5.3 Electrospray
5.3.6 Comprobación del calibrado
5.2.1 The benefits of leadership and risks of losing power
Occupying the highest political office in Africa can bring substantial material benefits, while losing control of the presidency can pose significant risks. As a result, leaders in Africa are generally classed as being primarily concerned with political survival and the retention of power (Goldsmith, 2001; Roessler, 2011; Roessler and Ohls, 2018). The ‘imperial’ nature of Africa’s presidencies enables leaders to enjoy significant material gains during their tenure, and many long-time rulers have managed to amass significant fortunes (Kieh, 2018; Prempeh, 2008; Felter, 2017).
Leaders in Africa can lose their incumbency via a number of democratic and non-democratic threats. From independence to 2015, 95 leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa lost power due to a coup executed by state actors, twelve have been removed by rebellions and four by popular protest (Goemans et al., 2009). Since the widespread adoption of multi-party elections in the 1990s, leaders are increasingly losing
power to opposition parties and elites (Cheeseman, 2010; Bell, 2016).39 To counter these threats to their
rule, leaders need to create a ruling coalition which will protect them (De Mesquita et al., 2005).
5.2.2 Political survival and its application within Africa
De Mesquita et al. (2005) identified two key concepts on how the creation of ruling coalitions translates to the political survival of leaders. Coalitions are picked from the ‘selectorate’ which comprises all individuals who can potentially engage in the decision over who leads the government. The winning coalition is the subset of the selectorate whose support is sufficient to confer political leadership. Within electoral democracies, the winning coalition can vary from a third to half of the voting population, whereas in a military dictatorship, the winning coalition may just include a few senior military officers. Under De Mesquita’s theory, leaders lose their position when they fail to create a coalition of the correct size and composition to insulate them from internal and external rivals.
Within Africa, the characteristics of the selectorate and winning coalition are affected by the links between political elites and the populations they represent. Politicians often link their political fortunes to the welfare of their co-ethnics (Langer, 2005; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Berman, 1998; Arriola, 2009; Szeftel, 2000). Groups with co-ethnics included within the senior government benefit disproportionately from government policies, giving voters an incentive to vote along ethnic lines (Franck and Rainer, 2012; Kramon and Posner, 2016; Burgess et al., 2015; Holder and Raschky, 2014). Consequently, political elites can be bought into the ruling coalition as ‘bloc leaders’ to deliver the support of their co-ethnics (De Mesquita et al., 2005).40 Another key dynamic of coalition systems in
Africa is that political positions are perceived as a means to enrich oneself and one’s network of clients (Szeftel, 2000; Van de Walle, 2007). The political system in Africa is noted for its lack of ideological diversity with parties or political movements often functioning as the personal tools of political elites (Carbone, 2007; Mehler, 2007). A system in which ‘a seat at the table’ is the primary concern of political actors enables leaders to readily co-opt opponents and create coalitions of convenience to shore up support (Kieh, 2018; Chabal and Daloz, 1999).
39 The loss of leadership also carries considerable risk including assassination, exile or arrest (Goldsmith, 2001).
Of the 285 leader exits in post-independence Sub-Saharan Africa, 93 resulted in the exile or imprisonment of the former leader while 27 resulted in execution (Goemans et al., 2009).
40 There is controversy over the degree to which ethnic considerations guide voting behaviour in Africa.
Although appeals to bloc interests are rarely the sole motivator in political support and vary in effectiveness across different contexts, the majority of literature argues that ethnic identities do matter in guiding political support within Africa (Lindberg and Morrison, 2008; Basedau et al. 2011; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Eifert et al., 2010).
5.2.3 Winning coalitions and strategies of survival
There is ongoing debate and disagreement over what size and composition of coalition is optimal for ensuring political survival and whether strategies of accommodating or excluding potential rivals are more effective. A large body of literature argues that leaders increase the security of their regime through creating a large and inclusive ruling coalition. Rebellion, opposition politics and mass protest can be interpreted as forms of political competition in which excluded elites and constituents try to either take over the government or force their inclusion in the ruling coalition (Choi and Kim, 2018). Consequently, a narrow ruling coalition with a large number of excluded groups and disaffected elites provides the necessary conditions for the opposition to form a coalition capable of displacing the government. Excluded elites can pose a risk to the leader through forming opposition parties, organising protests or openly rebelling against the government (Mehler, 2011; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992; Raleigh and Dowd, 2018).
Conversely, there are arguments that larger coalitions can increase leaders’ vulnerability to rivals from within the ruling coalition. Increasing the size of the ruling coalition limits the amount of spoils available to existing coalition members (De Mesquita et al., 2005). Continually expanding the coalition can encourage existing members to oust the leader in order to create a narrow coalition in which the remaining members are better compensated (Choi and Kim, 2018).41 Larger ruling coalitions, such as
‘big-tent parties’ or governments of national unity, are frequently beset with factions which compete over issues of patronage and policy (Köllner and Basedau, 2005; Sriram and Zahar, 2009; LeVan, 2011). The ongoing debate over the ideal ruling coalition raises the possibility that the optimal coalition is conditional on contextual political factors. A growing body of research argues that the optimal coalition is dictated by factors such as the strength of the regime, internal cohesion, strength of the opposition, whether the regime faces a threat to its rule and the nature of that threat (Roessler and Ohls, 2018; Choi and Kim, 2018; Lindemann, 2011a; Roessler, 2011; Raleigh and Dowd, 2018). Consequently, changes in any of these factors will lead to volatility in the ruling coalition as leaders reassess what form of coalition is optimal. Martinez-Gallardo (2014) summaries the process in her paper on shocks and reshuffles in Latin America:
"Unexpected events over the course of a government’s life will change these conditions and make bargains that were previously ‘stable’ no longer viable. Appointments are an explicit political strategy that presidents will use to face these unexpected challenges."
Two threats are chosen to test this theory: firstly, pre-electoral periods in which the leader’s rule is threatened by a democratic opposition; secondly, economic downturns which reduce the resources available for patronage for the coalition and weaken the leader’s legitimacy. Both threats have the
41 Arriola (2009) finds that increasing the size of the coalition up to a point actually reduces the chance of a
coup. However, the effect dampens as the coalition expands and eventually expanding the coalition increases the chance of deposition from within.
potential to destabilise the existing intra-elite bargain and to prompt the leader to make changes to their coalition.
In this paper the cabinet is considered a proxy for the leader’s coalition. The leader’s coalition is approximated by examining volatility within the cabinet and changes in attributes such as size, ethnic inclusivity and the predominance of the leader’s co-ethnics. The cabinet and senior government posts are well established as a proxy for which elites and subnational groups are included in the ruling coalition. Arriola (2009) used the size of the cabinet as an approximation for the number of elite clients sustained by the regime, while the ethnic composition of the cabinet has formed the basis of Francois, Rainer and Trebbi’s (2015) dataset and been an important guiding factor for the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Wimmer et al., 2009). Political appoints and reshuffles are frequently treated as a tool of political survival within the existing literature. Leaders may make changes to the cabinet to limit the power of internal rivals, shore up political support or appease mass discontent (Indridason and Kam, 2008; Martinez-Gallardo, 2014; Quiroz Flores and Smith, 2011; Lust-Okar, 2004).
Consequently, this paper hypothesises that as elections or economic crises destabilise formerly stable elite configurations, cabinets experience volatility as leaders reshuffle their senior government to create a new more stable coalition.
Hypothesis 1a: Cabinets will exhibit more volatility in the pre-electoral period
Hypothesis 1b: Cabinets will experience more volatility during times of economic stress
5.2.4 Competitive and hegemonic regimes
Since the third wave of democratisation in the 1990s, elections have become commonplace in Africa.42
Yet the level of democratisation, in terms of the ability of the political opposition to gain power through elections, varies significantly across the continent. Countries such as Kenya, Ghana or Sierra Leone have witnessed multiple democratic transitions in power with elections won by slim electoral margins, while countries such as Tanzania or Ethiopia have had a single party in power for multiple decades. The former are classed as competitive regimes which face a legitimate threat of replacement from the political opposition, while the latter are considered hegemonic regimes and are deemed unlikely to suffer an electoral loss (Schedler, 2013).43 This distinction dramatically affects calculations regimes
make to retain power. Competitive regimes frequently needing to find ways to outmanoeuvre or bargain with the opposition, while hegemonic regimes are more concerned with preventing defections from
42 Currently only two countries on the continent, Eritrea and South Sudan, do not hold national elections with
the stated aim of selecting the leadership of the country.
43 Instead hegemonic regimes are at risk of weakening and losing their hegemonic status. Only once this status is
lost do the regimes risk replacement by the political opposition. Examples include the PRI in Mexico, KANU in Kenya and PS in Senegal.
within the regime or countering opposing factions within the regime (Köllner and Basedau, 2005; Reuter and Gandhi, 2011).
The primary factors used to distinguish hegemonic from competitive regimes are control of seats in the legislature and regime-longevity (Morse, 2012; Schedler, 2013; Bogaards, 2004). Control of the legislature indicates the ability of the regime to dictate legislation, the degree of threat posed by the opposition and guide electoral outcomes through legitimate support or manipulation (Ochieng'Opalo, 2012; Levitsky and Way, 2002; Schedler, 2013). Regime longevity is indicative of its ability to hold on to power and the degree to which the ruling party or leader is perceived as the status quo by the public and elites (Magaloni, 2006; Posner and Young, 2007; Greene, 2007).
5.2.5 The threat of elections
Elections are a source of uncertainty for leaders. Leaders in Africa frequently use their power over the resources of the state to minimise the risk posed by electoral competition (Levitsky and Way, 2002). In spite of the advantages of incumbency, seventeen leaders standing for re-election have been voted out of office between 1990 and 2016, and many more open-seat contests have resulted in the incumbent party losing power (Cheeseman, 2010; Bell, 2016).
Leaders can instigate changes to the ruling coalition to widen its electoral base. Expanding the size of the ruling coalition will reduce the number of excluded elites who could aid the opposition. Pursuing a strategy of co-option through expansion can fragment the opposition and prevent the formation of opposition coalitions (Ash, 2015; Schedler, 2010; Wahman, 2013). Opposition parties in Africa frequently rely on a narrow, often ethnically determined, base of support (Wahman, 2017; Cheeseman and Ford, 2007). Ethnicised opposition parties are of little threat electorally, but if they form coalitions with other opposition parties, they can become a severe threat (Arriola 2013; Wahman, 2013). Creating a more ethnically inclusive coalition may widen the regime’s electoral base, limit the appeal of ethnically focussed opposition parties and foster splits in the opposition. Existing studies have demonstrated that in the run-up to elections, leaders frequently focus on securing votes from unaligned or ‘swing’ groups, while co-ethnics are deemed a captured constituency (Hassan, 2017; Baldwin, 2014; Wahman and Boone, 2018).
However, the threat to leaders posed by elections is not equally distributed throughout the continent. The need to create a larger and more inclusive coalition will be heavily dependent on the strength of the regime. Leaders will only need to expand the ruling coalition pre-elections if the regime faces a real threat of replacement.
Many states in Africa have been ruled by a single leader or party for multiple decades44 who have
retained power through mobilisation of the voting public, the lack of viable opposition parties or electoral manipulation and repression (Hassan, 2017; Schedler, 2010; Magaloni, 2006). A defining feature of these hegemonic regimes is that they face no immediate threat from the democratic opposition, and voters face little choice but to vote for the incumbent, the opposition in protest or abstain from voting (Schedler, 2013; Bratton et al., 2012). Any pre-electoral volatility in the cabinets of hegemonic regimes is more likely due to factionalism and intra-party divisions stoked by the primary elections than attempts to counter the democratic opposition (Köllner and Basedau, 2005). Competitive regimes, in contrast, face a real risk of losing to the opposition, even if they engage in electoral manipulation (Schedler, 2013). Consequently, the need to expand the coalition in response to external threats may be limited to competitive regimes, while stronger regimes may not opt to expand the coalition in the run up to elections. This will be reflected by cabinets in competitive regimes being larger and more inclusive in the pre-electoral period than at other times.
Hypothesis 2: Leaders in competitive regimes will increase the size and inclusivity of the cabinet before elections. This relationship will not occur in hegemonic regimes.
5.2.6 Threat of economic downturn
Poor economic performance and low or negative economic growth presents a two-fold threat to the leader: restriction of resources available for patronage for included coalition members and loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Patronage resources are crucial in the formation of an intra-elite bargain and for retaining the support of insiders who secure the leader’s incumbency (Arriola, 2009; Van de Walle, 2003; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Lindemann, 2011b). Threats to the supply well of patronage will weaken ‘instrumental’ support for the regime from elites and stability of the coalition securing the leader (Schedler, 2013).
For voters, economic performance is a key metric used to decide whether or not to support the incumbent regime, and it typically overrides other concerns about ethnicity and patronage (Bratton et al., 2012). Rulers who have lost legitimacy in the eyes of the public are more at risk of being displaced by rivals, as a new regime will likely be welcomed by the public at large (Lindemann, 2011b; Langer, 2005; Alesina et al., 1996; De Mesquita et al., 2005).
The threat posed to leaders by economic crises, like the threat of elections, is affected by the strength of the regime. In hegemonic regimes, longer tenures and the lack of a threatening opposition means that rulers have more opportunity to accumulate ‘slack resources’ which can be used to maintain their
44 As of the beginning of 2018, eighteen countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are run by parties which were in power
coalition during crisis periods (De Mesquita, 2005). In contrast, rulers in competitive regimes have less opportunities to create reserves of resources for patronage (ibid.). Schedler (2013) succinctly outlines the contrast between the vulnerability of competitive and hegemonic regimes to economic shocks:
“Less dependent on their medium-term performance, competitive regimes earn the fruits of current bonanzas and fall victims of present crises. Less dependent on short-term success, hegemonic regimes earn the fruits of past achievements and fall victims of medium-term failure.”
In cases where economic crises are an immediate threat to the leader’s patronage resources, expanding the coalition can exacerbate the existing problem of reduced patronage to coalition members and increase the chance of defection or rebellion by disenchanted insiders. A narrowing of the ruling coalition can allow the leader to distribute more to those who remain inside of the ruling coalition and enhance their loyalty (De Mesquita et al., 2005). In competitive regimes, this may take the form of leaders jettisoning elites and ethnic groups deemed unnecessary to their political survival from the cabinet while increasing the representation of their co-ethnics in an effort to retain the support of their core-constituency. Conversely, good economic performance should enable leaders in competitive regimes to use the ‘bonanza’ to create larger and more inclusive coalitions.
Hegemonic regimes, which have a higher capacity to hoard resources, should be able to maintain the size of the coalition. Poor economic performance may encourage insiders to leave the party while capitalising on popular discontent and can precipitate the loss of the regime’s hegemonic status (Reuter and Gandhi, 2011; Schedler, 2013). Leaders in hegemonic regimes may counter this threat by creating a larger and more representative cabinet.
Hypothesis 3a: Leaders in competitive regimes will shrink the size and the inclusivity of the cabinet during times of economic stress, compared to periods of high growth. Leaders in competitive regimes will increase the size and inclusivity of the cabinet during times of high economic growth.
Hypothesis 3b: Leaders in hegemonic regimes will maintain or expand the size and inclusivity of their cabinet during times of economic stress.