COMUNIDAD VIRTUAL

So  far  this  dissertation  has  addressed  the  impact  of  tolerance  on  democracy,  but  it  is  equally   important  to  see  if  democracy  has  an  impact  on  tolerance  as  well.    Previous  literature  established  that   being  socialized  in  a  democratic  society  has  an  important  impact  on  the  democratic  behavior.    This  ren-­‐ ders  the  logical  expectation  that  democratic  socialization  produces  more  tolerant  citizens.    One  venue   for  improving  the  levels  of  tolerance  and,  by  extension,  the  levels  of  democratization  in  the  country  of   origin  is  through  exposure  to  more  democratic  countries  where  through  the  process  of  democratic  so-­‐ cialization  citizens  will  become  more  tolerant.  

Regime  type.    If  having  more  tolerant  citizens  tends  to  make  countries  more  democratic,  is  it  al-­‐ so  the  case  that  democracy  fosters  tolerance?    Many  scholars  argue  that  this  is  indeed  the  case,  and  that   people  socialized  in  a  democracy  are  more  tolerant  than  those  who  are  socialized  in  an  authoritarian   regime  (Marquart-­‐Pyatt  and  Paxton,  2007;  Stenner  2005,  132).    While  the  younger  generations  tend  to   be  more  tolerant  in  the  vast  majority  of  societies  in  the  world,  the  widest  gap  between  the  values  of   younger  and  older  generations  is  observable  in  advanced  industrial  societies  which  have  made  a  recent   transition  from  an  autocratic  to  a  democratic  regime  –  Germany,  Spain,  South  Korea  (Inglehart  and   Welzel  2005,  112-­‐13).  

In  a  similar  vein,  Peffley  and  Rohrschneider  (2003,  244)  argue  that  “political  tolerance  at  a  more   concrete  level  is  extremely  difficult  and  […]  consequently,  citizens  must  be  exposed  to  experiences  that   encourage  the  application  of  democratic  norms  to  specific  instances.”    These  differences  determined  by   the  process  of  democratic  learning  could  produce  different  levels  of  political  tolerance  in  countries  with   different  democratic  histories,  and  for  different  individuals  based  on  their  personal  level  of  exposure   and  experience  with  a  democratic  regime  (Peffley  and  Rohrschneider  2003;  Weil  1991).    If  that  is  the   case,  we  can  think  of  migration  to  a  more  democratic  country  than  one’s  country  of  origin  as  the  func-­‐

tional  equivalent,  albeit  temporary,  of  a  transition  to  democracy  at  the  individual-­‐level,  and  we  can   study  whether  those  migrants  do  in  fact  become  more  tolerant  than  their  compatriots  who  stayed   home.  

Migration.    There  are  a  number  of  studies  that  indicate  that  this  phenomenon  does  indeed  hap-­‐ pen.    The  impact  of  migration  extends  to  a  whole  range  of  political  and  social  attitudes.    Furthermore,   migration  has  spillover  consequences,  affecting  the  sending  countries  as  well.    What  follows  is  a  critical   analysis  of  the  literature  on  the  aforementioned  effects  of  migration.    

Among  the  micro-­‐level  effects  of  migration  discussed  in  the  literature  are  changes  of  attitudes   toward  gender  equality  (Levitt  1996),  transformations  in  the  migrants’  views  of  democracy  (de  la  Garza   and  Yetim  2003;  Jimenez  2008),  changes  in  partisan  preferences  and  voting  behavior  (Lawson  2003;   Fidrmuc  and  Doyle  2004)  and,  last  but  certainly  not  least,  changes  in  the  level  of  tolerance  and  openness   (Watson  and  Lippitt  1958;  Gmelch  1987).    One  major  finding  of  Levitt’s  study  of  migrants  from  the  Do-­‐ minican  Republic  to  the  US,  more  specifically  Boston,  was  that  Dominican  women  in  the  US  play  a  much   more  important  role  in  public  and  family  life  compared  to  the  non-­‐migrant  Dominican  women.    Even   more  importantly,  they  acquire  an  emancipated  view  of  what  it  means  to  be  a  woman  (Levitt  1996,  15).  

In  a  study  comparing  Mexican-­‐Americans  and  Mexicans,  de  la  Garza  and  Yetim  wanted  to  find   out  whether  the  political  culture  of  the  former  group  differs  from  the  latter’s.    To  this  end,  they  used   survey  data  to  see  how  the  two  groups  differ  along  “three  dimensions  of  democracy:  how  they  define  it,   what  they  say  are  its  essential  characteristics,  and  how  they  define  its  principal  tasks”  (de  la  Garza  and   Yetim  2003,  85).    They  found  out  that  Mexican-­‐Americans  do  indeed  conceptualize  democracy  different-­‐ ly  than  Mexicans.    Moreover,  multivariate  analysis  of  political  attitudes  reveals  that  the  influence  of  mi-­‐ gration  remains  substantial,  even  after  controlling  for  the  effect  of  socioeconomic  and  demographic  var-­‐ iables  (de  la  Garza  and  Yetim  2003,  93-­‐98).    This  led  the  authors  to  conclude  that  the  Mexican  Ameri-­‐

cans’  views  of  democracy  “differ  significantly  from  those  of  Mexicans  because  of  their  exposure  to  the   political  institutions  and  culture  of  the  United  States”  (de  la  Garza  and  Yetim  2003,  81).    These  findings   echoed  those  from  Watson  and  Lippitt’s  (1958)  study  of  a  group  of  German  students  who  visited  the   United  States.    The  subjects  showed  evidence  that  they  had  acquired  a  more  cosmopolitan  world  view   as  a  direct  consequence  of  their  American  exposure.    This  was  indicated,  on  the  one  hand,  by  their  self-­‐ reporting  during  interviews  with  the  authors  and,  on  the  other  hand,  by  their  responses  to  various  ques-­‐ tions  (this  was  a  longitudinal  study  and,  as  such,  able  to  capture  attitudinal  changes).    That  being  the   case,  these  studies  support    Diamond’s  (1994)  claim  that  “there  is  no  better  way  of  developing  the  val-­‐ ues,  skills,  and  commitments  to  democratic  citizenship  than  through  direct  experience  with  democracy”   (de  la  Garza  and  Yetim  2003,  81).  

Other  scholars  have  looked  at  the  impact  of  migration  on  partisan  preferences  and  voting  be-­‐ havior.    In  cases  such  as  Poland  and  the  Czech  Republic,  and  using  a  dataset  that  shows  results  for  the   national  elections  with  results  for  emigrant  votes  reported  separately,  Fidrmuc  and  Doyle  (2004)  ana-­‐ lyzed  the  difference  between  Polish  and  Czech  migrants’  voting  patterns  and  those  of  their  domestic   counterparts.    They  found  striking  differences  between  the  two  groups,  and  tried  to  understand  these   changes  by  examining  three  alternative  explanations:  political  re-­‐socialization,  economic  self-­‐selection   and  political  self-­‐selection.    There  is  little  evidence  that  migrants’  political  attitudes  are  due  to  self-­‐ selection,  pre-­‐migration  political  attitudes  or  economic  characteristics.    That  being  the  case,  a  promising   candidate  for  explaining  these  emigrants’  vote  is  the  experience  of  migration  itself,  which  changed  the   political  attitudes  of  the  migrants,  as  reflected  in  their  vote.    Indeed,  that  was  what  the  authors  con-­‐ cluded:  “the  results  give  strong  indication  that  migrants’  voting  behavior  is  shaped  by  the  institutional   environment  of  the  host  countries  […]  in  particular  the  tradition  of  democracy  and  the  extent  of  eco-­‐ nomic  freedom”  (Fidrmuc  and  Doyle  2004,  34).  

In  a  similar  fashion,  Lawson  (2003)  compared  the  partisan  preferences  of  the  Mexican  immi-­‐ grants  in  the  United  States  to  those  of  the  Mexicans  living  in  Mexico.    He  found  significant  differences   between  the  political  preferences  of  the  two  groups,  with  Mexicans  living  at  home  more  inclined  to  vote   for  the  Institutional  Revolutionary  Party  (PRI),  and  the  immigrants  preferring  the  National  Action  Party   (PAN).  This  appears  as  prima  facie  evidence  that  migration  did  have  an  important  impact  on  the  political   values  and  partisan  preferences  of  Mexican  migrants.    However,  Lawson  is  cautious  in  attributing  the   observed  differences  to  migration;  rather,  he  argues  that  an  equally  likely  explanation  is  one  rooted  in   differences  in  the  educational  attainment  of  the  two  groups  and  the  media  messages  to  which  they   were  exposed  (Lawson  2003,  65).    Be  that  as  it  may,  media  exposure  should  then  have  a  significant  im-­‐ pact  on  political  values,  whether  the  focus  is  on  Mexican  immigrants  in  the  US  or  Romanian  students   enrolled  in  Work  and  Travel  programs  –  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  latter  group’s  better  education  opens  up   the  possibility  of  an  even  greater  effect.    Moreover,  media  exposure  can  be  looked  at  as  a  proxy  for  the   broader  exposure  to  a  political  environment  like  the  American  one,  more  liberal  and  democratic  com-­‐ pared  to  what  we  find  in  either  Mexico  or  Romania.  Other  scholars  found  out  that  this  is  indeed  what   happens  –  namely,  that  the  political  attitudes  of  migrants  change  as  a  result  of  the  process  of  socializa-­‐ tion  in  the  new  environment,  and  that  media  exposure  is  one  of  the  driving  forces  behind  this  process   (Glazer  and  Giles  1997).  

In  their  study  of  political  resocialization  of  immigrants  in  Canada,  White  et  al.  (2008)  were  inter-­‐ ested  in  finding  out  answers  to  two  questions.    Their  first  research  question  was  how  migrants  adjust  to   their  new  political  environment;  the  second,  to  what  extent  the  process  is  affected  by  the  political  envi-­‐ ronment  of  their  country  of  origin.    They  found  that  the  degree  of  exposure  to  the  new  environment   was  the  strongest  causal  factor  of  partisan  strength  among  immigrants.    Moreover,  “when  it  comes  to  

interest  in  elections  and  voting,  immigrants  from  quite  different  political  systems  appear  to  adapt  to   their  new  host  political  environment  in  remarkably  similar  ways”  (White  et  el.  2008,  277).  

The  effects  of  migration  are  not  limited  to  the  individual-­‐level  (i.e.,  these  effects  are  not  con-­‐ fined  to  the  migrants  themselves).    Additionally,  scholars  have  identified  macro-­‐level  effects;  that  is,  mi-­‐ grants  have  a  significant  impact  on  their  countries  of  origin,  by  bringing  back  and  spreading  democratic   ideas  (Dominguez  1996)  or  even,  in  some  cases,  contributing  to  a  democratic  transition  (Richmond   2003).    In  his  study  of  the  impact  of  return  migrants  in  Barbados,  Gmelch  (1987,  138)  concludes  that   “Barbadian  return  migrants  have  a  positive  impact  at  home,  and  […]  return  migration,  involving  the   transfer  of  ideas,  attitudes,  work  skills  and  capital,  can  represent  an  important  resource  in  the  nation’s   development.”    The  impact  of  return  migrants  is  perhaps  most  visible  in  politics,  where  all  four  of  the   country’s  prime  ministers  since  independence  (1966)  until  the  writing  of  the  article  (1987)  were  return   migrants,  and  so  were  the  majority  of  the  country’s  members  of  parliament  Gmelch  (1987,  138).  

Richmond  (2003)  argues  that  Soviet  citizens  who  traveled  to  the  United  States  and  Western  Eu-­‐ rope  in  the  decades  before  the  fall  of  Communism  were  instrumental  in  its  demise.    These  were  mostly   members  of  the  intellectual  and  political  elite  –  scholars,  students,  journalists,  scientists,  and  govern-­‐ ment  and  party  leaders.    As  Richmond’s  publisher  put  it,  “they  came,  they  saw,  they  were  conquered,   and  the  Soviet  Union  will  never  again  be  the  same.    Those  exchanges  changed  the  Soviet  Union  and  pre-­‐ pared  the  way  for  Gorbachev’s  glasnost,  perestroika,  and  the  end  of  the  Cold  War.”29