Comparación de huellas

The form er H absburg position was now taken by G reat Britain, which, as we have seen, had become actively concerned in O ttom an affairs only at the end o f the eighteenth century. Previously the state had been engrossed in the duel for em pire with France. A fter its victory over its rival and the acquisition o f India, the British governm ent gave its m ajor attention to the protection o f its vast colonial dom ains and the commercial routes to the East. These lines o f com munication ran direcdy through the O ttom an territories. T he situation became even m ore serious with the developm ent o f steam transport and the opening o f the Suez Canal in 1869. With the weakening o f France, Britain regarded Russia as the ch ief threat to its w orld position. Britain’s constant fear was that the Russian army w ould inflict a fatal defeat on the O ttom an Em pire, which w ould be follow ed by the collapse o f that state and

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887

the establishment o f Russian domination in the Balkan peninsula and at the Straits.

T h e apparent Russian menace had an Asiatic perspective. D u rin g the nine­ teenth century Russia not only absorbed the Caucasus area, but extended control over the Central Asian steppelands and the three khanates o f K hiva, Bokhara, and Kokand. The Russian border by 1885 thus reached that o f British- protected Afghanistan. Russian advances in the Far E ast at the expense o f China were also seen w ith apprehension in London. W ith points o f conflict running from the Pacific to the Mediterranean, it can be understood w h y British diplom ats watched the Russian moves w ith such care. M oreover, the key to the entire situation appeared to lie in Constantinople and the Turkish Straits.

Because o f these concerns, the British governm ent supported the m ainte­ nance o f the O ttom an Em pire and its continued dom ination over its wide territories. T h e alternative appeared to be an inevitable Russian control o f the region, in particular o f the Balkans and the Straits. This policy, together w ith its continued enthusiasm for colonial expansion, placed the British g o v­ ernm ent in a contradictory position. At home, where liberal victories resulted in an ever-w idening franchise, and on the Continent, where Britain usually joined w ith France in opposing the conservative powers, support was given to national and liberal movements. In contrast, in their ow n colonial posses­ sions and in the Eastern Q uestion, the British leaders follow ed quite different policies. A lth ough they always encouraged efforts to reform the Ottoman adm inistration, movements that had as their objective the dissolution o f the em pire were usually firmly discouraged.

D espite the defeat o f N apoleon, France continued to pursue an active pol­ icy in the M editerranean, but with the major attention directed tow ard N orth A frica and Syria, and not Constantinople and the Balkans. In the M editer­ ranean region, seen as a w hole, the chief French opponent remained Britain, w hose fleet controlled the waters o f that sea. H ow ever, in the m ore restricted area o f the A egean and Black seas, the French governm ent could cooperate w ith the British in opposing a Russian advance. French policy, in fact, pre­ served a great deal o f freedom o f action. When France’s interests were served, its diplom ats could support the maintenance o f the O ttom an Em pire. They had, how ever, the alternative o f agreeing to a partition and o f taking E gypt, Syria, and A lgeria, areas to which claims had already been staked out.

A s can be seen, although the policies o f Britain, France, and A ustria often conflicted in the N ear East, all were extremely apprehensive about Russian actions. It had certainly been clear throughout the eighteenth century that the Russian governm ent did have definite territorial goals, all o f which could

be achieved only at O ttom an expense. From the reign o f Peter the Great onw ard, an active policy o f expansion in the Black Sea region had been fol­ lowed. B y the end o f the eighteenth century, not only had the lands north o f that sea been taken, including the Crimea, but Russia was deeply involved in

The first national revolutions

the affairs o f the O rthodox Balkan people, in particular the Greeks, Serbs, M ontenegrins, and, o f course, the Rom anians in the D anubian Principalities. Before 1812 the tsarist governm ent had considered annexing the Rom anian provinces, but had limited itself to the acquisition o f Bessarabia.

In the nineteenth century the Russian governm ent was to retain the advan­ tages in Balkan affairs that it had enjoyed previously. Russian armies w ere in a position to menace C onstantinople, and, as w e have seen, the Balkan people did in fact offer a potential source o f support. Som e groups always called for Russian intervention. Should the Russian statesmen wish to exploit O ttom an weakness, they could usually count on Balkan allies.

O ther considerations, however, tended to take precedence and to limit se­ verely any tem ptation to pursue a forw ard policy in the area. In com parison w ith the West, Russia was a backward state. T h rou ghou t the nineteenth cen­ tury, w hen Western and Central E uro pe were undergoing a period o f rapid econom ic transform ation w ith the industrial revolution, Russian develop­ ment lagged behind. A lthough Russian armies were large in size, they were not particularly effective on the batdefield. The repeated victories w o n against the weak O ttom an em pire were not easily achieved. T h e Russian borders w ere also long and difficult to defend. T he great fear o f the governm ent th roughout the century was that the adoption o f an adventurous course in the Eastern Q uestion w ould lead to the form ation o f a European coalition and a crushing m ilitary defeat. This possibility, which became a reality in the m iddle o f the century, constandy hampered Russian actions.

Fortunately fo r Russian interests, the governm ent had alternatives to war by w hich it could achieve diplom atic suprem acy in the N ear East. I f the destruction o f the O ttom an Em pire were abandoned as a goal, Russia could instead adopt a policy o f alliance, and through close cooperation control and supervise the actions o f the weaker partner. A lready Russian-O ttom an m ili­ tary actions had been undertaken during the N apoleonic Wars. Th e occupa­ tion and subsequent administration o f the Ionian Islands had been a joint venture. Should this course o f action be chosen, the Russian governm ent o f course could not actively support Balkan revolutionary movements. It too w ould have to counsel the O rthodox population to accept the situation, a policy that was often neither effective nor popular.

T he Russian statesmen, how ever, had already discovered a partial solution to this dilemma. A s w e have seen, in the treaties dealing w ith the D anubian Principalities, provisions had been inserted enabling the Russian governm ent to supervise the internal political conditions o f the provinces. In Article V I I I o f the Treaty o f Bucharest o f 1812, similar stipulations gave St. Petersburg a tight to interfere in Serbian affairs. There w ere, in addition, the numerous vague provisions in other treaties dealing w ith the protection o f O rthodox Christianity. W ith these religious and political rights o f protection, Russian officials could both w ield great influence in Constantinople and also w in fa­ vor am ong the Balkan peoples. T h ey could exert their pow er to gain reform s

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887

see, to break dow n in crises involving the Balkans. In this area Prussia had no direct interests, and Austrian and Russian aims were often in open con­ flict.

D espite the conservative stance o f all o f the m ajor pow ers, revolutionary m ovem ents continued to gain strength and to disrupt international affairs. R evolts took place in som e German states, in Italy, and in Spain and her colonial possessions. T h e events in Central E urope and Italy w ere particularly dam aging to Austrian interests. H absburg foreign policy was under the di­ rection o f one o f the m ost able diplomats o f the time, Clem ens von Metter- nich. W inning over the tsar to his view s, he was able to im plem ent a policy that called fo r m ilitary intervention wherever a legitimate m onarch had been overthrow n o r was threatened by revolutionary activity. U n d er this program Austrian armies marched into Italy and put dow n revolts in the K in gd om o f the Tw o Sicilies and Sardinia in 1821; French troops undertook the same mis­ sion in Spain in 1823.

A lth ough Britain, and later France, w ithdrew from the Continental coali­ tion, Russia, A ustria, and Prussia remained joined in an alignm ent that not only stood for opposition to revolutions, but also favored positive measures fo r their suppression. F o r Alexander I “ the revolution” had become a truly m enacing presence. B y the time o f the opening o f the C ongress o f Laibach (Ljubljana) in 1821, w hich had been called to deal w ith Italian affairs, the tsar was convinced o f the existence o f an international revolutionary committee, w ith headquarters in Paris, which organized revolutions throughout Europe and engaged in constant intrigue and agitation. Both the national and the liberal bases o f m ost o f the revolts did in fact constitute a direct threat to the three conservative regimes. It can thus be seen w hy Russia and the H absburg E m pire, the tw o states immediately adjacent to the Balkan O ttom an prov­ inces, were strongly against change by revolutionary, violent means, and why they were com m itted to the defense o f the status quo in international rela­ tions.

T h e revolutionary situation in the Balkans

In the previous pages the general background to the first Balkan revolutions has been examined. It would, however, be a mistake to assign too much importance to elements that were in some ways extraneous to the everyday experiences o f the average Balkan inhabitant. A lthough E uropean ideology, the revival o f national consciousness am ong the intellectuals, the rise o f an O rthodox merchant class, and the com peting goals o f the great powers in the N ear E ast all play a role in our story, the immediate causes o f the first revolts lay rather in the internal conditions in the peninsula, almost all o f w hich had arisen in the eighteenth century. First in importance was the o b ­ vious failure o f the O ttom an governm ent to maintain law and order in the countryside and to control the unruly and brigand elements, both Christian