Comportamiento de las variables macroeconómicas

i) The role of necessity in the Analvtic of the B eautiful

In the last chapter, we concluded th a t the distinction between the agreeable and the beautiful could not be satisfactorily made using the three criteria of disinterestedness, universality and fin ality of form. In this chapter we wül consider the thought th a t the notion of necessity is fundam ental in forging th a t distinction.

First, though, we m ust clarify w hich notion of necessity K ant is concerned to address in the fourth m om ent. K ant is not

concerned w ith w h at he calls “theoretical objective necessity”: th at w ould be im proper for an analysis of judgm ents of taste, since such necessity would tell us th a t everyone will feel the same delight as the person m aking a judgm ent of taste. This cannot be the notion th a t K ant has in m ind, since it would im ply th a t the subjective basis of the judgm ent of taste is irrelevant: one w ould be able to deem something b eautiful on the basis of conform ity w ith the rule th a t everyone will feel the same delight. If it was theoretical objective necessity th a t was proper to the judgm ent of taste, 1 w ould know in advance th a t the thing was beautiful, so 1 w ould not need to

experience it before m aking a judgm ent of taste. As we saw, in chapter two, the genuine judgm ent of taste is grounded in subjective feelings of pleasure, and such feeUngs can only be prom pted by im m ediate and disinterested contem plation of the b eautiful object.

Nor is K ant concerned here w ith “practical necessity”, which he describes as derivable from “concepts of a pure ratio n al w ill.”i For in th a t case, the delight th a t one took in the b eautiful object would be the necessary consequence of an objective law . This is not the case w ith the delight th a t is proper to the genuine judgm ent of taste. For th a t delight is taken in the free play of the faculties of

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im agination and understanding, a free play prom pted by the fin ality of form exhibited by the beau tifu l object.

Rather, the notion of necessity th a t K ant employs is taken by m any com m entators to be th a t of “exem plary necessity”, w hich K ant characterises as “a necessity of the assent of all to a judgm ent regarded as exem plifying a rule incapable of f o r m u la t io n .” 2

M any com mentators on the C ritique of Judgm ent have held th a t the fourth m om ent of the Analvtic of the B eau tifu l, where Kant assesses the role of necessity in helping to distinguish between judgm ents on the beautiful and judgm ents on the agreeable and

the good, adds little to help forge the distinction. Thus, for example, G uyer w rites th a t K ant’s “description of the requirem ent of

necessity is alm ost indistinguishable from his exposition of the dem and for universality.”^

Thus, Guyer considers th at in the fourth m om ent K ant is reiterating w hat he says in the second m om ent. There K ant rules out certain kinds of pleasure as providing the proper grounds for the judgm ent of taste, nam ely those produced by interest or

sensuous states. He writes: “A pleasure due to the harm ony of im agination and understanding is a pleasure w hich one has ju s t in virtue of possessing the faculties necessary for cognition, rather than because of some contingent fact about one’s own physiology or in te re s ts .T h e necessity th a t Guyer believes K ant to be

employing in the distinction between the agreeable and the

b eautiful, then, concerns the necessary agreement in response to a judgm ent of taste of aU those who are constituted like the person

who is m aking the judgm ent of taste. For, once 1 subtract m y

“em pirical conditions”, th a t is m y interests and the contingencies of m y physiology, then the only kind of pleasure rem aining th a t could ground an aesthetic judgm ent is the one th a t is due to the harm ony of the faculties. K ant supposes th a t there is a parallel between

cognitive judgm ents and judgm ents of taste, one th a t Savile makes clear: “In the one case, the object th a t we tru ly judge to be spherical cannot b u t strike everyone as spherical; in the other, the object th at we rightly judge to be beautiful cannot b u t elicit a response of

universal p l e a s u r e .In both cases, there is a reference to the conditions of possibility: unless we suppose there is something common to all of us, then the judgm ent of taste is not possible. If we did not suppose a common understanding, we would not be able to m ake cognitive judgm ents; sim ilarly, if we did not suppose a common sense we would not be able to m ake judgm ents of taste th a t could be true or false. W ithout the presupposition of a

common sense, we w ould be able to m ake aesthetic judgm ents th a t accidentally agreed w ith each other, i.e. th a t actually acquired universal agreement. B u t such judgm ents would be grounded in private, contingent conditions (interests or physiologies).

Is Guyer right to claim th a t the requirem ent of necessity adds little to the requirem ent of universality? He is right in th a t in the second m om ent, K ant insists th a t the com m unicability

characteristic of the genuine judgm ent of taste is universal because the pleasure taken in the beautiful is not prom pted by the judge’s “em pirical conditions” - interests or private sensuous states. Thus, Guyer is supported by K ant’s rem ark in the fourth moment: “[T]he universal com m unicability of a feeling presupposes a common sense. ”6 B u t Guyer is wrong if he supposes th a t the mere

requirem ent of universality satisfactorily distinguishes between universal agreement of judgm ents on agreeable things and

universal agreem ent of judgm ents on b eautiful things. Savile w rites th a t K ant clearly envisages “th a t there m ight be contingent

agreement on a wide, even conceivably world wide, scale, . . . And then ‘contingently’ we should be confronted w ith something

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to introduce necessity in order th a t judgm ents of agreeableness, w hich meet the criteria of disinterestedness, fin ality of form and universality, cannot properly be called judgm ents of beauty.

That, however, does not m ean th a t we need the analysis of the fourth m om ent of the Analvtic of the B ea u tifu l, since the notion of necessity has been introduced in all b u t nam e in the second

m om ent on universality. In the second m om ent, K ant does not seem concerned w ith the possibility of accidental universality of the kind th a t Savile is a t pains to rule out as a condition of the genuine judgm ent of taste. Rather, K ant writes: “The judgm ent of taste does not itself postulate the agreement of every one . . . ; it only imputes

this agreement to every o n e .' ^ This is no mere accidental

convergence in judgm ent, b u t a judgm ent th a t is necessarily

universal, or a t least is thought to be so by the person who makes it. He m ay be wrong in thinking this, and if he is wrong th a t w ill show th a t he has not yet acquired taste. Thus, K ant writes: “The universal voice is, therefore, only an idea - resting upon grounds the investigation of which is here postponed. It m ay be a m atter of uncertainty w hether a person who thinks he is laying down a judgm ent of taste is, in fact, judging in conform ity w ith th a t idea; b u t th a t this idea is w h at is contem plated in his judgm ent, and that, consequently, it is m eant to be a judgm ent of taste, is proclaim ed by his use of the expression ‘beauty’.’’^

E arlier in the second m om ent, K ant contends th a t there would be no such thing as taste if it were not possible th a t a judge could m ake “a rig h tfu l claim upon the assent of a ll m en.’’^® Once more, the notion of a “rig h tfu l claim ” suggests th a t the assent of a ll m en is a m atter of necessity, and a norm ative m atter a t th at, rath er than contingency. Thus, the fourth m om ent offers a recapitulation at most of themes already explored in the second m om ent.

concerns the grounds of the Judgment of taste. Thus, w hen one reflects on the pleasure in a beautiful object, th at pleasure is one due to a necessary rather than a contingent source, i.e. to the harm ony of the faculties. Th at is, when one takes pleasure in a beautiful thing (a pleasure, furtherm ore, th a t is proper to the

genuine judgm ent of taste), th a t feeling w ill be em pirical, in th at it is a subjective experience, b u t Guyer adds: “[I]f I take the furth er step of reflecting on the sources of m y pleasure, then I m ay judge -

though still em pirically - th a t m y pleasure is necessary rath er than contingent, and this licences its a priori im putation to others.”! !

Here Guyer is relying on the distinction th a t we considered in chapter two, between the content and ground of the judgm ent of taste. For Kant, the ground of the judgm ent of taste is a priori in th a t the judgm ent of taste can only be properly made on the basis of satisfying certain conditions, nam ely th a t it is made on the basis of disinterested delight, th a t is, the delight taken in the fin ality of form of the object and the harm ony of the faculties. Th at licences the im putation of m y judgm ent to others, w hile nothing in a

judgm ent of agreeableness, even if it is, in fact, one th a t everybody agrees w ith, licences such im putation. For there is nothing in the la tte r th at commands universal assent; the form er does command universal assent, for K ant and for Guyer, because of the absence of em pirical conditions in grounding the judgm ent. Here Guyer is not guilty of the charge th a t is sometimes levelled a t Kant, th a t he

conflates the term s a priori and necessity. Rather, he is correctly asserting th a t the grounds of the judgm ent of taste are a priori.

However, thus understood, the notion of necessity does not help sustain the distinction between the agreeable and the

beautiful. True, K ant m ay th in k th a t he has made this distinction secure already, for he contends th a t a ll sensual pleasures are interested and private. In the last chapter we argued against th a t

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contention. There we m aintained th a t there are contemplative sensual pleasures th a t ground judgm ents th a t are disinterested, potentially universal (albeit accidentally so), and taken in the harm ony of the faculties and the fin ality of form of the objects of those pleasures. Such counter examples are not dealt w ith by G uyer’s interpretation of K antian necessity, since th a t effectively serves to reiterate conditions of possibility for judgm ents of taste given in the second m om ent of the Analytic of the B eautiful th a t we have already disputed.

ii) A ctual and ideal judges

Savile claim s th at the necessity w ith w hich K ant is concerned is not to do w ith the ground of the judgm ent, b u t w ith its content. He claim s th at, in the case of the beautiful object, the only proper way to respond to it is w ith pleasure. Savile recognises the im m ediate objection to this point is th a t there are no necessities of this kind, since we can respond in m any different ways to b eautiful things. One reply to this is th at, indeed, there are m any ways in which one could respond to a beautiful object, b u t there is only one proper

way, i.e. one th a t treats it as a b eautiful object rath er than one th at satisfies an end, satisfies sensual cravings or one’s desires or

interests. Savile’s reply is th a t the notion of necessity, as K ant seems to intend it, does not rely on actual responses, b u t on ideal ones. Hence, the judgm ent of taste retains its norm ative aspect. Savile writes: “W hen ideal judges come upon som ething tru ly beau tifu l, they find th a t there is no other way to respond to it than w ith pleasure.”!2

This interpretation of K antian necessity clearly goes beyond G uyer’s interpretation which envisages the necessity a t issue to be necessity in the sense th at we all m ust agree w ith the person

m aking the judgm ent of taste, if we were exposed to the beautiful object, because it is not grounded in the subject’s em pirical

conditions. This interpretation also goes beyond the one th a t Savile offered in his earlier book Aesthetic Reconstructions, nam ely th a t which stipulates th a t the universal agreem ent of the judgm ent of taste is non-fortuitous. This interpretation, Savile writes in th at book, “effects a distinction between the b eau tifu l and the agreeable in a way congenial to K ant by insisting of the form er th a t whatever generality of pleasure turns up in the analysis be non-fortuitous, whereas in the other case such a condition need not be m et.”^^ B u t this distinction w ould not have the result th a t contem plative sensual pleasures, such as those of gastronomy or w ine-tasting, fell under the heading of the agreeable: they would be non-fortuitously pleasurable because they would not be grounded in interest, or in the alleged contingencies of p articu lar physiologies.

One of the hopes for the notion of necessity developed in Savile’s later book, K antian Aesthetics Pursued, is th at, once it

serves to account for the m ind-expanding qualities th a t experiences of the beautiful purportedly offer, we can argue th a t contem plative sensual pleasures have no m ind-expanding role and therefore are not proper to the genuine judgm ent of taste.

First, of course, we need to see how th a t notion of necessity is developed, and, second, we need to see how it connects w ith the view th at experiences of beautiful things are m ind-expanding.

First, then, Savile focuses on K ant’s rem arks on necessity in section 22 of the Analytic of the S ublim e. There K ant writes: “The assertion is not th a t everyone will fall in w ith our judgm ent, b u t rather th at everyone ought to agree w ith it. Here 1 p u t forward m y Judgment of taste as an example of the judgm ent of common sense,

and attrib u te to it on th a t account exemplary validity. Hence

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such as G uyer take the K antian notion of common sense to consist in the actual shared faculties th a t m ake the judgm ent of taste

possible. Savile regards it as a sense w hich is shared by those who have cultivated their taste - ideal judges rath er than actual ones. It is the form er judges who cannot b u t respond to the beau tifu l object w ith pleasure. A ctual judges should respond w ith pleasure to the beau tifu l object, b u t there is no guarantee th a t they w ill, because they m ay not have the refinem ent necessary to m ake the true judgm ent of taste. This does not m ean th a t their responses to the

beau tifu l object w ill not ground genuine judgm ents of taste: they w ill do, if they satisfy the criteria of being grounded properly, b u t

the content of those judgm ents need not be true. They may be true,