Comparación de costos split set y madera incluido el flete

>ewer or icptic lanl Concrete lalrine Wooden latrine Others 57.201 53.737 4 Ü 3 2 68.705 146.431 332.748 43.959 90.489 104.551 2.312 58.976 36.675 19.346 Costa Rica [ZZ3 1963 Census Years BSB 1973 1984 180 160 140 120 100 60 40

Concrete latrine Wooden latrine Others

Sewer or septic tank None

16.129 11.853 7.409 I 1963 I 1973 I 1984 38.278 78.896 156.041 16.663 27.912 25,147 0.429 0.464 0.304 14.912 7.775 3.169

San José Province Census Years

C. Electricity network

Figures 2.4 shows changes in the degree of the electricity networks during the last 20 years. The pattern of growth is similar to that of the water supply. During the two inter census periods the network grew faster than the total number of houses.

In the country, the percentage of houses with individual electricity connections was 54% in 1963 and grew to 66% in 1973 and to 83% in 1984. The percentage of houses which used electricity to cook was lower (25%, 34% and 48%), but during the last period it grew by a larger ratio (2.15) than the number of houses with electricity (1.89) and particularly in relation to the growth in the total number of houses: 1.51. This means that there has been a process of change from other forms of cooking to the use of electricity.

In the province of San José the original percentage of houses with electricity connections was higher: 72% (1 9 6 3 ). The proportion grew to 81% in 1973 and to 92% in 1984. In 1963 50% of the houses used electricity to cook and the proportion grew to 61% in 1973 and 70% in 1984. In San José the ratio of growth has been less than that for the whole country. This means a higher growth ratio of the services in rural areas and secondary cities.

The significant coverage of the electricity network is explained by constant investment since the early 1950s and even before, not only in the building of the network but also in the building of various hydroelectric dams. The national network and major projects for producing and distributing electricity (as well as telephones and other communications systems) were built with a series of foreign loans over thirty years, but also the Institute for Electricity (ICE) has been a model of good management among public companies in the country's modern history.

The service of public electric lighting in San José started only in 1884, but during the twentieth century the network grew rapidly, particularly after the complete nationalization of electricity companies at the end of the 1950s. ICE was created in 1949 (Law #449) and its law of constitution made it responsible for the production of energy that the country needed for industrial development and residential growth. From the beginning the strategy was to develop a series of large hydroelectric dams to produce cheap electricity from national resources. Original plans estimated that industrial development would use 44% and residential growth 33% of the whole production. In early 1980 the consumption per capita of electricity was 231 KW/H per year and the coverage of urban zones was 95% (GAM; 1983:272).

D. Transport and rubbish collection

Private developers working for the first administration or in private projects did not meet basic urban standards according to the law or the new directives from SESVAH. The projects had little provision for public transport systems, and were actually designed for private transport, without bus stations, and with narrow roads, etc. The designs were in a typical middle class lay­ out, while the families were from low-income sectors and needed public transport.

When the number of housing projects decreased, families suffered from further declining standards. 'Lots with services' projects kept their dirt roads for years, so it was impossible to

introduce public transport to the barrios, and families had to walk to the main roads. These projects gave basic urban services, which meant water supply, electricity, drains and community services, but during the rainy season transit (even by foot) became very difficult. Some of these projects also restricted the water supply to some stand-pipes for various years due to lack of coordination between institutions. In addition, rubbish collection was ineffective because this is a responsibility of local government which normally had very limited budgets, so new barrios increased demand but Municipalities did not obtain any more equipment.

The main precarios of the AMSJ created critical conditions for the local governments, particularly from 1983, when the second administration began to concentrate community groups in large public areas. In 1985 and 1986 thousands of families were relocated into two large public areas (owned by INVU) with only some stand-pipes. The creation of CEV and its intervention in these places began a process of improvement, first in the amount of urban services and then through the development of proper fully serviced houses.

One of the main goals of CEV was to coordinate government institutions to improve the services and general conditions of the old precarios. CEV officials said that coordination with ICE or ICAA was easy, but it was almost impossible with local governments.®’ According to the new law CEV did not have to ask permission from local governments for its buildings and barrios, but as the Municipalities would have to take on rubbish collection, cleaning and community services, they formally rejected new projects. This led to conflicts and subsequent negotiations. Municipalities were prepared to provide new services only if the CEV gave them extra resources, but CEV neither had the resources nor the legal power to give funds.

Conflicts between CEV and Municipalities were sometimes very serious and Municipalities simply stopped some projects from developing. Sometimes they made agreements and sometimes the families continued without local government services after CEV finished its work. The situation varied according to the number of families, the original conditions of the barrios and the capacity of the Municipalities, but there was a clear lack of proper coordination and of a central institution to control development of the Metropolitan Area of San José.

At the end of the third administration, the enormous growth caused by new projects concentrated in some cantons of the AMSJ and the lack of controls on new developments caused a wide debate among professionals and officials from the government, universities and private companies. This debate became a formal conference at the end of 1989,®® the resolutions of which suggested the creation of a new central authority for the AMSJ.