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Composición de precios unitarios, de ejecución material y por contrata

In document PLIEGO DE CONDICIONES (página 32-36)

CAPÍTULO 2. CONDICIONES GENERALES

2.2. C ONDICIONES GENERALES ECONÓMICAS

2.2.3. Composición de precios unitarios, de ejecución material y por contrata

Clearly, valuations are not static, but dynamic. Depending on broader factors, such as market sentiment and sectoral preference, these change with time. A stock that trades at a discount to benchmark valuations, but shows superior earnings growth rates and scores better on operational efficiencies, can be a good investment pick. Investors should use the valuation methods mentioned above to zero in on the stocks that have value, while avoiding the ones that trap them by appearing to offer value.

What Impacts Stock Valuations in Sectors Industry Best measure of value Auto Volume growth, realisations, operating

profit margins, new product launches Banking Loan growth, non-performing assets,

net interest margins, CASA ratio Cement Dispatches, operating costs, regional

demandsupply equation

Engineering Order book inflows, execution skills, margins

FMCG RoE, RoCE, margins, volume growth, new products, marketshare

Real Estate Debt levels, liquid assets, inventory levels, promoters’ ability to raise funds Utilities/Power Project costs, plant load factors, raw

material costs, debtequity ratios

Telecom Revenue per user, growth in usage, new subscribers, non-wireless revenues, EBITDA

Oil & Gas Reserves, efficiency ratios, free cash

Recently there has been a lot of hullabaloo of how one particular fund has delivered around 40 times returns in 14 years. The best thing about statistics is that they show us what the statistician wants to display so if a fund has done best in the last five years it will advertise that period. The idea is to cut the time charts according to convenience and display it as an advertising tool.

The biggest question is whether these pieces of data are as Taleb would call rare random chance events or do they bear any resemblance of a recurring nature?

While I like history the worst place to put history is in the asset management industry.

At the cost of sounding critical I have stopped looking at how the past data works because investors cannot make future returns by looking at the past. More-over the past data means almost nothing when you have had several fund manager changes and in some cases even the whole research team has been revamped.

My first question would be to find out if there is any data of how many of the original investors are still with the fund? If there are a few people invested then the fund should use their faces to advertise. That will create more mileage for the fund in terms of impressing new investors then anything else. Here we should exclude the investors who are betting with less then 2% of their net worth.

There are over several hundred Mutual Fund schemes (and each of the fund houses having around twenty to fifty of them) then obviously a few would do the double of the underlying index but the trick is to find that out in foresight then in hindsight and the only way to know if that was in anyone's foresight is to count the number of original investors in the fund.

Though I have no privy to such data I am sure that the actual numbers would not impress me or for that matter anyone who is convinced and aware of the danger of getting sucked into chance events thinking them to be actual predictable outcomes in foresight.

I'd also like to know the Fund manager's bet on this particular fund as a percentage of his net worth soon as he took over and how long has he continued with that bet. Of course there should be no one believing more in the Fund then the Fund Manager himself. Now if the Fund Manager's bets aren't too big then he also did not think of the performance in foresight thus making it a chance event.

I would strongly urge SEBI to make mandatory disclosure of the Fund Manager‟s investment in the fund so that Investors know if they believe in the fund more then the Manager. Even if absolute bets are not mandated SEBI should include classifications as a relative percentage of the Fund Manager’s net worth.

There is a need for some urgent legislation in this context so Fund Managers just can't come up to the Idiot Box and say "OK Guys we got it wrong". They should also be made to pay for their mistakes. Once this is done some funds will advertise their Manager's bets in the underlying fund. Clearly Funds with little bets of their managers will have little confidence amongst the investing public and vice-versa.

flow generation

Technology Order inflow, ability to contain costs, service verticals, profitability, client attrition

Reading a Charles Sobraj book does not mean that you become a Charles Sobraj!

But yes, I would like to know more about trading and at some point allocate maybe 1% of my capital to trade like a trader with the maxim (Book your losses and let the profits run).

There is no end to learning in this world and though 99% of traders do lose money that 1% class makes enormous wealth and we should try and see what that 1% did which these 99% did not. I do not know if trading is a zero sum game but it does appear to be!

Even Lord Keynes was an active trader and so is Rajat Bose and Sudarshan Sukhani but surely there are features that distinguished each of these.

For example one TA who was running his own shop till recently before joining the Big Bull blew up a lot of money which my friend had given him by trading in Nifty but yet he seems so smart on the Idiot Box.

Trading is more about psychology then about skill you can learn the skills but psychology cannot be learnt it can only be developed!

Is it true that only 99% of the trader lose money??

Basantjee you must be in touch of lots and lots of market people. Haven't you found few successful traders?

From the ones I know personally I do not know anyone who has made as much to write home about but RK Damani: is one hell of a trader but many of the copy cats who wanted to copy him were caught with their pants down! He always pyramids into his position.

Even market talk has it that he lost a huge chunk (of what he made shorting in the bear market) in the market rally post March 09 many say that his loss post-election day was a few hundred crores. This is all market talk and I have no basis to prove anything on this.

Hit: I am aware of all that and have read Martin Pring a couple of times and keep looking at it time and often the real trick is to put that into a structure to create a monetary payoff.

Actually I am really curious to know why so many of all fail to make money trading.

Basant Ji...On this particular point...my understanding is that Keynes was a speculator/trader to start off with....but then moved to conservative/long term/concentrated investing which is when he became truly successful.

Rumour has it that the guy used to just work for an hour or so from his bed in the morning and could make impressive returns despite the great depression. He was one of the inspirations for WB

Yes, he managed the Chest Fund and beat the indices really hard. The London Markets did zero%

from 1920-34 whereas Keynes did a 13% CAGR.

Do you know any book or link that explains Keynes Investing Rationale and where we can get more information on his investing philosophy.

If you buy 100000 shares of Z at Rs 40 and the price moves to Rs 42 then you buy more and keep adding to your position in a profit. Alternatively if you short the stock at 40 and it goes to 37 you sell more of it.

The idea is to add position to a winning trade. This is what Jesse Livermore said:

"Stocks are never too high for you to begin buying or too low to begin selling. But after the initial transaction, don't make a second unless the first shows you a profit"

In document PLIEGO DE CONDICIONES (página 32-36)