Comparación con el sistema convencional a base de colectores solares

Reasonableness is contrasted with, and complements,³³⁵ rationality. When

reasonable persons pursue their own good in cooperation with others, they wish to pursue it in a way that is fair to the others they are cooperating with in that pursuit, and to

themselves. I think of it this way: reasonable persons come to interaction with others unwilling to press for their own good at all costs, and unwilling to use the full powers of their physical or intellectual advantages to get as much as they can. Instead, they stand ready to put aside some of their aims (though not all), providing that others are also willing to put aside theirs, and come to an agreement on fair terms of cooperation.

If reasonable, you approach cooperation with others with your interests viewed as provisional. You are willing to put aside any of these interests, provided that (1) the

332 PL, pp. 50, 220—221.

333 TJ, p. 127/110 334 PL, pp. 50—51

335 PL, p. 52. Freeman (2007b) pp. 22—25, tells a Rousseauian story of how neither rationality and reasonableness should be seen to be more primitive than each other. Rawls endorses it at PL, p. 53

88 willingness of others to do the same can be known and assured, and that (2) the

cooperation is mutually advantageous to all overall. I believe that any interests is the right understanding. A merely reasonable being “would have no ends of their own they wanted to advance by fair cooperation.”³³⁶ From this statement I conjecture that an ideally

reasonable person would be willing to put aside any of their particular ends, providing it supported a fair and advantageous social world. Only an understanding such as this could be compatible with Rawls's comments in Theory that “a perfectly just society should be part of an ideal that rational human beings could desire more than anything else once they have full knowledge and experience of what it was”³³⁷ and “for the sake of justice a man may lose his life where another would live to a later day.”³³⁸ This latter example quite starkly supports my reading, I feel. If any interest may be expected not to be put aside, it would be an interest such as this. Of course the sacrifice couldn't be pointless. But then the sacrifice wouldn't be pointless if it was in the service of preserving a just and fair social world.

It may appear that this ideal of reasonableness is excessively demanding. Surely there are certain commitments each of us has which we could never consider giving up in the name of a just and fair social world? What if doing my part in preserving or working towards a just society required I put my family in danger? I was the only one with the information regarding the coup which is being plotted. I know that the coup will most likely succeed unless I act. I also know that revenge will no doubt be pursued if I do act. It is understandable that I may not act — I do not think inaction would make anyone an immoral person here. But there are several observations to make. First, a fair social world would presumably not require that people give up such commitments unless it were

completely necessary to maintain the essentials of that society. It will often be the case that other demands can be made of us. These other demands could indeed also be serious sacrifices. But it all comes down to whether failing to do what is necessary to support the fair scheme of cooperation is the greater or lesser sacrifice for the person. In my example, my family's safety is a greater sacrifice to me than acting on the ideals of a just society. But placing our home in jeopardy, while a great sacrifice as well, may not be as great a

sacrifice as justice. Hence, all-things-considered, acting justly at the cost of the family home may be my only proper response.³³⁹ However, if such choices continually arise, eventually it may be that there is not enough in common between our interests and those of

336 PL, p. 52 337 TJ, p. 477/418 338 TJ, p. 573/502

339 If Mam, Dad or Becky are reading this: first, hi; second, thanks for reading this far; and third, I think justice can let us keep the house.

89 the rest of society. Cooperation for reciprocal advantage may simply not be possible, and the circumstances of justice will not obtain. So in summary, reasonableness may be very demanding. But it cannot be so demanding that the individual agent actually gains nothing at all from playing their part in a reasonable scheme. This is ruled out by the very

definition of reasonableness given by Rawls.

It is important to stress at this point that being motivated to be reasonable is not necessarily to be motivated by some element of one's good. If this were the case, there would be no question as to whether the requirements of justice and right could be

congruent with a person's good (subsection 4.2). Either justice would be part of your good, or you would be completely unconcerned with justice. The possibility that you acted justly, but acting justly was not good for you, would not exist. This is not to say that being just is not an end for people who are reasonable. It is simply that it is an open question whether it is a rational end – an open question which congruence arguments attempt to close.

Furthermore, being reasonable – it should be stressed – is not to be motived purely by the elements of other people's good, as with altruism.³⁴⁰ Rather, reasonable persons

are not moved by the general good as such but desire for its own sake a social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept. They insist that reciprocity should hold within that world so that each benefits along with others.³⁴¹

Neither reasonableness, nor rationality, nor indeed altruism, are sufficient in

themselves to ascribe much character to the members of the well-ordered society. As noted earlier, interests relating to each of these capacities are second-order interests, i.e. interests about one's other interests, or the interests of others. This is obvious with altruism. It moves us to meet others' interests, but not our own. But the other powers presuppose first-order motivations and interests also. Rationality entreats us to organise our various ends and motivations. But need not itself, on Rawls's view, provide any. Reasonableness asks us to secure arrangements between oneself and others where a fair selection of everyone's interests are met. But, again, there must first be initial interests to balance. Having said that the members of the well-ordered society are reasonable and rational, we hold that whatever interests and ends they possess, they will order them and attempt to act on them within the limits set by rationality and reasonableness. But we have not said anything about what

340 PL, p. 50, TJ, p. 189/165

341 PL, p. 50. See also TJ, p. 478/418—419

90 those interests etc. will actually be.³⁴² Included amongst these interests are the key interests previously spoken of. Until we have said something about these key interests, we cannot say that the members of the society will actually do anything at all.