Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
re-election to public office is not one of the grounds by which criminal liability is extinguished. This is only true to administrative cases but not criminal cases.
(1) By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
Extinguishment of criminal liability is a ground of motion to quash
Criminal liability whether before or after final judgment is extinguished upon death because it is a personal penalty
Pecuniary penalty is extinguished only when death occurs before final judgement.
PP vs. BAYOTAS
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.
2. The claim of civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
3. Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefore, may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1 Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator of the estate of the accused, depending on the source obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
If the act or omission complained of gives rise to a cause of action arising from quasi-delict, the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
When the civil liability does not arise from a certain crime and predicated on law, contract, quasi-contract, or quasi-delict, the civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused during the pendency of the trial of a criminal action or appeal.
What is contemplated in Article 89 is that the accused who died before the finality of a verdict or conviction cannot be ordered to make restitution, reparation or indemnification to the offended party by way of moral and exemplary damages.
Where there are several accused, the death of one does not result to the dismissal of the action because the liabilities, whether civil or criminal of said accused are distinct and separate.
The death of the offended party pending the trial is not included in the total extinction of criminal liability under Art. 89, neither is it a ground for the dismissal of a criminal complaint or information. (Pp vs. Bundalian, 117 SCRA 718)
(2) By service of the sentence
Service does not extinguish civil liability
.(3) By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects
Amnesty – is an act of the sovereign power granting oblivion or general pardon. It wipes all traces and vestiges of the crime but does not extinguish civil liability
(4) By absolute pardon
Pardon – an act of grace proceeding from the power entrusted w/ the execution of laws, which exempts the individual from the punishment the law inflicts for the crime.
Pardon, although absolute does not erase the effects of conviction. Pardon
only excuses the convict from serving the sentence. There is an exception to
this and that is when the pardon was granted when the convict had already served the sentence such that there is no more service of sentence to be executed then the pardon shall be understood as intended to erase the effects of the conviction. But if he was serving sentence when he was
pardoned, that pardon will not wipe out the effects of the crime, unless the language of the pardon absolutely relieve the offender of all the effects thereof. Considering that recidivism does not prescribe, no matter how long
ago was the first conviction, he shall still be a recidivist.
When the crime carries with it moral turpitude, the offender even if granted
pardon shall still remain disqualified from those falling in cases where moral turpitude is a bar.
In Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr., 170 SCRA 191, it was held that absolute
pardon does not ipso facto entitle the convict to reinstatement to the public office forfeited by reason of his conviction. Although pardon restores his
eligibility for appointment to that office, the pardoned convict must reapply for the new appointment
AMNESTY PARDON
Extended to classes of persons who may
be guilty of political offenses Exercised individually by the president(any crime) Exercised even before trial or investigation Exercised when one is convicted
Looks backward and abolishes the offense itself
Looks forward and relieves the offender of the consequences
Does not extinguish civil liability Same A public act that needs the declaration of
the president with the concurrence of Congress
A private act of the president
Pardon becomes valid only when there is a final judgment. If given before this, it is premature and hence void. There is no such thing as a premature amnesty, because it does not require a final judgment; it may be given before final judgment or after it.
(5) By prescription of the crime
When the crime prescribes, the state loses the right to prosecute
Prescription of a crime – is the loss/forfeiture of the right of the state to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time.
(6) By prescription of the penalty
Means: the loss/forfeiture of the right of government to execute the final
sentence after the lapse of a certain time. Conditions: there must be final judgement and the period has elapsed.
(6) By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Art 344 of this Code
In the case of marriage, do not say that it is applicable for the crimes under Article 344. It is only true in the crimes of rape, abduction, seduction and acts of lasciviousness. Do not say that it is applicable to private crimes because the term includes adultery and concubinage. Marriages in these cases may even compound the crime of adultery or concubinage. It is only in
the crimes of rape, abduction, seduction and acts of lasciviousness that the marriage by the offender with the offended woman shall extinguish civil liability, not only criminal liability of the principal who marries the offended woman, but also that of the accomplice and accessory, if there are any.
Co-principals who did not themselves directly participate in the execution of the crime but who only cooperated, will also benefit from such marriage, but not when such co-principal himself took direct part in the execution of the crime.
Marriage as a ground for extinguishing civil liability must have been contracted in good faith. The offender who marries the offended woman must
be sincere in the marriage and therefore must actually perform the duties of a husband after the marriage, otherwise, notwithstanding such marriage, the offended woman, although already his wife can still prosecute him again, although the marriage remains a valid marriage. Do not think that the marriage is avoided or annulled. The marriage still subsists although the offended woman may re-file the complaint. The Supreme Court ruled that marriage contemplated must be a real marriage and not one entered to and
not just to evade punishment for the crime committed because the offender will be compounding the wrong he has committed.
In cases of multiple rapes, however, the principle does not
apply. Thus, if A, B and C raped W in that when A was having sex
with W, B and C were holing the legs and arms, and when it was B’s turn, A and C were the ones holding W’s legs and arms, and when C was the one having sex with W, the ones holding her arms and legs were A and B. Even if later on, A contracted marriage with W, there is no extinction of penal responsibility because this is a case of multiple rapes.
The grant of probation may be considered as a form of extinction of criminal liability which was bestowed while accused who has never been encarcerated, was out on bail, may thus be categorized as total extinction thereof. However, if it was granted after the conviction of the accused who was in jail, it can be considered as partial extinction only. It must be noted however, that unlike in service of sentence, in probation, the probationer is still required to report to Probation Officer at a certain period until the duration of the probation period.
Art. 90. Prescription of crime. — Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years. Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year. The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.
Light offenses prescribe in two months.
When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article. (As amended by RA 4661, approved June 19, 1966.)
In computing for the period, the first day is excluded and the last day included. Subject to leap years