Comprobación de hipótesis

In May 1957, Archbishop Sava, of the Russian Orthodox Church issued a public appeal for funding for migrant barracks at Kentlyn, near Campbelltown:

At this time there is the possibility to bring out 3000 Russian people of China to Australia, who want to leave that place. The Australian Government, moved by humanitarian concerns, has facilitated and sped up the issuance of entry visas for all who are interested, not even considering age.1

Archbishop Sava presented government support for Russian migrants as a solid, based on simple humanitarian concern. Yet, in actual fact, only a few weeks after the archbishop called for community support, a confidential ministerial memorandum from the acting Secretary of the Department of Immigration recommended that his appeal for federal funding be dismissed:

Whilst being sympathetic towards Russian refugees in China I do not think we can go further than we have already gone in this field. A large number of refugees are aged who, if admitted, would represent a liability instead of being good migrants…

1 _{Raewsky, ‘Obrashcheniye Ko Vsem Dobrym Lyudyam, 17 May 1957 g. [An Appeal to All Good} People, 17 May 1957]’, in Preosviashchenneishii Savva (Raevskii)[The Reverend Sava Raewsky], 189.

In conclusion I suggest that the Bishop should not be given too much encouragement.2

Without the active cooperation of the Australian Government, the large-scale resettlement of Russians from China could not have taken place. But the relationships between the government and other interested parties, the migrants, the ACWCC and settled Russian communities were not necessarily as clear as they initially may seem. Government faced internal pressures to restrict Russian migration on security and health grounds, while receiving external pressure to maintain or even grow its support.

This chapter investigates how these relationships developed over three contexts – international relations, domestic security, and public health. The following chapter will develop these themes further as it looks at these relationships with particular reference to the Russian community and two particular sites of migrant accommodation in greater Sydney, an aged persons home at Cabramatta and the very migrant barracks at Kentlyn for which Archbishop Sava sought funding.

International Context

The Australian Government had been conscious of the international context of its actions towards Russians in China since the 1940s. From late 1948, both Labor and Liberal governments had gradually come to advocate

2 _{Nutt, ‘Memorandum: Russian Orthodox Church - Admission of Refugees from China’, A6980,} S250292, ff. 137-141, NAA.

internationally for the treatment of this group as refugees, and began to accept substantial numbers via the IRO.3 During the 1950s and 1960s, the Department of Immigration would point to Australia’s contribution to ICEM and the UNHCR in response to questions regarding Australia’s actions in support of Russian refugees from China.4 This international awareness shaped the government’s domestic interactions surrounding Russian migrants, as can be seen in two areas – the terms that were used for the migrants, and in a decision to increase Australia’s contributions to ICEM in 1958.

During the 1950s, the Department of Immigration preferred to officially refer to Russian migrants from China as ‘Non-British Europeans from China’. This phrase was used on the relevant correspondence file, and some official memos and circulars.5 It was broadly in line with terms such as ‘European refugees’, which were used by international governmental and non-governmental

3 _{‘China - Political Relations with Australia - European Migration from East Asia’ (Canberra, 1945-53),} A1838, 3107/38/9/1 PART 1, NAA; ‘International Refugee Organisation - Refugees and Displaced Persons in Shanghai’ (Canberra, 1948-53), A1838, 861/5/7, NAA; ‘Non-British European Migration from China Part 1’ (Canberra, 1948-49), A6980, S250253, NAA; ‘Non-British European Migration from China Part 2’ (Canberra, 1948-55), A6980, S250276, NAA; ‘Evacuation of White Russians, Jews and Other Refugees from Shanghai.’ (Canberra, 1949-54), A445, 235/3/6, NAA; ‘Evacuation of White Russians, Jews and Other Refugees from Shanghai. Part 2’ (Canberra, 1949-50), A445, 235/3/5, NAA; Tubabao, Russian Refugee Camp, Philippines 1949-1951 (Sydney: Russian Historical Society of Australia, 1999); Michael Mironov, ‘ “Criminals”, “Prostitutes”, “Collaborators” and “Communists”? The White Russians and Australia’s Post-War Immigration Program’ (Honours thesis, School of History, Australian National University, 2011).

4 _{H.E. Holt, Minister for Immigration, ‘Letter to B.R. Wyllie (Re Russians in China)’; Athol Townley,} ‘Letter to Harvey Perkins (Re Russians in China)’, 11 March 1958, ACC Records, MS 7645, Box 98, File. Refugees and immigration, 1957-1963, NLA; Commonwealth Dept. of Immigration, Refugees of European Origin in the Far East, January 1963, C3939, N1963/75024, NAA.

5 _{‘Non-British European Migration from China Part 3’ (Canberra, 1955-59), A6980, S250292, NAA;} T.H.E. Heyes, ‘Memorandum: Admission of Non-British Europeans’ 4 April 1955, A6980, S250292, ff. 9-10, NAA; T.H.E. Heyes, ‘Foreign Circular No. 152, Admission of Non-British Europeans from China’ 30 October 1957, A6980, S250292, f. 147, NAA; Townley, ‘Letter to Harvey Perkins (Re Russians in China)’.

agencies.6 This terminology had the advantage of recognising the ethnic diversity while obscuring any connection with the USSR. It originated around 1946, when international agencies UNRRA and then IRO first offered assistance to anti-Nazi refugees in Shanghai, which was expanded to include stateless Russians.7

However, unlike international agencies, the department’s preferred usage avoided calling the group from China ‘refugees’. During the 1950s the Russian migrants from China were issued visas that were no different to from other migrants. Only a government policy of favourable treatment distinguished them from regular migration.8 Although the migrants’ accommodation in Hong Kong and subsidised travel to Australia depended on their ‘refugee status’ with the UNHCR, once in Australia this status afforded no formal legal rights. At least initially, the department was reluctant to call these Russians ‘refugees’, possibly since government migration policy had been shifting away from ‘refugee’ migration since the end of the IRO mass-migration scheme.9

6 _{Holborn, Refugees, 1:667–76; ICEM, Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year}

1957, 15; UNHCR, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, General Assembly Official Records: Twelfth Session, Report no. A/3585/Rev.1 (New York: United Nations, May 1957), para. 165; UNHCR, Far Eastern Operation, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, First Session, Report no. A/AC.96/11 (United Nations, General Assembly, 29 December 1958).

7 _{Holborn, The International Refugee Organization, 364; Commonwealth Dept. of Immigration,}

Refugees of European Origin in the Far East.

8 _{T.H.E. Heyes, ‘Letter to the British Consul in Shanghai’, 12 August 1955, A6980, S250292, ff. 40-41,} NAA; T.H.E. Heyes, ‘Letter to the British Consul in Shanghai’, 13 April 1956, A6980, S250292, f. 59, NAA; H. McGuinness, ‘Memorandum to the Acting Secretary, Dept. of Immigration’ 25 May 1957, A6980, S250292, ff. 107-108, NAA.

Nevertheless, the Department of Immigration correspondence and memoranda over the 1950s gradually began to refer to ‘Russian refugees’ from China. This appears to have been under the influence of the many groups who advocated on behalf of Russians from China. Over time, the department seems to have partly adopted their usage as it interacted with them.10

The influence of external advocates is even further seen in Australia’s 1958 decision to make a special contribution to ICEM funds for Russian resettlement from China. During 1957 the increased numbers of Russian migrants meant that the ICEM projected that funding for this group would be exhausted by the end of the year. Therefore in August, the ICEM Executive Committee authorised a special appeal for contributions.11 Prior to this crisis, Australian had seen its role in ICEM primarily as providing ‘the maximum number of resettlement opportunities’ – with other nations providing most funding.12

When the ICEM administration first raised the issue, Gordon Jockel, the Australian representative at Geneva, helped draft a resolution that appealed for US$280,000 (A£125,000) from member governments. However, he was soon

10 _{eg A.L. Nutt, ‘Memorandum: Russian Refugees from China Temporarily in Hong Kong’ 30 May} 1957, A6980, S250292, ff. 107-108, NAA; Heyes, ‘Memorandum: Admission of Russians from China’; Townley, ‘Letter to Harvey Perkins (Re Russians in China)’; T.H.E. Heyes, ‘Letter to Charles Meeking’, 25 November 1958, A6980, S250276, ff 282-283, NAA; T.H.E. Heyes, ‘Memorandum: Russian Refugees from China Temporarily in Hong Kong’ July 1959, A6980, S250292, ff. 327-330, NAA. 11 _{UNHCR, Revised Plan of Operations (1958) Parts II and III, Addendum No. 1, Far Eastern Operation,} UNREF Executive Committee, Eighth Session, Report no. A/AC.79/91.Add.1. (United Nations, General Assembly, 29 November 1957), 3, Annex 1; ICEM, Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1957, 15.

12 _{‘Australian Statement on 1957 Budget and Programme for I.C.E.M.’ September 1956, A1838,} 80/1/3/2 PART 1, ff. 195-199.

advised that any Australian contribution to this appeal was ‘extremely unlikely’.13 Despite repeated requests from Jockel to reconsider this position, it was confirmed on 27 September.14 This was not surprising, given Australia’s previous position; in 1955, for instance, the Department of Immigration did not have funds to support an earlier ICEM appeal for funding for the Middle East and ‘Far East’.15

However, international pressure, including through the WCC led to the Australian Government changing its position. The WCC used the ACWCC to lobby the Australian Government on its behalf. On 28 September 1957, Margaret Jaboor and Leslie Cooke from the WCC Geneva office sent John Dedman a telegram:

Owing unprecedented unexpected flow visaed refugees Hong Kong and consequent shortage funds movement tragic situation has developed. … Can you take urgent action Canberra behalf Australian Churches World Council of Churches before Inter-governmental Committee for European Migration Council meeting October 7.16

13 _{Dept. External Affairs, ‘Cable to Australian Consulate General, Geneva (No. 239)’, 21 August} 1957, A463, 1956/569 PART 2, f. 11, NAA.

14 _{Australian Consulate General, Geneva, ‘Cable to Canberra (No. 270)’, 21 August 1957, A463,} 1956/569 PART 2, f. 12, NAA; Australian Consulate General, Geneva, ‘Cable to Canberra (No. 307)’, 24 September 1957, A463, 1956/569 PART 2, f. 28, NAA; Australian Consulate General, Geneva, ‘Cable to Canberra (No. 316)’, 26 September 1957, A463, 1956/569 PART 2, f. 28, NAA; Dept. External Affairs, ‘Cable to Australian Consulate General, Geneva (No. 295)’, 27 September 1957, A463, 1956/569 PART 2, f. 40, NAA.

15 _{T.H.E. Heyes, ‘I.C.E.M.: Request for Additional Contribution’, 14 February 1955, A6980, S250292,} f. 3, NAA.

16 _{Leslie Cooke and Margaret Jaboor, ‘Telegram to J.J. Dedman’, 28 September 1957, ACC Records,} MS 7645, Box 98, File. Refugees and immigration, 1957-1963, NLA.

This telegram brought considerable action from the ACWCC. The President of the ACWCC, the Anglican Archbishop of Sydney was brought in to request an urgent meeting between Prime Minister Menzies and Dedman.17 Menzies was unavailable, but a meeting with the Acting Minister for External Affairs, Philip McBride, was arranged instead. According to Dedman’s report, the outcome of the meeting was an undertaking that Australia would oppose any attempt to wind back the ICEM-supported movement of Russians from China, but that any additional funding would require a special appropriation.18 Diplomatic cables to Geneva indicate that Jockel was advised on 8 October that the government was reconsidering making an additional payment, due to representations by the WCC and the UNHCR.19

Even though the government did not immediately grant additional funding to ICEM, Dedman, a former Cabinet minister himself, was not fazed. In November he sent a reply to Jaboor that suggesting it simply a case of External Affairs ‘battling it out with Treasury’.20 He also sent a copy of his report on the matter to the New York-based Commission on International Affairs, a WCC-

17 _{Howard Mowll, ‘Telegram to the Prime Minister’, 30 September 1957, ACC Records, MS 7645,} Box 98, File. Refugees and immigration, 1957-1963, NLA.

18 _{Dedman, ‘Report on Refugees of European Origin in the Far East’; R.G. Menzies, ‘Telegram to} Archbishop Mowll’, 1 October 1957, ACC Records, MS 7645, Box 98, File. Refugees and immigration, 1957-1963, NLA.

19 _{Dept. External Affairs, ‘Cable to Australian Consulate General, Geneva (No. 323)’, 8 October} 1957, A463, 1956/569 PART 2, f. 56, NAA.

20 _{John J. Dedman, ‘Letter to Margaret Jaboor’, 20 November 1957, ACC Records, MS 7645, Box} 98, File. Refugees and immigration, 1957-1963, NLA.

affiliated think-tank.21 This made knowledge of his actions available to the foreign affairs community in New York through WCC networks.

Indeed, at the same time as the Australian Government was pressured by the ACWCC, it also began to receive pressure from the UNHCR. In October, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, August Lindt, made representations to the Minister for External Affairs in New York. In November, the Deputy High Commissioner called on the Australian Consul General in Geneva.22 At the end of September, Lindt also made representations to US ICEM representative, George Warren, indirectly influencing Australia.23 Continued migrant travel out of Hong Kong was in the UNHCR’s interest for financial, as well as humanitarian, reasons. Delays in Hong Kong meant that they spent more on refugee support.24

In January 1958, the matter finally came before the General Administrative Committee of Cabinet. There, Richard Casey, Minister for External Affairs, proposed that the Australian Government contribute A£25,000 (US$56,000) for ‘the ICEM programme for the resettlement of refugees of European origin in the Far East’. Casey supported this measure with three

21 _{John J. Dedman, ‘Letter to O. Frederick Nolde’, 14 November 1957, ACC Records, MS 7645, Box} 98, File. Refugees and immigration, 1957-1963, NLA.

22 _{Dept. External Affairs, ‘Cable to Australian Consulate General, Geneva (No. 323)’; Australian} Consulate-General, Geneva, ‘Cable to Canberra (No. 384)’, 8 November 1957, A463, 1956/569 PART 2, f. 66, NAA.

23 _{Australian Consulate General, Geneva, ‘Cable to Canberra (No. 325)’, 28 September 1957, A463,} 1956/569 PART 2, f. 38, NAA.

24 _{UNHCR, Revised Plan of Operations (1958) Parts II and III, Addendum No. 1, Far Eastern Operation;} UNHCR, Report on the Far Eastern Operation, UNREF Executive Committee, Eighth Session, Report no. A/AC.79/110 (United Nations, General Assembly, 19 May 1958).

arguments; humanitarian reasons (specifically naming Dedman), Cold War political reasons, and to maintain Australia’s reputation within the ICEM.25 The Commonwealth then attempted to redirect a further A£25,000 from its original appropriation in support of Hungarian refugees, although this required some indirect arrangements due to Treasury rules. In the 1958-59 financial year, Australia contributed a further A£40,000 (US$89,600).26 Larger Australian contributions followed again in 1959.27 Notably, these payments alone were not sufficient to completely cover ICEM costs related to the resettlement of Russians in Australia, as an internal memorandum from the time states.28

This brief exchange illustrates how international and local factors intersected in the Australian Government’s decision-making process surrounding support for the resettlement of Russians from China, and in particular role that the ACWCC could play. On account of his political experience, Dedman was evidently comfortable negotiating the political process to the benefit of the

25 _{‘Cabinet Minute, Decision No. 1177(GA)’ 29 January 1958, 3, A4926, 1001, NAA; cf Dept. of} External Affairs, ‘Relief of European Refugees in Hongkong [Press Release]’.

26 _{Dept. External Affairs, ‘Cable to Australian Consulate General, Geneva (No. 202)’, 7 May 1958,} A463, 1956/569 PART 2, f. 118, NAA; Australian Consulate-General, Geneva, ‘Cable to Canberra (No. 274)’, 10 May 1958, A463, 1956/569 PART 2, f. 114, NAA; Dept. External Affairs, ‘Cable to Australian Consulate General, Geneva (No. 214)’, 13 May 1958, A463, 1956/569 PART 2, f. 119, NAA; E.L. Charles, ‘Memorandum to the Secretary, Dept. of Immigration’ 16 May 1958, A6980, S250292, ff. 238-239, NAA; Dept. External Affairs, ‘Cable to Australian Consulate General, Geneva (No. 437)’, 27 October 1958, A463, 1956/569 PART 2, f. 131A, NAA; Dept. External Affairs, ‘Cable to Australian High Commission, London (No. 2384)’, 29 October 1958, A463, 1956/569 PART 2, f. 138, NAA; T.H.E. Heyes, ‘Letter to Dedman’, 4 November 1958, A463, 1956/569 PART 2, NAA. 27 _{UNHCR, Addendum to the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Report on}

the Second Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme), Report no. A/4104/REV.1/ADD.1(SUPP) (Geneva, 9 October 1959), 7.

28 _{H. McGuinness, ‘Memorandum to the Secretary, Dept. of Immigration’ 14 May 1958, A6980,} S250292, f. 240, NAA.

ACWCC and its clients. He used his skills on multiple occasions throughout his time with the Resettlement Department, on topics such as the Hungarian refugee crisis of 1956,29 finding further funding for ICEM in late 1958,30 and funding for homes for aged Russians from China, as will be discussed further in Chapter 4.

This exchange also illustrates the limitations of the international refugee effort at the time. At the very same time that international efforts were going on to assist Russian migrants in China, there were much greater numbers of Chinese refugees in Hong Kong.31 The members of ICEM were aware of this disparity. For instance, according to one Australian diplomatic cable, the US was initially hesitant to fund ICEM shipping from Hong Kong, since this would lead to an ‘invidious distinction’ between the amounts of aid the US gave to Chinese and European refugees in Hong Kong.32 Nevertheless, as long as Australia maintained heavy restrictions on non-European immigration, its assistance to Chinese refugees remained minimal.33

29 _{A.S. Brown, ‘Letter (Re Hungarian Refugees)’, 16 November 1956, ACC Records, MS 7645, Box} 98, File. Refugees and immigration, 1957-1963, NLA.

30 _{Heyes, ‘Letter to Dedman’.}

31 _{Peterson, ‘To Be or Not to Be a Refugee’; Peterson, ‘The Uneven Development of the} International Refugee Regime in Postwar Asia’; Peterson, ‘Sovereignty, International Law, and the Uneven Development of the International Refugee Regime’.

32 _{Australian Consulate General, Geneva, ‘Cable to Canberra (No. 316)’.}

33 _{A very small number of Chinese refugees from Hong Kong did find their way to Australia in the} 1950s, such as Henry Sue, whose story is recorded in Will Davies and Andrea Dal Bosco, Tales from a Suitcase (Port Melbourne, Vic: Lothian, 2001), 202–20. Others people were deported to China:

Even the Australian Government’s willingness to accept Russians from China remained tenuous. Shortly after Cabinet had approved the A£25,000 payment to the ICEM, some within the Department of Immigration began to internally recommend winding back the concessions made towards Russian migrants from China.34 Although these changes did not take place, they do point to pressures within the government. Two factors in particular repeatedly caused problems; domestic security worries and public health concerns, particularly around tuberculosis. We will now consider these in turn.

Security

Some Australian officials had long held fears that Russian migrants from China posed a security risk. During the late 1940s, Australian officials in Shanghai viewed the Russians from there as potential communists and criminals.35 Although immigration policy gradually became more favourable, security concerns remained. From 1952, Charles Spry, Director-General of ASIO, repeatedly raised concerns with the Department of Immigration regarding

Klaus Neumann, Refuge Australia, Australia’s Humanitarian Record, Briefings (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2004), 8–10, 98–100.

34 _{McGuinness, ‘Memorandum to the Secretary, Dept. of Immigration’; Charles, ‘Memorandum to} the Secretary, Dept. of Immigration’; ‘Policy Relating to Admission of Russians from China [Undated Draft]’ May 1958, A6980, S250292, ff. 245-249, NAA.

35 _{Mironov, ‘ “Criminals”, “Prostitutes”, “Collaborators” and “Communists”? The White Russians and} Australia’s Post-War Immigration Program’, 50–57; Michael Mironov, ‘Taylor, Leslie Athol (1920– 2001)’, People Australia, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, 2011,

Russians from China.36 However, the increased numbers of arrivals from 1957 meant that security concerns also increased.

At the start of 1957, ASIO and the Department of Immigration came to an arrangement whereby ASIO officers could sit in on immigration officer interviews with sponsors. This was in lieu of actual interviews with the nominees, who were in China, and so inaccessible to Australian officials.37 Later in 1957, a policy to obtain women’s maiden names for security screening was implemented.38 Notably, internal Department of Immigration correspondence suggests that maiden names were already easily obtainable in most cases from files held by the Russian Orthodox Church.39

However, ASIO and the Department of Immigration often disagreed regarding how to manage any potential risk posed by Russian migrants from