You may now worry whether there is a coherent notion of this oughtsimpliciter and thus answer negatively to Q2 on the flowchart (when oughts conflict, is there anything that the agent oughtsimpliciter do?). I confess, this is a skepticism that I share. Perhaps there are just facts about what you morally ought do, what you epistemically ought do,
5Finlay (2014), critic of the all-things-considered view, also argues that some of these ‘oughts’ do not
what you politely ought do, what you athletically ought do, what you legally ought do, what you aesthetically ought do, etc. But, there is no ought that adjudicates conflicts between these other oughts. I turn now to considering three reasons for being skeptical about the ought simpliciter. That is, three reasons that push us to answer “no” to Q2.
First, you could worry that these distinctive kinds of reasons or oughts don’t share a common justificatory source. For example, Tiffany (2007) argues that there is no com- mon scale on which these various considerations—moral, epistemic, aesthetic, legal, etc.— can be compared. He argues that however we combine these competing reasons is de- termined by facts about our psychology (see also Finlay 2006, 2009). That is, different agents will weigh considerations differently. There is no further normative perspective from which we can both ask and answer the question of how these reasons should be com- bined. Tiffany argues that any proposed account of weighings would be guilty of some degree of arbitrariness. On this point, this arbitrariness might be due to the incommen- surable nature of these oughts. That is, the oughts are incommensurable, and that is why there is no common scale on which they can be weighed.6 For example, Kelly (2003, pp.
619) argues:
In cases in which what it is epistemically rational to believe clearly diverges from what it is practically advantageous to believe, there is simply no gen- uine question about what one should believe: Although we can ask what one should believe from the epistemic perspective, and we can ask what one should believe from the practical perspective, there is no third question: what one should believe, all things considered. In any case in which epistemic and practical considerations pull in opposite directions, there is simply nothing to be said about what one should believe all things considered.
This is merely a statement of the skepticism, it is not yet an argument for skepticism. To fill in that argument, we can turn to Feldman (2004, pp. 692) who presents the following two examples to argue that there is no sense to be made of a plain ought that “somehow en- compasses moral considerations, epistemic considerations, and perhaps others, and then weighs them against one another to come up with an overall assessment.” First, consider a child comparing two dolls—where one is short and square, the other tall and thin—how do we determine which one is bigger? Similarly, imagine trying to give an all-things- con- sidered judgement about who is the all-things-considered best billionaire by comparing billionaires according to their wealth and their strength. Feldman argues that it doesn’t
6I should briefly note that this same worry might push you to posit an all-things-considered ought pre-
make sense to ask whether height trumps width, or whether volume trumps height, etc. in the case of the dolls. Similarly, there is no independent concept ofstrealth for which there is some correct combination or weighing of the two components—wealth and strength. There is no sense in which one doll is just plain bigger than the other, there is no sense in which one billionaire is just plain strealthier than the other.7 We could think that this
is also the case for the oughtsimplicter. As strealth is the combination of strength and wealth, the ought simpliciter is supposed to be a combination of moral considerations, epistemic considerations and more. So as there is no sense to be made of strealth, perhaps there is also no sense to be made of the ought simpliciter.
Second, you might worry that the ought simpliciter doesn’t make sense because it requires there to be some standard that is the most normatively important standard and either way you cash out this idea is incoherent. Copp (1997) argues that whatever way we try to explain the authority that this most normatively important standard has will force us to embrace a contradiction. Copp (1997, pp. 101) notes:
...the claim that the candidate[standard] S has the property of supremacy is the claim that it is normatively more important than any other standpoint, as assessed from a relevant authoritative standpoint. That is, if S is normatively the most important, then there is some authoritative standard R that yields the verdict that S is normatively the most important standpoint.
The challenge we now face is answering whether R is identical to S. If R is identical to S, then R cannot play the role of the more important normative standard that establishes the normative supremacy of S. That kind of self-endorsement is characteristic of all the normative standards we’ve been considering and as such it is unimpressive, e.g., morality tells you to listen to morality and self-interest tells you to listen to self-interest. So, R cannot be identical to S.
But, were R to a be a standardother than S, that is similarly unimpressive. As Copp (1997, pp. 102) further notes:
We don’t want to know whether S is most important, according to some ar- bitrary standard R. We want to know if S is most important full stop. But that means R would have to be the normatively most important standard.
7I should note that Thomson (2008) has a response to this worry. She argues that normative evaluations
are not ambiguous. The best option to choose is which is the most choice worthy option in a particular situation. So in a case like that presented by Feldman (2004) in which are trying to determine who’s the best billionaire, that question does not make sense in the abstract. Rather, if we ask for a purpose, e.g., who’s the best billionaire to choose for a game of baseball, there is no longer an ambiguity.
But then S is not the most important standard. This contradicts our initial assumption.
So, Copp concludes, there is no coherent way to cash out the idea that there is a norma- tively most important standard that is the standard of what we ought simpliciter do.
Third, you might worry, as Baker (MS) does, that if the initial conflict resulted from too many oughts, “how does adding another ought help, instead of multiplying the num- ber of conflicts?” In order for the ought simpliciter to add anything and resolve the dilemma it must possess some special property of greater normative authority than the other oughts. Baker (MS) summarizes:
The characterization of that special property is typically metaphorical or oth- erwise hopelessly vague and ambiguous. Attempts to eliminate this vagueness face a dilemma: either they characterize the special property in more famil- iar normative terms, leading to vicious circularity, or they are psychological characterizations that seem to change the subject.
On this point regarding the vagaries of the ought simpliciter, Baker (MS) argues that the ought simpliciter not only lacks any sort of a link to a more familiar theoretical notion— i.e., it is often merely gestured at through the use of evocative phrases—it also lacks the- oretical utility. Baker (MS) argues that there is no theoretical problem that the ought simpliciter solves. In the case of the supposedly rational racist, Spencer ought morally re- frain from belief, but he also ought epistemically believe. Baker (MS) argues that “[t]here is no mystery here calling out for explanation.” Whatever problem there is here is a prac- tical dilemma, and there is no reason to assume that practical problems admit of solution. The problem of the supposedly rational racist, perhaps, is just a practical problem we face given that we live in a world that is structured by racism and racist institutions, and perhaps it doesn’t admit of solution.
These reasons for skepticism can lead us in a few directions. We might worry whether denying that there’s anything Spencer oughtsimpliciter do amounts to endorsing the pes- simistic conclusion that the conflict is irresolvable and he’s damned if he believes and damned if he doesn’t. In Section 4.3.2 I’ll consider the account that answers yes—i.e., that Spencer is damned no matter what he does—and then in Section 4.3.3 I’ll consider the ac- counts that answer no. All of these accounts, I suggest, emerge from a general skepticism of the idea that there is an oughtsimpliciter.