The theory of communicative action and structural transformation of the public sphere influenced the design of the study and required that I consider the following:
o Firstly I needed to ensure that the research orientation acknowledges the importance of shared understanding and the notion that what is important, as Habermas (1987) argued, is how we, through language use, can enhance communicative action and the process of coming to an understanding of (in the case of this study) issues around contemporary heritage discourses and how these determine education practices.
o Secondly I needed to ensure that the data collection protocols, i.e. the focus group interviews, generative workshops and in-depth interviews are, to the extent possible, providing “ideal speech situations and public spheres” in which every research participant is respected, diversity of thought is accepted and valued, and opportunities to be heard are granted.
Working with Habermasian theory therefore had implications for the way this study was carried out. Chapter Four provides more information on how I gave the research methodology, to borrow Gustavson’s (2009: 17) terminology a “Habermasian spin”.
3. 9 Critique of Habermasian Critical Social Theory
As I worked with critical social theory as discussed above it was important to reflect on some of the shortfalls of Habermasian theory. Acknowledging these critiques and
discussing their implications was an important strategy for enhancing the trustworthiness and rigour of the study. I also discuss how I mediated some of the shortfalls, by drawing on McKernan’s (2008) critical curriculum theory (to interrogate heritage education as curriculum) and Critical Realism as an underlabourer providing depth ontology across the entire study (see Section 3.2.1). The following are some of the major critiques of Habermasian critical social theory:
3.9.1 Questioning the basis upon which Habermasian theory emerged
Habermas’s critical social theory has been criticised on various fronts (Cooks, 2004;
Smith & Riley, 2009). Post structural critics, like Foucault, question whether the Enlightenment project, upon which Habermas developed his theory, can or indeed should be salvaged (Cooks, 2004; Allan, 2006). Post structuralists see Enlightenment as having reached a dead end and also no longer having the potential to provide theoretical tools to understand the evils or problems of modern society (Smith &
Riley, 2009). However, critical realists are critical of the realism of post structuralism, and refuse to accept a loss of rationality or reason, even though they accept that truth is fallible.
3.9.2 Idealising the life world and public sphere
Other critics of Habermas’s critical social theory have pointed to the utopian aspects of Habermas’s work. Habermas is specifically critiqued for idealising both the life world and the public sphere and not seeing them as social systems with their own hegemonic dominance and inequalities. For instance, feminist scholars argue that the life world was a fundamental locus of patriarchal oppression, thus state intervention in the family and private life has been a positive rather than negative development (Cooks, 2004; Smith & Riley, 2009). Feminist scholars, elaborating the above, argued that state intervention helped to address in some way issues of domestic violence legislation and child support payments. Closely related to this argument is the claim that Habermas also seemed not to have acknowledged the inequalities that were inherent in the 18th century public spheres such as his classical example of coffee houses. Not all people had access to the coffee houses and as Smith and Riley (2009:
44) pointed out, “the coffee houses were chiefly frequented by educated and affluent men”, and by formal or informal means that implied exclusion of the working class, women and minorities. Similarly even the traditional structures in pre-colonial
southern Africa such as the Kgotla or Padare that Mamdani (1996) talks of, have also been critiqued for being patriarchal and acting as centres of male dominion. Even the existence of freedom of expression or “ideal speech situation” ascribed to the Kgotla is questionable, as by its nature the Kgotla had its own hierarchical structures of power and decision making (Sharma, 1999 & 2003). In a foreword to the booklet entitled The Tswana Traditional Kgotla, Mpulubusi (1997) further alluded to inequalities inherent within the Kgotla when he is cited as saying that:
The Kgotla was a semi-circular structure of poles which varied in size to accommodate as many people or men as possible at the exclusion of basadi, women. Men gathered at Kgotla according to their status, ability and social role. The lesser men, bathlanka, sat on the periphery and made marginal contributions. (NMMAG, 1997: 1).
It is therefore important to realise that not all was good about pre-colonial societal structures and ways of governance, as is the case with Habermasian theoretical concepts
3.9.3 Single unified public sphere as unrealistic
A related problem is that Habermas tended to depict a single unified public sphere, where as in reality, and more so, in modern and differentiated societies (Africa included), it may be more useful to think of “mediated” multiple public spheres, as already pointed out, organised around communities defined by race, gender, sexuality and religion (Outhwaite, 2007: 244; Smith & Riley, 2009:44). From this critique emanates the metaphor used in this study of “re-imagining heritage education as framed within the notion of multiple public spheres” allowing for the cultural diversities inherent within post colonial southern Africa to be accommodated, deliberated or reconciled. Agyeman (2002) and Levinson (2009) in their critique of multicultural education also allude to the same notion (see Section 8.3).
3.9.4 Utopian nature of Habermas’s work
Another critique of Habermas’s work relates to his failure to stipulate “how much”
communicative action is needed for the reproduction of the life world (Cooks, 2004:
34 drawing from Cooke, 1994; Allan, 2006). According to Harvey-Brown and Goodman (2001) and supported by Smith and Riley (2009: 46), Habermas has
“relatively little to say about concrete ways of building a better world”. Allan (2006)
claimed, with regard to the utopian aspects of Habermas’s work that “what Habermas gives us is an ideal – not in the form of fantasy but in the sense of an exemplar vision”. What falls short in Habermas’s critical social theory are realistically plausible institutional forms that can support revitalisation of the life world. Such institutions, I suppose, may include a broad based media (contextualised education included), grass-roots social movements, and civic activism (which in some cases may also become hegemonic counter-public spheres if not carefully constituted).
It is therefore important to ensure that re-orientation of current heritage education practices, to increase representation and use of indigenous cultural heritage, as envisaged in this study is not done in a counter-hegemonic manner (see Sections 8.3.5 and 9.3). If this is not considered carefully the potential of contemporary heritage education practices to enhance the sustainability of heritage resources in the region, may continue to be questionable.
3.9.5 A distinction without difference
Habermas is also critiqued for attempting to refine the distinction between the life world and system, and failing to see that the boundaries between the two are in
“actual fact very porous” (Cooks, 2004: 34). In strengthening her argument Cooks (ibid.) reminded us that the same individual inhabiting the life world is also an employee in the economic or government sector making the boundaries even more blurred. Borrowing a phrase from Hegel, Cooks (2004: 34) referring to Habermas’s attempt as stated above, called this “a distinction without difference”. Related to the same critique is also the problematic distinction of public concern from private concern. And such a critique thus makes Habermas’s social theory a bit of an incomplete project, as Harvey Brown and Goodman (2001) claimed.