Comparativa reguladora entre Comunidades Autónomas

judged as sublime by everyone else.⁴⁰² The sublime has a necessary reference to liking or admiring. This kind of necessity has neither a theoretical character allowing us to cognize a priori that everyone will feel this liking, nor a practical character where the liking is the necessary consequence of an objective law, according to which one ought to act in a certain way. Instead, it is an exemplary necessity, that is,

399 Ak 221 Kant (1987), pp. 65, 66, 84, 99; see also Allison (2001), p. 323.

400 Ak 245, 246 Kant (1987), p. 99

401 Ak 203-205, 207-209, 211, 226, 228, Kant (1987), pp. 44, 46, 48-49, 51, 53, 73, 75.

402 Ak 211, 214, Kant (1987), pp. 54, 57.

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a necessity of the agreement of all with an aesthetic judgment which is regarded as an example of a universal rule that we are unable to state.⁴⁰³ Here, Kant points out that he the su li e a ises i o e s i d, o e ot o l presupposes that everyone else judges in the same way, but she also requires the same judgment from all others. Her judgment is then required to be not only hers, ut e e o e else s judgment as well. Hence, she speaks of the sublime as if it was a property of things themselves, or as something having general validity, or being public –not just a private feeling or personal opinion. Thus, one eventually demands that everyone else agrees with them.⁴⁰⁴

Within this context, Kant argues that a judgment of sublime may be converted into a logical judgment based on an aesthetic one. For example, if looking at the ocean e do ot si pl sa that this ocean is sublime to me ut this ocean is su li e , then our judgment is no longer merely aesthetic but is a logical judgment based on an aesthetic judgment, given that, contrary to the first expression, the second one is stated in non-subjective terms carrying with it, as Kant says, an aesthetic quantity of universality, that is, of validity for everyone. Hence, it resembles a judgment about the good in the sense that when the ocean is called sublime we effectively believe that we have a universal voice claiming to the agreement of everyone.⁴⁰⁵

This is in effect the Ka tia su je ti e u i e sal o u i a ilit of the aesthetic judgments in general, namely of the aesthetic judgments of the beautiful and the aesthetic judgments of the sublime.⁴⁰⁶ As has been mentioned, in the case of the su li e, i pa ti ula , Ka t defi es this su je ti e u i e sal o u i a ilit as the free play of imagination and reason. This special kind of subjective –not objective, because it does not rest on a concept as in the case of a moral

403 Ak 237, Kant (1987), p. 85.

404 Ak 213-216, Kant (1987), pp. 56-60.

405 Ak. 215-216, Kant (1987), p. 58-60.

406 Ak 217-218, Kant (1987), p. 62.

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judgment⁴⁰⁷– universality is the esult of the fa t that o e s judg e t is ot ased on private conditions, or interests, or inclinations, or ideologies, and so on; so that it can be assumed that everyone else judges in the same way, or that the relevant judgment is universally valid for all subjects.⁴⁰⁸ Here the question arises as to how we become conscious of the reciprocal subjective harmony between our cognitive powers?

The reciprocal subjective harmony, as Kant claims, reveals itself through sensation only. This sensation, in particular, consists of the free play of imagination and reason.⁴⁰⁹ Hence, when one talks about the relevant object, belonging in the aesthetic area of the sublime, one speaks as if the sublime was something accorded to the object itself, and o e s judgment is a logical judgment valid for everyone, not an aesthetic judgment; for example, one says that the view from the top of the mountain is sublime, not that one considers the view from the top of the mountain as sublime. Kant claims that it would be ridiculous if someone who prided himself on his taste tried to justify it by saying that the object is sublime for him or her.⁴¹⁰ 7. In pa ti ula , Ka t a gues that the o ditio fo the e essit alleged a judgment of taste is the idea of a o o se se .⁴¹¹ Co o se se , which differs f o o o u de sta di g , i hi h the judgment is based on concepts, is a subjective principle which determines by feeling only and universal validity the liking or admiring. That is to say, it is a sha ed se se all, i.e. a judging power that in efle ti g takes a ou t of e e o e else s a of p ese ti g so ethi g, in order as it were to compare our own judgment with human reason, so that to escape the illusion arising from the ease of mistaking subjective conditions for objective ones.⁴¹² Kant describes in detail how this is done: We compare our judgments not so much with the actual, but rather with the possible judgments of others putting

407 Ak 214, Kant (1987), p. 58.

408 Ak 244, Kant (1987), p. 97.

409 Ak 292 Kant (1987), p. 158.

410 Ak 212-213, 214-215, see: Kant (1987), pp. 55-56, 58-59.

411 Ak 238, Kant (1987), p. 87.

412 Ak 293, Kant (1987), p. 160.

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ourselves in the position of others by abstracting from the limitations that attach to our own judging, that is, by leaving out as much as possible whatever belongs to sensation, and focusing more on the formal features of our presentation. Kant mentions three crucial elements in achieving this common sense: 1) to think without prejudices and superstitions, 2) to think in broad terms overriding the private conditions of judgment, and 3) to think repeatedly using 1) and 2).⁴¹³ Eventually, through common or shared sense, the aesthetic judgment becomes universally communicable, hence a judgment with exemplary validity, that is, a rule for everyone.⁴¹⁴ Consequently, whenever we make an aesthetic judgment declaring that something is sublime (or beautiful), we presuppose that everyone else holds the same opinion, or that everyone else ought to agree with our judgment, even though our judgment is based only on our own feeling.

8. Further, according to Kant, the sublime is not just an aesthetic judgment, but also