation o f five new independent Muslim nations was not a development widely perceived by Israeli policy makers as one that would be o f benefit to their national security concerns. This is in large part due to the Israeli trend of ‘primacy of security’ dating back to the founding o f the state; this belief “holds that almost every problem is a security problem, or at least involves security aspects.” 119 A multitude of interests was at stake in the region, and in order to address the fast-moving new realities being created on the ground in Central Asia, Israel needed to create a framework with which to engage the republics. This strategic framework was primarily intended to ensure the continued security o f the State o f Israel and was composed o f several longstanding Israeli foreign policy objectives. Israeli foreign policy objectives would be furthered by ensuring that the republics did not align themselves against Israel and preventing the republics from falling under either the influence o f Iran or radical Islam. I have identified nine separate yet interdependent strategic objectives which Israeli policy sought to achieve. These nine interdependent objectives are as follows:

• to prevent the spread o f Iranian influence among the states of the former Soviet Union;

• to curb the development o f hostile regimes and curtail the spread of weapons o f mass destruction (WMDs);

118 “USA encourages Muslim republics to follow Turkey: Israel makes inroads,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Moscow), in Russian, 20 January 1992, in British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary o f World

Broadcast (hereafter B BC SWB) SU/1285 A4/2[3]23 (January 1992).

119 Uri Bar-Joseph, “Towards a Paradigm Shift in Israel’s National Security Conception,” Israel Affairs 6, no. 3 & 4, (Spring/Summer 2000): p. 105.

• to remove the emphasis on the Arab world within the Greater Middle East;

• to avert the focus from the Middle East peace process;

• to maintain and expand the strategic relationship with the United States;

• to foster the creation o f ‘moderate’ Muslim states;

• to encourage the development o f an economic hinterland;

• to expand and support domestic military preparedness and technologies through the sale o f military hardware to foreign states; and

• to ensure the protection o f local Jewish communities and cultural heritage.

For the purposes o f this thesis, these nine Israeli policy objectives have been divided into four primary means o f implementation: diplomatic efforts, economic and commercial relations, development assistance, and military and security cooperation. In later chapters which focus on Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, these components will be examined in detail. Because the primary focus o f this study addresses security concerns, the religious and cultural aspects of Israel’s relationship with Central Asia will be discussed briefly and only as warranted. A thorough examination o f the religious, cultural, and historical links is much beyond the scope o f this present work, and is deserving of a separate treatment. For this reason, there will be little mention o f the region’s Jewish communities and how they are a factor vis-a-vis Israeli-Central Asian relations, except within the context o f security policy making.

In order to better understand Israeli policy towards Central Asia it is essential to detail the rationale and logic motivating Israel’s actions. The following is an attempt to place the nine policy concerns and objectives in the context o f Israeli national security policy.

Pr e v e n t i n g t h e Sp r e a d o f Ir a n i a n In f l u e n c e

Israel’s primary strategic objective in Central Asia was to block the spread of Iranian influence.120 This view was also echoed by Ephraim Sneli who had long taken a serious interest in Israel’s policies toward Central A sia.121 The emergence o f an independent Central Asia led many Western observers to fear that these new republics could eventually fall under the sway o f Iran. In 1993, two American academics often associated with the thinking in Israel claimed that “looking at the world through the combined filters of fundamentalist Islam and resurgent Persian nationalism, they [the Iranian government] aspire to a sphere o f influence that includes Iraq, the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf.” 122

Writing in Amu Dcuya; The Iranian Journal o f Central Asian Studies, published by the Iranian Foreign M inistry’s in-house think tank, Mohammad-Reza Maleki observes that “Israel still considers Iran as a main strategic threat.” 123 According to the stance o f Israeli national security policy, the development o f an Iranian sphere o f influence in Central Asia would have a negative impact on Israeli national security.124 At the time, Israeli security planners viewed not only all of its immediate neighbors (including Egypt, in the event that a future Egyptian government might reverse and revoke the Camp David Accords) as potential adversaries, but also the rejectionist hard-line Arab states o f Libya, Iraq, and especially Persian Iran. The 120 David Menashri, PhD (Senior Research Fellow at The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern

Studies, Tel Aviv University), interview with the author, 7 July 1999, Tel Aviv, Israel.

121 Ephraim Sneh, MD (Member o f Knesset), in a telephone interview the author, 4 November 2005, Tel Aviv, Israel.

122 Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson, “Ambitious Iran, Troubled Neighbors,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 1 (January-February 1993): p. 126.

123 Mohammad-Reza Maleki, “Turkish-Israeli Relations: Impacts on Central Asia and the Caucasus,”

Amu D a/ya: The Iranian Journal o f Central Asian Studies (Teheran) 4, no. 2 (summer 1999): p.

182.

124 “Iran, Central Asia and Israel: Quality, Situation, and the Interests,” Middle East Quarterly (Teheran) 1, no. 3 (W inter 1995), http://www.netiran.com/Htdocs/Clippings/FPolitics/951200XXFP0I.html (accessed 6 April 2002).

possibility that the Central Asian republics might follow the Iranian model of development and align against Israel was a veiy real concern.

In examining Israel’s goals in the region, Rasul Yalcin notes that Israel was eager “to weaken any attempts by Iran to rally the Islamic world against it.” 125 In addition to Israeli efforts, American supporters o f Israel took action to block Iranian influence in the region. Eleven major American Jewish organizations actively encouraged the US Congress to pass the Silk Road Strategy Act o f 1999 in part to prevent Iranian efforts “to bring the nations of the region into its sphere of influence.” 126 Both the United States and Israel recognized the danger; one of the conclusions from Israel’s bilateral strategic talks with the United States in 1997 was that Iran poses “a threat to the former Soviet republics o f Central A sia... and Israel.” 127

An Iranian Shift o f Focus, Not an Israeli Change in Perception

Towards the late 1990s, Iran shifted its emphasis to focus on improving its economic links with the Central Asian states: “Iran has concentrated on its trade links more than anything else. O f course one can argue that commercial ties increase the political presence.” 128 Israel’s efforts to frustrate Iran’s early objectives clearly increased the difficulty that the Iranian regime encountered in Central Asia. However, simply because Iran no longer sought to actively export its fiery brand of revolutionary Islam does not mean that Iran ceased being a threat in the eyes of Israeli

125 Rasul Yalcin, The Rebirth o f Uzbekistan: Politics, Economy, and Society in the Post-Soviet Era (Reading, UK, 2002), p. 273.

lie “ {jrgent: Tell your Senators to vote for the Silk Road Strategy Act,” report prepared by the B ’nai B ’rith Center for Public Policy, June 1999, http://bnaibrith.org/cpp/randa/silkroad699.html (accessed on 5 April 2001),

127 Arieh O ’Sullivan, “US, Israel conclude strategic dialogue,” The Jerusalem P ost, 6 June 1997.

128 Julia Nanay (Petroleum Finance Corporation), “Iran’s Role in Central Asia: A Dialogue with AIPAC” (lecture at event sponsored by the Middle East Institute and Johns Hopkins University-SAIS Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Washington, DC, 24 September 1998).

policy makers. Iran’s ambitious program to acquire WMD and advanced missile technology was, and remains to this day, of prime concern. Likewise, Iran’s recent efforts to forge an informal grouping o f nations sharing Persian heritage and language129 are viewed by the Israeli Foreign Ministry as an attempt to covertly promote Iranian influence through seemingly innocuous means.130 In the view o f the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Iran needs all the friends it can get to continually offset the tensions it encounters in the international community.131 Iran’s attempts to shift to

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economic cooperation are equally disturbing to Israeli policy makers, especially when it comes to infrastructure projects and road and rail construction. When Iranians are involved, according to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, such long-term projects mean that the Iranians establish an equally long-term presence in a country and over time will work to make that presence— and its accompanying influence—

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permanent.

Throughout the period covered in this thesis, Israel’s prime objective has been to prevent Iran from establishing a threatening presence in Central Asia. This theme—based largely upon the Israeli perception o f Iran as a grave threat to its national security— not only recurs throughout the decade after independence but well into the 21st century. The rise o f catastrophic terrorism, the emergence o f violent radical Islamist militancy, and the spotlight on Eurasia created by the US-led global war on terror has reaffirmed for many the dangers posed by dangerous regimes which operate outside the international consensus. Iran’s continued support for militant

129 Based upon discussions held with Iranian foreign ministry employees in Teheran, Iran, February 2004.

130 Ofer Moreno (Deputy C hief of Mission, Embassy of the State of Israel to the Republic o f Uzbekistan), interview with the author, 13 March 2006, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

131 Moreno, interview.

13“ W. Nathaniel Howell, “Iran’s Policy in Northwest Asia: Opportunities, Challenges, and Implications,” in Iran and the Gulf: A Search fo r Stability, ed. Jamal S. al-Suwaidi (London, 1996), p. 182.

terrorist organizations bent upon targeting Israel, the new Iranian regime’s threatening and bellicose rhetoric with regards to Israel’s existence, and Teheran’s ongoing nuclear program all serve to reinforce the perception that Iran is a mortal threat to the security and safety o f Israel. As long as Central Asia remains one o f the venues in which Iran may engage in provocative behavior against Israeli interests, this view will endure.

Cu r b i n g t h e De v e l o p m e n t o f Ho s t i l e Re g i m e s a n d t h e Sp r e a d o f

WMDs

In order to maintain its security, Israeli policy has sought to curb— or at least not promote— the emergence o f hostile governments which may eventually engage in hostilities with Israel. In the past, this policy has produced some notable failures, including the rise o f Hamas in the Occupied Territories and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The five new Central Asian states were perceived to be at risk o f developing along the same path as the regime in Iran. Such a development posed considerable risks, especially due to the presence o f Soviet-era nuclear arms. As one analyst noted, “[T]he existence o f nuclear weapons and technology in Central Asia worries Israel and increases the strategic importance o f the region.” 134

Maleki asserts in Amu Darya that the “possibility o f nuclear proliferation in the region is a prime concern for Israel.” 135 Yalcin moreover identifies the “ultimate disposition o f nuclear weapons (in Kazakhstan), and their possible transfer to such enemies as Iran” 136 as one o f Israel’s three main concerns in Central Asia. A further

134 Aras, “Post-Cold War Realities,” p. 78. 135 Maleki, “Turkish-Israeli Relations,” p. 190. 136 Yalcin, Rebirth o f Uzbekistan, p. 273.

fear concerns the possible rise o f “Islamic terror groups in Pakistan and the Central Asian republics” and Pakistan’s nuclear capability.137

After the collapse of Soviet power in Central Asia, the threat o f WMD proliferation became one o f the three main dangers that Israel faced in its dealings with the region and this will be examined in greater detail later in this chapter.

Di l u t i n g t h e ‘Co n c e p t o fa n Ar a b Mi d d l e Ea s t’

From an Israeli security perspective, the State of Israel has always been at risk due to its situational permanence. As noted in the previous chapter, Israel cannot change the very real fact that it is numerically outnumbered by enemies, both real and perceived. Furthermore, Israel has often risked being defined by its Arab neighbors. That is to say, Israel has often been defined by what it is not—-Arab and Muslim— rather than what it is. This tendency has the effect of placing the State o f Israel on the defensive. Twenty-two Arab states, it is feared, have the option o f speaking with one voice, however rarely it is used. Whether it is to denounce Israeli behavior towards its Arab neighbors in such venues as the Arab League or Non-Aligned Movement or in the attempts to link Zionism with racism through the United Nations General

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Assembly, in the past the Arab states have sought to use their greater numbers to isolate Israel, not just regionally but internationally. Israel, for its part, has refused to engage the Arab world as one entity. Examples of this tactic have included Israel’s refusal to sit down simultaneously with all parties at the peace process talks139 and the

137 B. Raman, “National Missile Defense-Theatre Missile Defense: Right Question, Wrong Answer,” South Asia Analysis Group paper number 22, Executive Assessment, 18 May 2001, http://www.saag.org/papers3/paper242.html (accessed 17 November 2001).

138 See Robert O. Freedman, “Israel and Central Asia: A Preliminary Analysis,” Central Asia M onitor, no. 2 (1993): pp. 16-20.

139 With the notable exception of the opening of the Madrid peace talks, Israel has repeatedly refused to engage all parties to the talks at once, and this Israeli acquiescence came about due to US pressure following the 1991 G ulf War. This is based on author’s experience working at the US Department of State, Bureau o f Near Eastern Affairs, Office o f Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and

Sharon government’s non-answer to the Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Abdullah’s peace initiative offered at the 22nd Summit of the Arab League, held in Beirut, Lebanon, in March 2002.140

Dating back to Ben-Gurion’s Periphery Policy, Israel has historically sought to break out o f this restrictive labeling and reach out to other non-Arab peoples in the Middle East. The development o f Israel’s close ties with Turkey can be viewed as a natural progression o f this tendency. The creation of five new non-Arab, culturally Muslim states abutting the region gave the opportunity for Israeli policy to again advance the concept of a greater Middle East.141 As an Iranian journal noted, “[Tjies with Central A sia... has somewhat diluted the concept of an Arab Middle East. And from a strategic point o f view, the proximity o f this region with Iran, makes the issue even more significant for Israel.” 142

Av e r t i n g t h e Fo c u s f r o m t h e Mi d d l e Ea s t Pe a c e Pr o c e s s

For Israel, the Middle East peace process is not just about establishing peace and security with its immediate neighbors; it has also come to be a prerequisite to greater international recognition and acceptance and by extension, greater security. Thus, Israel’s efforts are intended not just for Arab consumption but for international consumption; peace with its neighbors, per the Israeli perspective, can also serve as a means to solidify the security o f the state, both regionally and internationally. Through negotiating settlements with its Arab neighbors, Israel stands not only to

Palestinian Affairs on the 9th round of the Middle East peace process talks held in Washington, DC, during the summer o f 1993.

140 Under the Saudi initiative, all 22 members o f the Arab League agreed to recognize Israel in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Palestinian territories. Many observers at the time noted that this proposal was very similar to that which had been offered by Saudi King Faisal which also went unanswered (based upon discussion with a Saudi diplomat, March 2002, Washington, DC).

141 “Iran, Central Asia and Israel,” http://www.netiran.com/ (accessed 6 April 2002). 142 “Iran, Central Asia and Israel,” http://www.netiran.com/ (accessed 6 April 2002).

secure the safety o f its citizens but also to gain the international recognition that it has long sought. For example, through acceptance Israel’s permanent position in the United Nations would be finally established as either an Asian, Middle Eastern, or even European member.

The Israeli public and policy makers alike are well aware o f the impact the peace process has 011 the state’s international standing. From the perspective o f the Israeli Foreign Ministry, the number o f nations with full diplomatic relations with Israel is often used as an informal measure o f the success of Israeli foreign policy. As mentioned previously, following the Oslo Accords, the number o f nations recognizing Israel rose to an all-time high. This demonstrates the importance other nations have placed upon Israel’s relationship with the Palestinians. Not only does engagement with the Palestinians and Israel’s other neighbors move Israel closer to international normalization, it also undercuts the popular international perception o f Israel as being an anti-Muslim state.

Therefore, it is not surprising that during previous lulls and hiatuses in the peace talks, Israel’s relationship with the Central Asian republics truly began to emerge. As the peace talks slow down or falter, Israel continues to advance its goal of eliminating the anti-Muslim perception. At the time, this fact was widely written about in the Arab and Iranian press. Many Arab commentators saw links between the Netanyahu government’s intransigence in negotiations and the development o f ties