Componentes básicos de una máquina de control numérico

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Interview with Dr Rafiqual Huda Chowdhury of the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, Canberra, 8 October 1979.

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West Pakistani sharp reaction to the Tashkent Declaration

of January 1966 that formally ended Indo-Pakistani hostilities through Soviet mediation was not shared by the Bengalis who felt that they had more to lose by the continuation of

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belligerency. The feeling that the East Pakistanis had a distinct set of interests intensifed and culminated in

Mujib's 'Six Point Programme' announced in Lahore in February 78

1966 .

The Central Government reacted by levelling charges

of conspiracy against Mujib in what is known as the 'Agartala Conspiracy Case'. This led to a violent protest movement that obtained Mujib's release and also catapulted him to the position of East Pakistan's foremost political leader.

A combined movement against Ayub in both the Wings of Pakistan resulted in his resignation and the assumption cf his mantle by the Army Commander-in-Chief General Yahya Khan. Yahya promised elections on a 'one-man one vote' and adult franchise

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Holiday (Dacca), 6 February 1966. Also The Economist (London), 21 May 1966.

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Briefly, the salient features of the Six Points were demands for (i) a Federal Constitution and Parliamentary form of government with >erupremacy of Legislature directly elected on the basis of universal adult

franchise; (ii) only two subjects, Defence and Foreign Affairs to be dealt with by the Centre and residuary subjects by the Provinces;

(iii) either two separate but freely convertible currencies for two wings or one currency to be maintained with effective constitutional provisions to check flight of capital from East to West Pakistan in which case

Separate Banking Reserve to be made and separate fiscal and monetary policy to be adopted for East Pakistan; (iv) powers of taxation and revenue

collection to vest in the federating units; (v) two separate accounts of foreign exchange earnings of the two wings, with the earnings of each Wing under its control with the requirements of the Centre being met either equally or in a ratio to be fixed; and (vi) a militia or a para-military force for East Pakistan. See Bangladesh Contemporary Events and documents

basis to an Assembly that was to frame a new constitution for Pakistan. However he foreclosed the proposed Assembly's options by issuing a L v g a l Framework O r d e r (LFO) that was to guide Constitution-making. This purported to ensure

(a) Islamic ideology, (b) territorial integrity, (c) indepen­ dence of judiciary, (d) the federation principle, and (e) full opportunity for participation in government of all regions. Also the new Constitution would have to be authenticated

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by the President. Clearly^now that the passage of power to the demographically superior Bengalis was almost certain, steps were being taken to preserve West Pakistani interests. Mujib's Awami League considered the LFO 'restrictive' but nevertheless decided to participate in the forthcoming elections. ^

In the 19 70 elections the Awami League won 16 7 out of 169 East Pakistani seats in the National Assembly. In West Pakistan ZulfikarAli Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party

(PPP) secured 85 seats, the largest number in that Wing.

Neither Party won any seats in the other wing. Barnds points out that the elections demonstrated that Pakistan was 'two separate polities'J on the one hand there was the Awami League in East Pakistan with its advocacy of normalisation of

relations with India, provincial autonomy and moderate

socialism and on the other hand there was the PPP in the West

Rashiduzzaman, 'Awami League in the Political Dev elopment of Pakistan', op.cit., p . 586.

Bangladesh: Contemporary Events and Documents, p.56. 80

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with its manifesto of extreme socialization, a harsh anti- 81

Indian policy, and a stronger Central Government.

Bhutto and Mujib fell out on the Six Points issue,

and Yahya postponed s i n e d i e the scheduled National Assembly session on March 1 which triggered off a massive popular Movement in East Pakistan where Mujib was in virtual control of all sectors of public life. A well known academic at the Dacca University wrote on Yahya's action:

Yahya's decision on March 1 to save Bhutto's crumbling position in the West by postponing the Assembly session sine die brought to the surface the fear that had been dormant in Bengal since the successful completion of the elections that the generals never really wanted to transfer power.82

Yahya initiated tripartite negotiations in Dacca between himself, Mujib and Bhutto from 15 March 1971 which ended

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with the military crackdown in Dacca on 25 March. With that began the War for a sovereign East Be-ngal, which was achieved with Indian assistance, in December that year.

While political development as analyzed above fanned the nationalist sentiments of the Bengalis, a deep sense of economic deprivation provided added fuel.

There were, firstly, complaints about the comparative minimal share of central government expenditure for East Pakistan. In spite of higher population, the East's share

81

William J. Barnds, 'Pakistan's Disintegration', Wovld Today, Vol.27, (1971), p . 321.

8 2

Rehman Sohhan, 'Negotiations For Bangladesh: A Participant's View',

South Asian Review, Vol.4, No.4 (July 1971), p . 319. 83

For details of the negotiations, ibid., p p . 315-326. Also see for a different view G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan

of central development expenditure over the First Five Year Plan Period (1951-1955) was only 20%; there was an upward trend in the Plans to follow but even during the Third Plan Period (1965-1970) it did not exceed 36% with private

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