Comercio exterior

The persistence of the Sports Council’s Sport for All campaign from 1972 to 1993, arguably resulted from the disarray characterised by a ‘nascent’ policy subsystem and a weakened Sports Council, as evidenced by the conflict and competition among policy actors (McIntosh and Charlton, 1985; Pickup, 1996), and limited governmental coercion (Houlihan, 1991; Jefferys, 2012). Attempts to develop a more coherent policy met with continued governmental resistance, disruption, and attitudinal fluctuations, epitomised by the dysfunctional relationship between government and the Sports Council. The lack of a strong or unified ministerial responsibility for sport, arguably a consequence of the shifting designations and definitions of what sport was and where it belonged, to the extent that by 1994, 15 different departments apart from the DNH had an interest in sport policy (Houlihan, 1991; Jefferys, 2012).

However, evidence suggests that a sequential set of external shocks within the sport policy subsystem brought about not only a major change in sport policy, but also a level of subsystem maturation. The Prime Ministerial change in the early 1990s from Thatcher to Major provided a change in the systematic governing coalition implicit within the assumptions of the ACF, and a change in ‘policy-core’ beliefs, elevating sport as an instrument of government, as noted by Major (1999), sport had been previously subjected to ‘misguided attitudes and mistaken policies’ (DNH, 1995, p.1).

It is also evident that public criticisms concerning failure at the Atlanta 1996 Olympiad were sufficient external perturbations to bring about major policy change.

As Dutton (2006, p.21) claimed these factors had ‘created pressure on the government, politicians and [SE] to introduce Lottery revenue programmes … to

117 begin to reverse the failures’, as seen by the shift in government priorities from mass participation, to a twin track of elite performance and school sport within Raising the Game, there being a serious intent to focus on sport ‘in a way it had never done before’ (Holt and Mason, 2000, pp.153-154). Moreover, it is argued that the creation of the Lottery provided a significant external development to the sport policy subsystem, which facilitated government intervention in sport policy, and signified a key moment in the UK and government’s relationship with sport. In particular, the Lottery provided government with a policy instrument to achieve its priorities, while providing sport/NGBs accessibility to previously unimaginable financial resources.

Yet, there is an apparent disregard within the ACF of government-led initiatives, such as the Lottery, which act as external shocks to stimulate a policy subsystem, and enable major policy change.

If Wolfenden is seen as the ‘architect’ of the UK sport policy subsystem, Major should be acknowledged as the person who raised the political status of sport;

revolutionising the prospects for sport through the introduction of the Lottery; and laying the foundations for the development of future strategies and policies for sport, as evidenced by the high degree of overlap between New Labour’s Sporting Future for All (2000) and Major’s Raising the Game (1995), particularly the twin track for elite performance and school sport. However, Blair’s New Labour government raised the profile of sport as a ‘social tool’, having highlighted its potential to cross the boundaries of different policy subsystems, such as health and education. For example, policy change included a renewed focus on physical activity in schools for health benefits, signposting health’s increasing salience to government. Policy change was also evident from an elite perspective with a move towards improvements in talent identification and the talent pathway, to help achieve consistent success in the international arena, as recommended by Cunningham (2001, p.5). International sporting success was seen as a means to generate ‘pride and a sense of national identity, a ‘feelgood factor’, (DCMS, 2002a, p.9), in part due to an apparent ‘growing public awareness that success in, and support of, international competition is as important as providing access to sporting opportunities’ (UKS, 2003, p.8).

Game Plan (2002) signified a further significant change in policy and the adoption by government of a contractual approach to funding, which clearly reflected New

118 Labour’s Best Value political philosophy, and arguably represented a ‘deep-core’

belief. The key impact on ‘policy-core’ beliefs was the implementation of policy through a process of reform and modernisation, to ensure a ‘fit-for-purpose’ regime to partner government and ‘joined-up delivery against sporting objectives’ (SE, 2001a, p.12). From an ACF perspective, it is possible to argue that policy change resulted from not only an external perturbation to the sport policy subsystem (change in government), but also a change in the relatively stable parameters in terms of the

‘deep-core’ beliefs of political ideology. An example of the impact of ideological change would be the requirement for NGBs to earn the right to have a partnership with government, and the drive for NGB modernisation reinforced by KPIs and the threat of withdrawal of funding, whereby ‘any sport not wishing to accept this challenge – funding [would] be switched to those that do’ (DCMS, 2008, p.2). Such evidence not only demonstrates Lukes’ third dimension of power, but also illuminates the shift in government values from passive to contractual subsystem politics, as well as the rise of compliance regimes, shared-interests/objectives, and economic/financial motivations as conditions for participation within the UK sport policy subsystem, and coalition membership, exemplifying both the first and second dimensions of Luke’s concept of power.

Evidence also indicates that London’s successful bid in 2005 to host the 2012 Olympic Games provoked a further external shock to the sport policy subsystem, which triggered a change in the way sport policy was funded and delivered, as seen in Playing to Win (2008). It is evident here that NGBs had been elevated to the forefront of government and agency consciousness as a delivery mechanism capable of achieving government aims and objectives, which also coincided with NGBs’ lobbying for greater involvement within the policy environment:

‘We’d won the right to host the Olympics in 2005, and there was a great debate about what should be our aims and objectives for that … The idea grew up that actually it shouldn’t just be about elite; it should be about [being] transformational for all sport, and therefore “who’s going to do that?” Well, it’s got to be [NGBs]’ (Interviewee:

SEC¹⁸).

18 References to interviewee SEC relate to an interview dated 4^th September 2018.

119

‘[I]nfluential [NGBs] were vocalising the fact that they could drive [SE’s] outcomes, if they were given the money [through a single investment, rather than disparate amounts of investment]’ (Interviewee: SESLR¹⁹).

While the above evidence points towards NGBs’ collective willingness to achieve shared-objectives, further evidence indicates that the use of NGBs was more opportunistic than strategic, on the basis that no alternative delivery mechanism existed:

‘[NGBs] were the only show in town, so [government] had to invest in them as there was nothing else’ (Interviewee: SRADP).

Interviewee DCMSb also claimed that the relationship between government and NGBs had developed ‘very organically’, as NGBs had ‘access to the largest number of people in the sport market that government could talk to.’

Arguably, the Coalition government’s Creating a Sporting Habit for Life (2012) was merely old wine in a new bottle; the historical issues of stemming the flow of school drop-off and increasing youth participation, having been evident in previous policy documents. For elite sport, evidence suggests a strong desire for continuity, in particular, UKS’s strategy for high performance sport investment was seen as being

‘increasingly understood and respected’ (UKS, 2011, p.9). DCMS (2014, p.6) asserting that there were ‘no plans to review the [No Compromise] approach, as we have no wish to give other nations a competitive advantage over Team GB.’

However, the lack of progress by government in achieving participation targets, signified policy on the verge of failure rather than in a state of equilibrium. It also signalled challenging times for community sport and NGBs, particularly in lieu of the new payment-by-results performance regime, and the widening of an already complex network of deliverers of sport. For example, the government’s new partnership with SE was arguably less about policy objectives and more to do with process, specifically a ‘more rigorous, targeted and results-orientated way of thinking about grassroots sport’, which would focus ‘all energies into reaching out to young people more effectively’ (DCMS, 2012, p.1).

19 References to interviewee SESLR relate to an interview dated 17^th August 2018.

120 SE’s changed remit was to take ‘sport out of its traditional structures and environments and into young people’s lives’ (SE, 2012d p.2), signposting a more concerted effort towards a mixed economy approach to funding grassroots participation, while the collective focus of sport would continue to have 'the spirit of mass participation, but with a particular focus on 14-25 year olds’ (SE, 2012d, p.4).

For example, SE’s increasing support of StreetGames, who not only aligned to SE’s strategy (SE, 2012d, p.5), but also reflected a more attractive proposition than the

‘single sport NGB option’, for solving problems with youth engagement (SE, 2012e, p.6). Support for non-NGB organisations is demonstrated by the meteoric increase in the level of funding invested into StreetGames from £300,000 in 2010-11 (SE, 2011, p.8) to an in-principle four-year award close to £19.5m for the 2013-17 funding cycle (SE, 2012b, p.5). It could be argued that increased role of ‘social actors’, such as StreetGames, provided an internal shock to the sport policy subsystem by increasing doubt in the ability of NGBs to meet policy objectives, which provided a critical path to major policy change within Sporting Future.

Since Game Plan, the central objective for SE had been increased regular and sustained participation in sport, especially through a core strategy of developing long-term relationships with and investment in sports’ NGBs to deliver ‘stretching and difficult targets’ (SE, 2011, pp.2-3). However, it is evident that in support of Creating a Sporting Habit for Life, SE would not have a government-set target for national participation, DCMS being ‘merely keen’ on increasing participation in 14-25 year olds (SE, 2012a, p.3). While this raises doubts over government’s commitment to its own legacy plans, NGBs would be ‘performance managed’ to meet internal WSP 2013-17 agreed targets, so that SE could ‘demonstrate to the [National Audit Office]

that both impact and value for money were being delivered’ (SE, 2012a, p.3). Such evidence not only highlights SE’s determination to preserve its status quo with government, through the continuance of the compliance nature of the SE-led coalition, but also the prospect of major policy change.

Indeed, the question of government’s commitment to sport policy was significantly criticised within the HLSCOPL Report (2013b). Arguably, this set in motion a further game-changer in the way sports participation and community sport was funded and delivered. A lack of robustness in government policy to deliver on its legacy ambitions, and a ‘lack of a clear legacy plan for capturing the enthusiasm of the

121 Games within all sports’, having been highlighted (HLSCOPL, 2013b, p.8). It could be argued that this represented a major internal shock to the sport policy subsystem (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994; Sabatier and Weible, 2007), with these serious criticisms of the sport policy subsystem having been placed in the public domain.

The consequence of the accumulation of criticism of policy failure was a redistribution of critical political resources, particularly financial support, away from NGBs and ‘sports for sport’s sake’ to ‘sport for social good’, thus altering the structure of the policy subsystem by way of a clearer focus on physical activity for the inactive. The nature of the government’s Sporting Future (DCMS, 2015b, p.10) policy document can thus be considered a radical departure from historical central government policy, and signified not only a step-change in community and grassroots sport policy, but also a dramatic change in emphasis for SE. The changed focus of government priorities, premised on a genuine cross-Whitehall effort for joined-up government, was intended to achieve a principal aim of harnessing the potential of sport and physical activity to deliver ‘social good’, and

‘change people’s lives for the better.’

However, evidence points towards the continued existence of a quandary within government as to the role sport can play in public service. As noted by Baroness Heyhoe-Flint, ‘[government] must manifest itself in understanding the role that sport and recreation can play in achieving its objectives’ (Hansards, 2015b²⁰). Yet, evidence suggests a lack of coordination within government, and that sport’s potential contribution to an array of government departmental agendas remains under-valued, unacknowledged and misunderstood:

‘[Within] Sporting Futures there is a signature there from the ministers of all the various departments, but the inter-ministerial group has only I think met once, since Sporting Future was written. So, to what extent do they truly buy into this in every department? Sport can do so much for so many of their agendas, yet I don’t think that every one of those departments quite gets the power of sport to achieve its aims’

(Interviewee: SEC).

20 See column 402.

122 Conversely though, it could be argued that the sporting sector demonstrated a reluctance to utilise its significant influence to shape policy, in contrast to other policy sectors, which has potential implications for the application of the ACF, in the analysis of UK sport policy. Evidence suggests that sport policy actors’ preferences have been framed by a fear of ‘rocking the boat’, a reluctance to promote their valuable contribution to society, an acceptance of sustained levels of conservatism and compliance, and a willingness to be subjected to policy rather than shape it.

Thus, pointing towards the notion of power as psychological control (Wrong, 1995) in association with Lukes’ third dimension of power:

‘the sports sector punches very significantly below its weight, in terms of its influence on government, in relation to the size of the sector, the economic role of the sector, the genuinely great stuff that the sport sector does at local level, and the social impact [of] sport. The profile and the credit that the sector gets for doing that within government is minimal. As a sector we are very subject to rather than shaping changes in the strategic environment. Culturally, the sector is very conservative and very compliant as well, so people do as they’re told and uphold the rules, which is different from other sectors’ (Interviewee: SRADP).

5.7) Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to provide a more in-depth utilisation of the ACF to provide a theoretical conceptualisation of the UK sport policy subsystem, and provide context for the following case-study Chapters, particularly with regard to the identification and definition of sport policy subsystem and policy actors, advocacy coalitions, and factors that have influenced policy stability and change over a decade or more, in line with ACF assumptions. The findings also point towards potential issues with the ACF in terms of the characteristics of mature subsystems, the ACF’s belief system, delimitation boundaries of coalitions and subsystem boundaries, and the height from which the ACF observes policy subsystems, which are discussed in detail within Chapter 9.

Evidence suggests that a CCPR-led advocacy coalition and the Wolfenden Report of 1960, provided an opportunity for policy actors to coalesce around the issues identified within the Report, to produce a ‘nascent’ policy subsystem to translate their

123 beliefs into public policy. Arguably, the UK sport policy domain remained in a

‘nascent’ state for nearly three decades, due in the most part to limited government coercion and the enduring conflicts among policy actors, as the ACF would expect to see in a ‘nascent’ policy subsystem, despite the Sports Council’s potential positioning as a ‘policy broker’, and arguably the semi-autonomous nature of various policy actors (NGBs, BOA, CCPR and SC). While evidence signposts a degree of maturity in the development of the sport policy subsystem, its failure to reach the stage of maturity attained by other policy subsystems (e.g. health and education), is arguably a consequence of sports’ perpetual fragmentation within a disjointed political system, which is further complicated by the existence nested and overlapping subsystems, coalitions and policy actor.

The mapping the key beliefs and policies of government/SE not only identified the role and influence of technical information and beliefs on policy change, but also a degree of overlap and alignment within a UK sport policy subsystem that has arguably been constructed by government rather than by advocacy coalitions.

Evidence suggests that a trio of advocacy coalitions for elite, community and school sport occupy the policy subsystem, having emerged from government intervention, and engineered by government to achieve its own objectives. While, the ACF’s assumptions of shared ‘policy-core’ beliefs as the norm for coalition membership/activity is still highly applicable, evidence suggests that coalitions are not merely the product of shared ‘policy-core’ beliefs, but can also be constructed and maintained through compliance, shared-interests/objectives, financial incentives and sanctions. This is exemplified by the SE-led social/community sport coalition and membership’s support to drive increased participation against a myriad of government objectives. The interaction between government/SE and policy actors (e.g. NGBs) also demonstrates a high degree of coordinated activity to meet shared goals, which arguably meets ACF assumptions regarding the structuring of advocacy coalitions through shared ‘policy-core’ beliefs, and significant engagement in coordinated activity over time. Yet, the requirement for NGBs to modernise and reform to become ‘fit-for-purpose’ to partner government, and the increasing dependency of NGBs on public funding arising from the greater access to opportunities and Lottery funds, demonstrates the power relationship between coalition members within the UK sport policy subsystem.

124 Evidence indicates that the UK sport policy subsystem has experienced a series of external shocks, which have shaped the trajectory of sports policy, thus highlighting the ACF’s usefulness in the explanation of major policy change. Examples of which are the Prime Ministerial change from Thatcher to Major, and the latter’s belief that sport matters to society; and the introduction of the Lottery which served to provide previously unimaginable financial resources for policy actors within the sport policy subsystem, the composition of which is complex, and influence predominantly follows the ‘money-trail.’ A further external shock was London’s successful bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games, which provoked a major change in the way sport policy was funded and delivered, elevating NGBs to a front-line mechanism for delivering government aims and objectives. However, evidence shows that the transition of NGBs to a higher level of responsibility was not strategic but opportunistic, as no alternative delivery method existed. It is also argued that the change from a generally non-interventionist Conservative philosophy to New Labour’s ‘Third Way – Best Value’ ideology, represented an external perturbation that explicitly changed the way government sport policy was funded and implemented, and again emphasises the usefulness of the ACF to explain policy change. The shift in government values for sport policy from a passive to contractual phase signalled an increased concern with compliance, shared-interests/objectives, and economic efficiency as conditions for participation within the sports policy subsystem and coalition membership.

Arguably, the HLSCOPL Report fashioned a major internal shock to the sport policy subsystem. In line with ACF assumptions, the perceived view of policy failure being placed in the public eye, which prompted a move away from ‘sports for sport’s sake’

to ‘sport for social good’, as seen in Sporting Future. This resulted in a changed focus for the SE-led coalition towards the inactive, served by an organisational-neutral

‘mixed model’ approach to funding. Such evidence confirmed that the UK sport policy subsystem was not confined to shared ‘policy-core’ beliefs, but also embodied shared-interests/objectives, compliance processes, and financial inducements and sanctions, which are also determinants of entry to and exit from coalition

‘mixed model’ approach to funding. Such evidence confirmed that the UK sport policy subsystem was not confined to shared ‘policy-core’ beliefs, but also embodied shared-interests/objectives, compliance processes, and financial inducements and sanctions, which are also determinants of entry to and exit from coalition