Comportamiento agronómico

Mitchell  was  convinced  that  there  was  a  certain  anxiety  concerning  images  in  texts  by   Wittgenstein,   which   he   interpreted   as   iconophobia   and   need   to   “defend   ‘our   speech’   against  ‘the  visual’”  (1994:  12–13)  .  He  understood  these  claims  as  indicators  of  a  new,   pictorial  turn  that  was  taking  place  in  human  sciences:  

“(W)hile   the   problem   of   pictorial   representation   has   always   been   with  us,  it  presses  inescapably  now,  and  with  unprecedented  force,   on  very  level  of  culture,  from  the  most  refined  philosophical  specu-­‐ lations  to  the  most  vulgar  productions  of  the  mass  media.  Tradi-­‐ tional  strategies  of  containment  no  longer  seem  adequate,  and  the   need   for   a   global   critique   of   visual   culture   seems   inescapable.”   (Mitchell  1994:  16)  

In   other   words,   Mitchell   wanted   to   win   broader   attention   for   the   visual.   Methods   of   “reading”  or  interpreting  images  that  were  already  at  hand  he  found  rather  unsatisfac-­‐ tory—though  they  dealt  with  spectatorship  and  various  forms  of  reading,  for  Mitchell   it   was   unacceptable   to   explain   such   phenomena   “on   the   model   of   textuality17_”   (1994:  16).  Although  the  society  of  that  time  was  often  described  as  one  of  “spectacle”   and   “surveillance”   (which   are   both   vision-­‐based   metaphors),   there   was   a   significant   lack   of   knowledge   about   images   and   Mitchell   thus   complained   that   “we   still   do   not   know  exactly  what  pictures  are,  what  their  relation  to  language  is,  how  they  operate  on   observers  and  on  the  world  (...)”  (1994:  13).  Mitchell’s  goal  was,  however,  not  only  to   emancipate  images  from  logos,  but  also  to  give  them  absolute  precedence  (1994:  28f.).   What  is  also  important  and  distinctive  in  Mitchell’s  approach  is  the  fact  that  he  refused   to  restrict  his  study  to  images  to  art  (Moxey  2008:  135).  

One  of  Mitchell’s  inspirations  was  the  book  Ways  of  worldmaking    (1978),  where  the   American  philosopher  Nelson  Goodman,  at  that  time  strongly  influenced  by  Ernst  Cas-­‐ sirer’s  work,  discussed  the  role  symbols  play  in  the  processes  of  worldmaking,  i.e.  the   creation   of   meaningful   worlds   ‘from   nothing’.   Borrowing   Goodman’s   vocabulary   Mitchell  insists  that  pictures  enable  us  to  gain  access  to  events  and  practices  and  that   they  are  “‘ways  of  worldmaking’,  not  just  world  mirroring”  (Mitchell  2005:xiv–xv)  .  That   is  also  the  reason  why  for  Mitchell,  the  iconological  intepretation  in  its  form  as  intro-­‐ duced  by  Panofsky  is  not  a  way  how  to  disentangle  webs  of  meaning  contained  within   images;  he  sees  it  rather  as  a  kind  of  ideology.  It  is  nothing  more  than  a  “system  of  nat-­‐ uralization,  a  homogenizing  discourse  that  effaces  conflict  and  difference  with  figures   of   ‘organic   unity’   and   ‘synthetic   intuition’,”   he   assumes   (Mitchell   1994:  30).   What   is   need  to  be  done,  then,  is  “to  unweave  this  tapestry”  of  “symbolic  forms,”  which  synthe-­‐ tize   vision,   and   space   as   well   as   world-­‐   and   art-­‐pictures   and   which   were   elaborated   within  Panofsky’s  iconology—only  after  that  can  pictorial  turn  accomplish  Panofsky’s   ambitions  for  a  critical  iconology  (Mitchell  1994:  19).  Therefore,  pictures  were  no  long-­‐ er  treated  as  mere  passive  reflections  of  reality;  the  accent  put  on  their  active  role  in   worldmaking  (one  can  also  use  the  term  meaning-­‐making)  made  them,  in  Mitchell’s   theory,  legitimate  participants  in  social  life18_.  

The  rather  postmodern  character  of  Mitchell’s  picture  theory  becomes  also  evident  as   soon  as  we  consider  how  deliberately  he  subjectivizes  and  personificates  pictures  and   argues  that  they  have  desires  (which  is  already  indicated  by  the  book’s  title  What  do   pictures  want?),  while  at  the  same  time  the  way  he  suggests  for  understanding  them   reminds  of  Latour’s  (2005)  notion  of  objects’  agency:  “What  pictures  want  is  not  the   same  as  the  message  they  communicate  or  the  effect  they  produce;  it’s  not  even  the   same  as  what  they  say  they  want.  Like  people,  pictures  may  not  know  what  they  want,  

18  _{In  order  to  show  that  even  though  people  tend  to  disrespect  those  who  believe  pictures  “are  alive  and}  

want  things”  (Mitchell  2005:  7)  and  no  one  thinks  pictures  should  be  treated  like  persons,  “we  always   seem  to  be  willing  to  make  exceptions  for  special  cases”  (ibid.:  31).  In  other  words,  “when  students  scoff   at  the  idea  of  a  magical  relation  between  a  picture  and  what  it  represents,  ask  them  to  take  a  photograph   of  their  mother  and  cut  off  the  eyes.”  (ibid.:9)  

they   have   to   be   helped   to   recollect   it   through   a   dialogue   with   others.”   (Mitchell   2005:  46)  

The  most  problematic  part  of  Mitchell’s  approach  seems  to  be  his  method  for  finding   out  what  effects  pictures  have  on  human  behavior,  since  there  is  none.  On  one  hand,   he   claims   his   aim   is   “to   undermine   the   ready-­‐made   template   for   interpretative   mas-­‐ tery”  (2005:  49),  by  which  he  means  psychoanalytical,  materialist  or  Panofsky’s  model.   On   the   other   hand,   he   does   not   offer   any   substitute   for   these   abandoned   methods.   What   is   more,   the   insistence   on   considering   pictures   independently   of   language,   for   they  have  “a  presence  that  escapes  our  linguistic  ability  to  describe  or  interpret”  (Mox-­‐ ey  2008:  135)  practically  deprives  him  of  the  possibility  to  say  (or,  in  this  case,  to  write)   anything  about  them.  Also,  even  though  Mitchell  explicitly  states  that  he  wants  to  step   back  from  questions  of  meaning  and  power  that  were  in  picture  analysis  usually  taken   into  consideration,  his  effort  to  find  out  what  pictures  want  eventually  employs  exactly   the   old,   criticized   methods   borrowed   from   linguistics,   semiotics,   hermeneutics   and   rhetoric   (Mitchell   2005:  46).   Unfortunately,   a   certain   methodological   vagueness   pre-­‐ vents  Mitchell  from  offering  any  plausible  interpretation  or  understanding  of  pictures   eventually;   he   sticks   with   mere   suggestions   of   possible   meanings   one   could   find   and   subsequently  lets  the  reader  decide  which  one  she  prefers  (Mitchell  2005:  50).  How  are   we  then  supposed  to  accept  such  bold  statements  as  “(i)mages  are  active  players  in  the   game  of  establishing  and  changing  values”  (Mitchell  2005:  105),  if  everyone  is  allowed   to   decide   freely   what   kind   of   message   he   wants   to   find   in   a   picture?   At   this   point   Mitchell  seems  to  be  sinking  into  Baudrillardian  thinking  characteristic  of  “floating”  or   “empty”   signifiers.   Supposed   that   values   are   shared,   collective   representations,   one   should   be   able   to   identify   shared   meanings   that   would   be   portrayed   and   also   trans-­‐ ferred   by   images,   in   order   to   demonstrate   that   pictures   actually   have   the   power   to   shape  peoples’  values.  Otherwise,  everything  we  are  left  with  is  just  an  ephemeral  im-­‐ pression   of   the   elusive   power   of   pictures   that   can   never   be   reduced   to   or   translated   into   language.   It   seems   that   images   used   to   be   the   victims   of   rationalizing   linguistic   turn;   after   Mitchell’s   postmodern   crusade   that   he—in   reaction   to   Panofsky—called   critical   iconology,   language   became   the   defeated:   “If   traditional   iconology   repressed   the  image,  postmodern  iconology  represses  language.”  (Mitchell  1994:  28f.)