The term ‘institution’ has taken diverse meanings over time as significant authors within economics, political science, sociology and organization theory have engaged with it, making delineation of an appropriate and robust definition a “challenge… [which] resides in the varying meanings and usages of the concept” by different groups (Scott 2001:xx). Scott meets this challenge by coherently juxtaposing the multiple conceptions of the term in different strands of literature to derive a rich, synthesized, definition. According to him institutions are “[multifaceted, durable] social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience…. composed of cultured-cognitive, normative and regulatory elements, that together with associated activities and material resources, provide stability and meaning to social life”49 (Scott 2001:48, bracketed words taken from his ensuing elaboration).
By weaving together the multiple views, this holistic definition successfully captures the essential facets that contribute to the ubiquity, persistence and significance of institutions. Authors train different disciplinary lenses that focus on specific facets of the whole concept and accordingly define the term. Institutional economists, public
49
As is clearly evident from his extended discussion, Scott’s use of ‘social’ is in its broadest sense of including economic, political, legal and other structures that combine to produce what is experienced as ‘social life’.
29
administration theorists and some political scientists focus on the regulative elements and define institutions as a stable system of statutory rules, either formal or informal, backed by surveillance and sanctioning power. Other political scientists, organization theorists and sociologists who see institutions as systems of normative rules that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory dimension to social life (through values and norms), focus on the normative elements. The conception of rules here is broad, including ‘routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, organizational forms, and technologies…beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures and knowledge’ (March and Olsen 1989:22, also cited in Scott 2001) – with a focus on social obligations as the basis for compliance. Finally, anthropologists and sociologists view institutions as ‘sedimentation of meanings or, to vary the image, a crystallization of meanings in objective form’ (Berger and Kellner 1981: 31, also cited in Scott 2001), stressing the importance of shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and the frames through which meaning is made; that is, the cultural-cognitive elements of institutions.
The three facets of institutions are not only manifested in specific carriers respectively (see Table 1.2 below) but also have corresponding bases of compliance, order and legitimacy. They are also associated with indicators that not only proclaim and solidify their existence, but can also be used to signal compliance. Table 1.2 summarizes the overall conception of institutions, their carriers and the elements that contribute to their functioning and persistence. All three facets – regulative (rules), normative (norms, values) and cultural-cognitive (beliefs, schema) – and the various elements that carry the institutional burden in each case, are vital ingredients, forming a continuum ‘from the conscious to the unconscious, from the legally enforced to the taken-for-granted’ (Hoffman 1997:36). All contribute, in independent and mutually
30
reinforcing ways, to giving institutions their power; their ‘directive force’ results from being ‘over-determined in the sense that social sanctions, plus pressure for conformity, plus intrinsic direct reward, plus values, are all likely to act together’ (Andrade
1984:98).
Table 1.2
Pillars, Elements, Carriers and Functioning of Institutions (derived from Scott 2001: 52, 77)
Institutional Pillars Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive
Insti
tutional Ca
rriers
Symbolic systems Rules, Laws Values, Expectations Categories, Schema
Relational systems Governance systems,
Power systems Regimes, Authority systems Structural Isomorphism, Identities
Routines Protocols, Standard
Operating Procedures Jobs, Roles, Obedience to duty Scripts
Artifacts Objects complying with
(legally) mandated systems Objects meeting conventions, Standards Objects possessing symbolic value Insti tu tio nal F un cti oni ng Bases of
Compliance Expedience Social Obligation Taken-for-grantedness, Shared understandings
Bases of Order Regulative rules Binding Obligations Constitutive Schema
Nature of Mechanisms
Coercive Normative Mimetic
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy
Indicators Rules, Laws, Sanctions Certification,
Accreditation Common Beliefs, Shared logic of action
Bases of Legitimacy Legally sanctioned Morally governed Comprehensible,
Recognizable, Culturally supported
Clearly, distinctions between formal-informal, customary-statutory, or regulatory- normative-cultural-cognitive institutions serve analytical purposes only, but do not necessarily connote any greater significance or importance in institutional terms; it is coherence and mutual reinforcement across these distinctions that make institutions
31
stable, durable and effective in their purpose. Institutions develop (or change) with the collective development of both regulative rules – that attempt to influence
‘antecedently existing activities’ – and constitutive rules that ‘create the very possibility of certain activities’ (Searle 1995:27). Constitutive rules construct the social objects, events and activities to which regulative rules are applied and therefore make possible their effective operation, but because they are so basic to social
structure, so fundamental to social life, they are often overlooked.
The term ‘organization’ is often used interchangeably with ‘institution’, but it is conceptually different. An organization is ‘the structural expression of rational action’ (Selznick 1948:25); a mechanistic instrument designed to achieve specified goals. As ‘structures of recognized and accepted roles’, organizations can become more or less ‘institutionalized’ over time to the extent that they enjoy special status and legitimacy for having satisfied people’s needs and met their normative expectations (Selznick 1948; Huntington 1965; Uphoff 1986, 1993). Organizations are instruments, goal- oriented structures of roles, rules and procedures, but ‘[b]ecause organizations are social systems, goals or procedures tend to achieve an established, value-impregnated status … they become institutionalized.’ (Selznick 1949:256-57). Institutionalization occurs through a process of value-commitment to structures, people or procedures extending beyond their instrumentalities, whereby organizations become ‘infuse[d] with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand.’ (Selznick 1957:16- 17, emphasis in original). Many organizations are therefore not institutions, which concept includes only practices, rules, places, people, structures or organizations that have acquired value beyond their immediate utility or instrumentality, and therefore persist.
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What are the implications of these conceptual understandings for the decentralized governance problematic? First, that while the discourses in decentralization center on the reform of regulatory frameworks and the organizational architecture through which they function, it is clear that the effective and stable operation of decentralized governance arrangements rests not only on the design of the statutory provisions and organizational structures for their operation – which constitute the ‘regulative’
elements – but from their coherence with normative and cultural-cognitive elements in the local context, which are the ‘constitutive’ elements50. Also, while the instrumental objectives of reform must be adequately met (for example, effective provision of a basic service), the stability and sustainability of the reformed arrangements depends to an extent on the active de-institutionalization of the pre-reform arrangements, and interventions for the institutionalization of the latter.51
50
Such coherence is likely to be a matter of degree, and clearly, the question is of finding degrees of fit that enable success of various kinds of decentralization. Moreover, systematic efforts to alter the normative and cultural-cognitive elements in the context so as to enable greater fit, such as training or educational programs, or the demonstration effect of changed circumstances can also alter the initial degree of coherence. The question then is of the cost of such additional efforts and the time required for effect; ultimately, the more efficient and effective approach would be to identify the kinds of
decentralization that have greater coherence with different kinds of contexts – the exact burden of this research.
51
On the basis of these understandings, one could hypothesize that the efficacy of reformed arrangements would depend on (a) the extent to which they prove more effective in providing
(perceptually) safer, more reliable, regular and/or convenient services than earlier arrangements, (b) the extent to which they cohere with existing norms, beliefs, patterns of behavior and activity. Also, one could hypothesize that (1) if the first is very significant, the second would matter less in terms of how
quickly the newer arrangements are accepted, but the longevity and sustainability of reformed
arrangements may require more frequent attention, (2) if the first is insignificant, reforms would either be a non-starter and die quickly where the coherence between regulative and constitutive rules is less, but persist for a long time despite their ineffectiveness, where the reformed arrangements cohere highly with normative and cultural patterns in the environment.
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2.
DECENTRALIZATION: DEFINITION, DEGREES AND TYPES
Even after decades of discussion about decentralization and application of the concept, the multi-valence of the term persists.52
What is clear……. is that people who are regarded as authorities on the subject are yet to agree on what exactly the concept [of decentralization] entails. And unless a
consensus is reached, more conceptual confusion in the name of identifying new typologies of decentralization will persist. (Oyugi 2000a:iii)
Though most authors preface their writing with similar observations, they have either adopted existing definitions and proceeded with their enquiry, or set out a new set of definitions for the purpose of their research. Neither of the two approaches resolves the issue of inconsistency across studies, and in the latter approach, a fresh set of definitions and meanings are created that add to the existing confusion. In this study, therefore, neither of these strategies was adopted. Instead, following Sartori (1984), definitions were derived by critically evaluating existing ones for specificity with regard to the object it signifies and its clarity in terms of the boundary conditions that distinguish it from allied terms, two necessary characteristics of an epistemologically defensible definition.53
. The specific delineation of the core concepts and accurate definitions of various terms in the decentralization lexicon are discussed below.
52
A major proportion of authors whose writing was reviewed in this project preface their essays with this observation, but it is most emphatically pointed out by Silverman (1992), Cohen and Peterson (1999), Ribot (2001) and World Bank (2003), among others.
53
Sartori suggests 3 successive steps towards defining a term, (1) anatomy – sorting out the constitutive elements of a given concept – i.e., its characteristics, properties or attributes (2) reconstruction – recombining and organizing these elements in some meaningful and logically sound fashion (3) concept formation – selecting a definition or definitions of a concept on warranted and explicated grounds (Sartori 1984).
34 2.1. DEFINING THE CONCEPT
The most widely used definitions of decentralization in the literature are taken from the UN54, Rondinelli (with various co-authors, in 1983, 1984, 1989, 1990), Mawhood (1983) and Smith (1985), and are listed in Annexure I. These were all formulated before the current phase of interest in decentralization, and suffer from some
ambiguity and conceptual limitations. The first issue is that the concepts of ‘power’, ‘authority’ and ‘responsibility’, are used interchangeably, though they have clearly different legal and functional implications55. A second issue lies in the use of the words transfer or cede, both of which restrict decentralization to ‘handing-over’ of powers held by the central authority and exclude other deliberate processes and actions that could also constitute decentralization.56 Thirdly, in these definitions, all kinds of transfer of powers are included, including to another centralized or single entity, such as a para-statal, private enterprise or voluntary agency, operating in a monopolistic situation57, which may not disperse ordistribute power, authority or
54
Oyugi (2000:iii) observes that the UN definition remains the standard definition today, but none of the many reviews I examined adopted this definition or referred to it, though other content from that source has been cited by some (eg, Cohen and Peterson 2000).
55
Balogun’s definition, that it is the “…transfer, in varying degrees, of the sovereign power, functions, responsibilities, and resources of the state from the center to …” (Balogun 2000:154) does better, but is not adopted by others. Transfer of each of these connotes different things – transfer of responsibilities without the authority to act to discharge them would be meaningless; but even the holding of authority does not necessarily lead to the discharge of shifted responsibilities, if resources – or the authority to marshall them and the possibility of their availability – are not ensured. And this – the presence of both authority and resources, together – would constitute power. Therefore, when all three – responsibility, authority and resources – are not transferred together, there is no transfer of ‘power’, making the decentralization either meaningless or ineffective. This alerts us to the fact that such inadequate and partial changes may be effected in practice in the name of decentralization, constituting of at best very partial steps, (when at least responsibilities and authority are granted), or at worst political posturing (when only responsibilities are transferred). These constitutive elements of power, however, must not be conflated with different degrees of power, which represent an orthogonal variable.
56
These could include strengthening or granting official recognition to non-central governing entities such as customary or community-based organizations or NGOs, altering legal structures to enable the functioning of entities other than the government in tasks or functions that were earlier in the exclusive domain of the state, and similar instances. Mawhood and Smith are less exclusive, including ‘any act that formally cedes power’. (italics and emphases mine)
57
Manor (1999) finds this typical of privatization processes, which he therefore excludes as instances of decentralization. While the issue of whether all privatization processes need be excluded on this basis
35
responsibility. Finally, and most importantly, these definitions are conceptually and empirically limited in the face of the variety of processes currently included in the discourses and practices of decentralization, though they well reflect “the
decentralization efforts that have been tried in developing countries since the early 1970s” (Rondinelli et al., 1984:9). Changing notions of the nature of public goods and the appropriateness of their production, supply and distribution through market
processes, neoliberal concerns with downsizing of governments and bureaucracies, political concerns with extending and deepening democracy as well as a groundswell for local and regional autonomy on the basis of religion, ethnicity, or indigeneity in the late ‘80s and ‘90s, have all added multiple strands and conceptual variations of the notion of decentralization (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007)58. These are not adequately reflected in the older definitions, in which there is only a peripheral concern with political decentralization59 and privatization60, the explicit focus being the sharing of power between the central government and its sub-ordinate units (Smith 1985;
bears examination, but the point about non-distributive transfers not being ‘decentralization’ is well made. Ribot also excludes privatization but on different grounds – that there is an “exclusive” logic to it that is contradictory to the “inclusive public logic” of decentralization (Ribot 2002:iii).
58
For discussion on the multiple concerns and reasons around the contemporary heightened interest in decentralization, see also Bennett (1990), Manor (1999), Cohen and Peterson (1999), among others.
59
That is, the sharing of governing powers between different units or tiers in a political system. While local governments find mention as one kind of entities to which authority can be transferred, the focus is instrumental - they figure only as an alternative implementing unit for central government programs. It is recognized that they are political bodies (elected, nominated or customarily constituted), which is why, transfers to them are referred to as political decentralization later by Rondinelli (1990a) but the concern is not as much with sub-national political development and the transfer of political power, as with delegated administrative authority and responsibility to implement specified development projects and programs (Slater 1989).
60
Privatization was included only in the sense that these “evolved from situations in which private sector firms offered goods and services which government provided poorly, or not at all, or only in some parts of the country”, rather than from deliberate efforts by governments to divest themselves of public functions. It is only later that privatization in the latter sense of the term is included, and a clear shift in focus is visible, with decentralization itself being additionally defined as “a situation in which public goods and services are provided primarily through the revealed preferences of individuals through market mechanisms” (Rondinelli et al, 1989:59, see also Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007). Though Oyugi suggests that the interest in decentralization in the developing countries in the earlier phase (‘70s) was due to pressure for privatization by multi-lateral agencies, other authors do not suggest this – in fact, most clearly see the neoliberal agenda for privatization as a driving force in the 80s and 90s (eg., Cheema and Rondinelli 2007).
36
Mawhood 1983; Rondinelli et al. 1989; Slater 1989; Oyugi 2000, Cheema and Rondinelli 2007).
These definitions are therefore particularly limiting, in the face of the strong normative pressures for privatization, liberalization and democratization in the current
discourses. For example Balogun asserts that the idea of decentralization embodies a “…concern for equity, through the redistribution of power.” (Balogun 2000:155) and Ribot emphasizes that there is an ‘inclusive logic to decentralization’ (Ribot 2001:v). Others equally strongly advocate privatization (Littvack et al 1998, Savas 2000). Therefore, using the older definitions limits and de-politicizes the discussions on decentralization – a charge leveled by critics such as Slater (1989, 1990)61 and later, Mohan and Stokke (2000).
In contrast, Wolman offers a ‘common-sense’ and inclusive definition – “the dispersal or distribution of powers away from the center” (1990:29), which succinctly and uniquely specifies the action(s) denoted by the term, and is yet broad enough to cover the variety of processes which are currently included in the rubric of decentralization. It is also surprisingly robust in providing specific distinguishing features and boundary conditions for the kind of institutional changes that can be included, as I explain below. This generic definition can apply to different contexts62, but in this research, I use it (as Wolman has) in the context of governance arrangements for discharge of public functions63.
61
See also Samoff (1990), Rondinelli et al. (1989), Rondinelli (1990) for a debate on this issue.
62
Decentralization in this sense can also be discussed in the context of various types of private organizations; in a slightly altered meaning, has been used in relation to geographic disperal of human settlements, economic enterprises etc. There is parallel literature on decentralization of decision- making power or information within corporate, manufacturing and various other kinds of organizations (see, for example, Sherwood 1969, Kochen and Deutsch 1980).
63
It is to be noted that the domain so delineated is not restricted only to government reform i.e., the dispersal of power away from central and state governments, which has been a predominant focus of the
37
By this definition, decentralization implies a redistribution of power from central to a number of non-central entities, as is clear from the words ‘dispersal’ and ‘distribute’. There is no inherent normative prescription of an ideally decentralized or centralized situation; only a specification that there be an outward or centrifugal dispersal from whatever distribution exists. Also, as a verb (‘to decentralize’) it clearly indicates that the set of actions that constitute or result in this process are purposive – that is, the dispersal was intended, and was not an unintended or exogenous result of other processes. Finally, the definition is also consistent with those suggested by other authors, for there is no disagreement that decentralization refers to centrifugal dispersal of powers already held or assumed to be held – explicitly, by default, or as residuals – by the ‘center’.
Wolman’s generic formulation, in addition to connoting governance reforms that explicitly transfer powers already being exercised by the state away from itself (as in the previous definitions), also covers other processes that have been a part of
decentralization reform in many countries. These include legal actions by the centralized state to institutionalize, formally recognize, or strengthen the exercise of powers by non-central actors already exercising the same – such as the granting of Constitutional status to local governments that existed in India but did not have legislative mandate. It also does not preclude processes of organizing non-centralized