A critical examination should be made of each case where there is room for doubt. In case of well- known facts admitted by all, examination is unnecessary. A critical examination of some of the categories is given below :—
(1) The Means of Bight Knowledge (pramana).
The means.
Some say that perception and other so-called means of right knowledge are invalid as they are impossible The means of right at all the three times. Perception is impos-knowledee are said to be ., , , ., , , , r , ,-• invalid. * the present, past and future times
inasmuch as it can neither be prior to, nor posterior to, nor simultaneous with, the objects of sense. If perception occurred anteriorly it could not have arisen from the contact
A History of Indian Logicof a sense with its object. With reference to the perception of colour, for instance, it is asked whether the colour preceded perception or the perception preceded colour. If one says that perception occurred anteriorly or preceded the colour, one must give up one's definition of perception, viz. that perception arises from the contact of a sense with its object. If perception is supposed to occur posteriorly, it cannot be maintained that objects of sense are established by perception. Colour, for instance, is an object which is said to be established by visual perception. But this conclusion will have to be abandoned if perception is supposed to occur posteriorly to the object. If perception were simultaneous with its object, there would not be any order of succession in our cognitions as there is no such order in their coiresponding objects. Various objects of sense can exist at one time, e.g. colour and smell exist in a flower at the same time. If we hold that perception is simultaneous with its object, we must admit that the colour and the smell can be perceived at the same time, that is, our perception of colour must be admitted to be simultaneous with our perception of smell. This is absurd becawse two acts of perception, nay, two cognitions cannot take place at the same time. As there is an order of succession in our cognitions, perception cannot be simultaneous with its object.
Perception and other so-called means of right knowledge are therefore not only invalid but also im- possible. Moreover, if an object of knowledge is to be established by a means of knowledge, this latter needs also to be established by another means of knowledge. Just as a balance is an instrument when it weighs a thing, but is an object when it is itself weighed in another balance, so a means of knowledge is an instrument when it establishes an object, but is an object when it is itself to be established. Finally if a means of knowledge does not require another means of knowledge for its establishment, let an object of knowledge be also established without any means of knowledge.
In reply it is stated that if perception and other means of right knowledge are impossible, then the denial of
Validity of the means щ ig also impossible, for owing to absence of ot right knowledge estab- ,. ,, . ' 1.1.1 i - • , .. ip -n lished. matter to be denied the denial itself will
be inoperative. If there is no means of knowledge to establish any thing, how is the denial itself to be established ? If on the other hand the denial is held to be based on a certain means of knowledge, we are thereby to acknowledge the validity of that means. When we deny a thing on the ground of its not being perceived, we acknowledge by implication that perception is a means of right knowledge. Similarly inference, etc., are also means of knowledge. There is no fixed rule that the means of knowledge should precede the objects of "Knowledge or should succeed them or be simultaneous with them. They resemble sometimes a drum which precedes its sound, sometimes an illumination which succeeds the sun, and another time a smoke which is synchronous with the fire. The means of knowledge are self-established like the illumination of a lamp. Just as a lamp illumines itself and other objects, so the means of knowledge establish themselves and the objects of knowledge. Though a lamp which illumines
A History of Indian Logicother objects is itself illumined by our eye, we cannot deny a general notion of illuminafcor as distinguished from that of the objfects illuminated. Similarly we must admit a general notion of the means of knowledge as distinguished from that of the objects of knowledge. The means of knowledge are therefore neither invalid nor impossible.
Perception,
Some say that the definition of perception as given before is defective, as it doss not notice the conjunction The definition of per- p{ goul yith mind and of mind with sense, lece" РвР--
the contact of a sense with its object no knowledge arises unless, it is said, there is also conjunction of soul with mind. A sense coming in contact with its object produces knowledge in our soul only if the sense is conjoined with the mind. Hence the conjunction of soul with mind should be mentioned as a necessary element in the definition of perception. Moreover the contact of a sense with its object is sometimes not found to be the cause of perception, e.g. a person listening to a song does not see colour though it comes in contact with his eye.
In reply it is stated that if the conjunction of soul with mind is to be mentioned as a necessary element in The definition of per- g definition of perception, then direction ception defended. ("dik"), space ("desa"), time (-kala") and ether ("akasa") should also be enumsrated among the causes of perception. But such an enumeration is held on all hands to be undesirable. The soul, we point out, has not been excluded from our definition of perception inasmuch as knowledge is a mark of the soul. Perception has been described as knowledge, and knowledge implies the soul which is its abode. Consequently in speaking of knowledge the soul has, by implication, been mentioned as a condition in the production of perception. The mind too has not been omitted from our definition inasmuch as we have spoken of the non-simultaneity of acts of knowledge. Perception has been defined as knowledge. An essential character of knowledge is that more than one act of knowing cannot take place at a time. This characteristic is due to the mind, an atomic
substance, which is conjoined with the sense, when knowledge is produced. Hence in speaking of knowledge we have by implication mentioned the mind as a condition of perception. The contact of a sense with its object is mentioned as the special cause of perception. There are many kinds of knowledge, such as perception, recollection, etc. Conjunction of soul with mind is a cause which operates in the production of all kinds of knowledge, while the contact of a sense with its object is the cause which operates only in perception. In our definition of perception we have mentioned only the special cause, and have omitted the common causes which precede not only perception, but also other kinds of knowledge. By saying that perception is knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object. we have distinguished five special kinds of knowledge, vi/. (1) the visual perception also called eye-knowledge or colour-knowledge, (2) the
A History of Indian Logicauditory perception also called ear-knowledge or sound-knowledge, (3) the olfactory perception also called nose-knowledge or smell-knowledge. (4) the gustatory perception also called tongue-knowledge or taste-knowledge, and (5) the tactual perception also called skin-knowledge or touch-knowledge. It is admitted that a person while listening to a song may not see colour though the latter comes in contact with his eye. Yet the instance does not prove that the contact of a sense with its object, is not the cause of perception, for it is to be understood that his intent listening prevents him from seeing the colour. In other words, the auditory perception supersedes the visual perception, because the song is more attractive than the colour.
Perception, some say, is inference because it apprehends a thing by
grasping only a part of the same. We are said Is Perception a mere perceive a tree while we really perceive onlv inference ? , , ., „,, . , i 1 " -i i
a part of it. This knowledge ot the tree, as a whole, derived from the knowledge of a part of it, is said to be a mere inference.
In reply it is stated that perception is not inference for even the objectors admit that at least a part of the tree is actually perceived. Hence perception as a means of knowledge is not altogether denied, on the contrary it is accepted as different from inference.
Inference
Inference, some say, is not a means of right knowledge, as it errs in certain cases. For instance, if we see
a river • ''"'Tl swollen we infer that there has been rain, if we right knowledge ? • ce л-i. • • г 'ч see ants carrying oft their eggs, we infer that there will be rain, and if we hear a peacock scream, we infer that clouds are gathering. These inferences are said to be not necessarily correct, for a river may be swollen because of its being embanked, the ants may carry off their eggs because their nests have been damaged, and the supposed screaming of a peacock may be nothing but the voice of a man.
Inference, we reply, is really a means of right knowledge, as the errors alleged to be involved in it may be explained away. The swelling of a river caused by rain is different from that which results from the embankment of a part oE it; the former is attended by a great rapidity of currents, an abundance of foam, a mass of fruits, leaves, wood. etc. The manner in which ants carry off their eggs just before rain is quite different from the manner in which they do so when their nests are damaged. The ants run away quickly in a steady line when rain is imminent, but fear makes them fly in disorder when their nests are damaged. The screaming of a peacock which suggests gathering clouds is quite different from a man's imitation of it, for the latter is not natural. If in such cases any wrong inference is drawn, the fault is in the person, not in the process.
Comparison.
Comparison, ;.oins say, is not a means of right knowledge, as the т . knowledge o? a thine
of'hTkZwTdg'e""" gb similarity to another thing, no " matter whether the similarity is complete, con-
A History of Indian Logicsiderable or partial. On the ground of complete similarity we never say " a cow is like a cow " ; on the ground of considerable similarity we do not say "a buffalo is like a cow"; and on the ground of partial similarity we do not say " a mustard seed is like Mount Meru." Hence comparison is regarded by some as not a means of right knowledge, for it has no precise standard.
This objection does not, we maintain, carry any weight, for comparison is established through similarity in a high degree. The similarity in a high degree exists between such well-known objects as a cow and a bos gavaeus, etc.
Some hold that comparison is not a separate means of knowledge, for when one notices the likeness of a cow in
ee?""" в-'»® animal, one really performs an act of
perception. In reply it is urged that we cannot deny comparison as a separate means of knowledge, for how otherwise does the name bos gavaeus convey the general notion of the animal called bos gavaeus ? That the name bos gavaeus signifies one and all members of the 6os gavaeus class is not a result of perception, but the consequence of a distinct knowledge called comparison.
Comparison, some say, is not different from inference, for both seek to establish the unperceived by means of
inreT" Ped- We recognize a bos gavaeus
at first sight through its special similarity to a cow which we have often perceived. This knowledge of a previously unperceived object derived through its similarity to a perceived object is said to be nothing but inference.
In reply we maintain that it is not in a bos gavaeus unperceived that we find" the real matter of comparison. The matter of comparison is similarity, e.g. between a cow and a oos gavaeus. The bos gavaeus in which we notice the similarity is first perceived, that is, on perceiving a bos gavaeus we notice its similarity to a cow. Hence comparison supplies us with knowledge of a perceived thing through its similarity to another thing also perceived. This characteristic distinguishes it from inference which furnishes us with knowledge of an unperceived thing through that of a thing perceived. Comparison is not identical with inference because the former is established through the compendious expression " so." " As is a cow, so is a &os gavaeus—":
this is an instance of comparison. This use of ' so ' makes it clear that comparison is a distinct means of right knowledge.
Verbal testimony.
Verbal testimony, some say, is inference because the object indicated by it is not perceived but inferred.
In-Is "word" or verbal fgrence 'gives us the knowledge oi an unper-testimony a mere infer- . , " . . ., , „ . ,° , . . ,. , , ceived object through that of an object which
is perceived. Verbal testimony too enables us to acquire the knowledge of an unperceived object through that of a word which is perceived (heard). In inference as well as in verbal testimony we pass to an unperceived object through an object which is perceived. Just as in inference there is a certain connection
A History of Indian Logicbetween a sign (e.g. smoke), and the thing signified by it (e.g. fire), so in verbal testimony there is connection between a word and the object signified by it. Verbal testimony does not therefore differ from inference.
In reply we say that there is a great difference between inference and verbal testimony. The knowledge gained by verbal testimony is correct, not simply because it comes through the medium of words, but because it comes through words spoken by a reliable person. There are, it is said, paradise, nymphs, ultarakurus, seven islands, ocean, human settlements, etc. We accept them as realities not
simply because they are known through words, but because they are spoken of by persons who are reliable. Hence verbal testimony is not inference. The two agree in conveying knowledge of an object through its sign, but the sign in one is different from the sign in the other. In the case of verbal testimony the special point is to decide whether the sign (word) comes from a reliable person. Moreover the connection between a word and the object signified by it is conventional and not a natural one We acknowledge that a word indicates a certain object, but we deny that the object is naturally or necessarily connected with the word. 'Hearing, for instance, the word "cow," we think of the animal signified by it, nevertheless the word and the animal are not connectsd with each other by nature or necessity. In the case of inference, however, the connection between a sign (e.g. smoke), and the thing signified (e.g. fire), is natural and necessary. The connection involved in inference is not, therefore, of the same kind as that involved in verbal testimony. In the case of verbal testimony tliere is no perception of the connection. The connection between a sign and the thing signified, which is the basis of inference, is obvious to perception. For instance, the inference that "the hill is fiery because it is smoky" is based on a certain connection between smoke and fire, which is actually perceived in a kitchen or elsewhere. The connection between a word and the object signified by it, which is the basis of verbal testimony, is not obvious to perception. The word uttarakuru, for instance, signifies the country of that name, but the con- nection between the word and the country is not perceived, as the latter lies beyond our observation. Hence verbal testimony is not inference. Some say that the means of right knowledge are more than four because tliere are such other means of right TrighT kn knowledge as rumour ("aitihya"). presump-ledge ? ( arthapatti), probability (sambhava)
and non-existence ("abhava"). In reply we say that the means of right knowledge are really four, inasmuch as rumour is included in verbal testimony, and presumption, probability and
non-existence are included in inference.
Other means.
Rumour is an assertion which has come from one to another without т, any indication of the
source from which it first originated, e.g. on this tree there live goblins
It is not a separate means ot knowledge, but partakes of the general characteristics of verbal testimony and is a special kind of it.
A History of Indian LogicPresumption, is the deduction of one thing from the declaration of another
thing, e.g. from the declaration Presumption 'unless there is cloud there is no rain.' we deduce that ' if there is rain there must have been cloud.'
Some say that presumption is not valid a& it leads to uncertainty. "If there is no'cloud there >vill be no rain"—from this we are said to presume that if there is a cloud there will be rain But it often happens that a cloud isJiot followed by rain So presumption does. according to the objectors lead to uncertainty. In reply we say, that if there is uncertainty it is due to the objectors supposing that to be a presumption which is not really so. "If there is no cloud there will be no rain." From this we are entitled to presume that if there is rain there must have been cloud. But if one pretends to presume that " if there is a cloud there will be rain," one's so-called presumption will be an invalid one.
Presumption is thus found to be the knowledge of a thing derived through the consideration of it from the opposite standpoint. It does not differ from inference since both pass from a psrceived thing to an unperceived one through a certain connection.
Probability consists in cognuing the existence of a thing from that
. of another thing in which it is included, e g. Frobability. knowledge of the measure of an
adhaka from that of а Лгопа of which it is a fourth part.
Probability is inference because it is the cognizance of a part from that of a whole with which it is inseparably connected.
existence of the other, e g. the non-existence of on-existence or neg»- indicates the existence of an obstruction i
of the cloud which was to have brought it dow n. Some say that non-existence is not a means of right knowledge, as there is no object which is known by it. Though a mark may distinguish the object which is marked, the non-existence (absence)