Comparativa de resultados de ensayos con y sin rejilla

 FC Art. 102 (4) provides: “Net profits earned” - “shall be the increase in value between the market value of the

community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.”

 For the purpose of dissolution and liquidation, the definition of Art 102 (4) shall govern; both for ACP (Art. 102) and CPG (Art. 129)

 ACP Art 102:

(1) Find the market value of the properties at the time of the community’s dissolution.

(2) Total market value of all the properties - Debts and obligations of the absolute community = Net assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute community

(3) Net assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute community - market value of the properties at the time 156

of marriage = Net profits earned (4) Net profits earned ÷ 2

 CPG Art. 129:

(1) Conjugal properties + Reimbursements for benefits received by a spouse from the

conjugal partnership – Reimbursements to spouse/s for benefits received by conjugal partnership = Total assets of conjugal partnership

(2) Total assets of conjugal partnership - Debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership = Net profits earned (3) Net profits earned ÷ 2

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

Net profits earned shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.

Note: The definition was not used in computing for CPG. There was no computation of market value, etc. They strictly used Art.

129, and only provided Art 102 (4) as the definition of “net profits earned” to clarify the dispositive portion of RTC.

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

Remo v DFA

TOPIC: On use of surname (NCC 371, 364, 369) PONENTE: Carpio, J.

AUTHOR: Magsino, Patricia Marie C.

Note:

FACTS: (chronological order)

 Petition for review on certiorari of a CA decision and resolution affirming DFA decision denying Maria Virginia Remo’s request to revert to the use of her maiden name in her replacement passport

 Remo’s (married Filipino citizen) Philippine passport was then expiring on Oct. 27, 2000

 Remo being then married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the ff. entries appear on her passport; Rallonza (surname), Maria Virgina (given name), Remo (middle name)

 Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, and while her marriage was still subsisting, she requested to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport (DFA Chicago), this was denied

 Petitioner then wrote to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siason, this was also denied

 She then filed an appeal with the Office of the President but it was dismissed, ruling that RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act) only cites 4 instances where a married woman may revert to her maiden name; (1) divorce, (2) annulment, (3) declaration of nullity of marriage, and (4) death of husband

 Remo then moved for reconsideration before the CA but this was also denied, hence the present petition ISSUE(S):

WON Remo (who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport) can revert to the use of her maiden name in replacement passport

HELD:

NO. Remo may not revert to the use of her maiden name in her passport.

RATIO:

RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act) cites only 4 instances where a married woman may revert to the use of her maiden name in the passport. These are; (1) divorce, (2) annulment, (3) declaration of nullity of marriage, and (4) death of husband. Clearly Remo does not fall within any of the categories, so her petition must fail.

Truthfully, Remo could have used her maiden name in the passport but she chose to use her husband’s surname in her expired passport. Once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert back to the use of her maiden name anymore.

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Petition is DENIED!

CA Decision and Resolution is AFFIRMED!

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

Valdez v. Republic

G.R. No. 180863. September 8, 2009 TOPIC: Marriage when one spouse is absent , FC 41-44

PONENTE: Nachura, J.

AUTHOR: Ocampo, Miguel TAKE NOTE: CC83 and CC390

FACTS:

 On Jan. 11, 1971, petitioner Angelita Valdez and Sofio got married. However, they argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and does not bring home any money. So on March 1972, Sofio left the conjugal home w/c prompted Angelita to go back to her parents in Camiling.

 On 1975, Sofio showed up to Angelita and talked about getting separated. They made a document to effect the separation and this was the last time Angelita saw him and heard from him.

 On June 20, 1985, with the belief that Sofio was already dead, Angelita married Virgilio Reyes. Virgilio was about to be a naturalized US citizen but it did not happen because of Angelita’s marriage to Sofio.

 So this gave rise to this petition for the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio. But the RTC held:

a. That Angelita failed to prove her well-grounded belief that Sofio was already dead pursuant to FC41;

b. She did not exert diligent efforts to find her husband in light of their agreement to live separately;

c. Angelita’s daughter, Nancy, testified that she was prevented by her mother to look for Sofio;

d. Despite Sofio being 61 yrs. old by now, upon reaching 60s have not become evident that people of such age are low in health and spirits;

e. Assuming arguendo the allegation that Sofio was a chain-smoker and drunkard, there’s no evidence he still is up to now.

 Angelita now files a motion for reconsideration contending that it is the old CC that applies, not FC. Applying FC would be prejudicial to Angelita’s vested rights under the old CC. E dineny pa rin ng RTC.

ISSUE:

 WON the petition should prosper. NO.

HELD:

 SC affirmed RTC’s decision but on different grounds:

a. Only cases of pure question of law can be directly appealed to SC, not question of facts. But the facts of the case was not disputed because of the motion (w/c the OSG agreed to) was WON it is the old CC or FC that applies;

b. In the Szatraw case, the petitioner’s husband was missing for more than 7 yrs. and was already presumed dead pursuant to CC83 and CC390. The petition for a declaration that her husband is presumptively dead was denied because such declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve her situation because such presumption is already established by law (CC390);

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c. In Lukban v. Republic, petitioner Lourdes Lukban filed a petition in 1956 for a declaration of presumption of death of her husband, Francisco because he was already missing for more than 20 yrs. after a quarrel on Dec. 27, 1933;

d. In Gue v. Republic, petitioner Angelina Gue’s husband, William, left Manila to go to Shanghai and after 11 yrs., nothing was heard from him despite effort to find him, hence, prompted her to file a petition for a declaration of the presumption of death of Willian Gue pursuant to CC390.

 In both cases mentioned ([c] and [d]), the Szatraw ruling was reiterated. These marriages, like the Angelita-Sofio and Angelita-Virgilio marriages, were all celebrated under the old CC.

 With all that said, proof of “well-founded belief” is not required with regard to Angelita’s case. She could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the FC was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. So Sofio was presumed dead since October 1982 and therefore making Angelita’s marriage to Virgilio legal and valid.