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DEL COMITÉ DE EVALUACIÓN Y COMPENSACIÓN

In document ESTATUTOS Y SUS REGLAMENTOS (página 101-105)

Studies on agricultural development in Botswana seem to lack one essential element - the need to associate the study of local politics and local development administration, on the one hand, and rural agricultural economy, on the other. It is almost inconceivable how a study of the agrarian question in Botswana can proceed without a proper synthesis of these contending forces of motion. What are the functional relationships between local administration, politics and the agricultural economy and how have the same determined the mode of agrarian transition in the rural economy over time?

A most important model in the study of institutional development in African politics, so common in the political sociology of the 1960s has been "the theory of social mobilisation" (Holm, 1971). According to the literature on the latter subject, initiators and supporters of new political institutions come predominantly from those groups of the population which are more affected by social and economic change. Social mobilisation theorists in particular often hypothesise that the groups most likely to involve themselves in new political institutions are the youth, the more educated, wage employees and many others who are alienated from traditional society. However, when put to rigorous analysis this modern-vis-a-vis traditional perception of political participation is found wanting in the case of Botswana.

With the imposition of a British Protectorate mandate over Bechuanaland in 1885, the Tswana chiefs became the primary executive authority in local Government. The representatives of the colonial administration at the local level, the District/Resident Commissioners, confined themselves to the role of giving advice and guidance. In fact the British were so lax in exercising their authority over the chiefs that it was not until 1934 that the Protectorate Government issued any significant regulations governing the duties of chiefs. Even then, these regulations were effectively resisted by some of the chiefs and had to be substantially modified before they could be implemented.

Meanwhile, certain institutional aspects and traditions of colonial administrative policy were gaining ground in the Protectorate. In a pioneering study of the evolution of an "administrative state" in Botswana, Gunderson (1971) makes the following observation:

Colonial rule brought to Bechuanaland a cadre of Western or European civil servants, in theory, the policy of "indirect rule" posited that traditional authority was to concern itself with the traditional or African population, while colonial authority would focus on general over-rule, particularly in regard to defence (p. 223).

In his studies, however, Gunderson reveals that in reality traditional authority was eventually undermined. The result was a reorientation of:

... decision making for the social order away from local rule and towards centralised agencies. Thus a situation developed where authority for decision-making began to flow downwards from experts oriented to a Western cultural ethos towards a peasant mass restricted to traditional Tswana culture (ibid., p. 223).

But as mentioned earlier the chiefs did not take all this curtailment of their powers lying down. Indeed, even today it can be argued that the existence of their residual powers is still manifest in the enduring, but anachronistic House of Chiefs (Proctor, 1968). Recently, political scientists have placed more emphasis on the extent to which traditional patterns of behaviour are integrated into new political institutions; an approach more rewarding in that old values and

perceptions of both governance and social reality as well as the traditional leaders are analyzed with regard to the way in which they affect the character of the new modes of administration and the extent to which new (rural) institutions find general public acceptance (Holm, 1971).

African self-Government was achieved at the national level in Botswana in 1965. The structure of Government designed for independent Botswana as embodied in the constitution of the country followed, with minor exceptions, the model of British parliamentary democracy. As one of the last British African colonies to become independent in the 1960s, Botswana gained a slight reputation as a dumping ground for colonial civil servants who had lost their jobs elsewhere (Gunderson, 1971) (1). Most of these expatriates were later to occupy managerial, technical and supervisory positions in Government and their policy influence has been extremely crucial as will be seen later.

A small educated elite numbering no more than 43 university degree holders, a few school teachers, clerical workers and political activists complemented the efforts of this expatriate personnel. The former constituted what Kuper (1970) called the " New Man”. They comprised mostly of young but politically experienced royals and sons of influential Tswana families who had obtained their academic training in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia although a few like Sir Seretse Khama, leader of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and first president of independent Botswana, and the radical nationalist K.T. Motsepe (leader of the opposition splinter group - Botswana Peoples' Party) received their education in western Europe. Others like Dr. K. Koma, current leader of the opposition Botswana National Front (BNF) in parliament, and described by Hoim (1971) as a romantic Leninist and naive Machiavellian, were trained in eastern Europe. Many of these so-called New Men represented the ruling group within the BDP. At independence they served in parliament, occupied senior positions in the civil service, and a few were employed to administer party structures in the rural areas. A handful were employed in the private sector which was, and still is, heavily dominated by foreign capital.

When a new constitution was drafted for the granting of self-Government to the then British Protectorate in 1963, it was decided that rapid constitutional advance should be matched by a democratic system of local Government (Jeppe, 1974). A Local Government Commission set up in the same year recommended a system of district councils of which the majority of members were to be elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage. The legal framework of local Government arose from the report of the Local Government Commission to the legislative council in 1964. This system of local Government representation was introduced by the Local Government Law, 1965 (Law No. 20 of 1965).

The Local Government Commission consisted of politicians from three parties, chiefs and civil servants and it agreed in its findings that:

... provision should be made for a nonracial representative and responsible system of local Government in Bechuanaland. The system should as far as possible be a national development from the existing system of tribal administration (MacCartney, 1978, p. 395).

However, the Protectorate Government went even further in its explicit espousal of democracy as the basis for the Local Government system arguing that:

(i) The policy of Her Majesty's Government and the desires of the people of Bechuanaland today are the same... this means that administration at every level must be nonracial, representative and responsible.

(ii) It is essential that constitutional development at the centre should be balanced by the growth of democratic institutions throughout the country.

(iii) It is a matter of great importance and urgency that the territory's rapid constitutional advance should be matched by an efficient and democratic system of local Government {ibid., p. 395).

This new system of local Government was, consequently, brought into operation at the beginning of 1966, just a few months before Botswana gained independence. Although its introduction was mainly due to pressures from the pre-independence administration, the implementation of the system was left to the emerging national leadership of the BDP.

The establishment of local Government in rural areas was carried out in haste due to pressures from the departing colonial power. One consequence of this hasty implementation of the system was the important decision to recognise the existing tribal entities by basing the units of rural local Government on the clan territories and by converting the clan administrative structures into the nucleus of the new District Commission staff. The direct political advantage of this new arrangement was the impression it created among the population. Many people got the wrong impression that the new system represented a development of the old traditional system rather than its abolition (MacCartney, 1978). However, most people in general, and the chiefs in particular, were disappointed in the immediate post-independence period when marked discernible trends began to emerge in the relations between the BDP Central Government and the District Commission staff. Starting with the premise that "democratic local Government" should replace the rule of the chiefs, the Government transferred a series of powers and administrative functions from the latter to elected district councillors (Jeppe, 1974, pp. 142-152).

When the chiefs responded by vigorously opposing the unfavourable decentralisation exercise instituted by the BDP, and others resigned their positions as ethnic rulers to join mainstream opposition parties (21), the Government sought to contain popular dissent by resorting to new hybrid bodies like the notorious Land Boards and District Development Committees. These two eventually took over the chiefs hitherto traditionally sanctioned prerogative functions over land distribution and water development.

Thus, it would appear that, confronted with a choice between strengthening the pyramid of democratic institutions bequeathed to it by the previous British administration and continually stressed in its political rhetoric ad nauseam and relying increasingly on a purely administrative approach, the BDP Government opted for the latter.

In document ESTATUTOS Y SUS REGLAMENTOS (página 101-105)