COMUNITAT VALENCIANA

2-17. Likely participants in COIN operations include the following:

z U.S. military forces.

z Multinational (including HN) forces.

z U.S. Government agencies. z Other governments’ agencies.

z NGOs. z IGOs.

z Multinational corporations and contractors.

U.S.M

F

2-18. Military forces play an extensive role in COIN efforts. Demanding and complex, COIN draws heavily on a broad range of the joint force’s capabilities and requires a different mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations from that expected in major combat operations. Air, land, and maritime components all contribute to successful operations and to the vital effort to separate insurgents from the people they seek to control. The Army and Marine Corps usually furnish the principal U.S. military contributions to COIN forces. Special operations forces (SOF) are particularly valuable due to their specialized capabilities: z Civil affairs. z Psychological operations. z Intelligence. z Language skills. z Region-specific knowledge.

SOF can provide light, agile, high-capability teams able to operate discreetly in local communities. SOF can also conduct complex counterterrorist operations.

2-19. U.S. military forces are vastly capable. Designed primarily for conventional warfare, they nonethe- less have the capabilities essential to successfully conduct COIN operations. The most important military assets in COIN are disciplined Soldiers and Marines with adaptive, self-aware, and intelligent leaders. Military forces also have capabilities particularly relevant to common COIN requirements. These capabili- ties include the following:

z Dismounted infantry. z Human intelligence. z Language specialists. z Military police. z Civil affairs. z Engineers. z Medical units. z Logistic support. z Legal affairs. z Contracting elements.

All are found in the Army; most are found in the Marine Corps. To a limited degree, they are also found in the Air Force and Navy.

2-20. U.S. forces help HN military, paramilitary, and police forces conduct COIN operations, including area security and local security operations. U.S. forces provide advice and help find, disperse, capture, and defeat insurgent forces. Concurrently, they emphasize training HN forces to perform essential defense functions. These are the central tasks of foreign internal defense, a core SOF task. The current and more extensive national security demands for such efforts require conventional forces of all Services be prepared to contribute to establishing and training local security forces.

2-21. Land combat forces, supported by air and maritime forces, conduct full spectrum operations to dis- rupt or destroy insurgent military capabilities. Land forces use offensive operations to disrupt insurgent ef- forts to establish base areas and consolidate their forces. They conduct defensive operations to provide area and local security. They conduct stability operations to thwart insurgent efforts to control or disrupt peo- ple’s lives and routine activities. In all applications of combat power, commanders first ensure that likely costs do not outweigh or undermine other more important COIN efforts.

2-22. Most valuable to long-term success in winning the support of the populace are the contributions land forces make by conducting stability operations. Stability operations is an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide es- sential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 1-02).

Forces engaged in stability operations establish, safeguard, or restore basic civil services. They act directly but also support government agencies. Success in stability operations enables the local populace and HN government agencies to resume or develop the capabilities needed to conduct COIN operations and create conditions that permit U.S. military forces to disengage.

2-23. Military forces also use their capabilities to enable the efforts of nonmilitary participants. Logistics, transportation, equipment, personnel, and other assets can support interagency partners and other civilian organizations.

M

(I

H

-N

)M

F

2-24. The U.S. Government prefers that U.S. military forces operate with other nations’ forces and not alone. Thus, Soldiers and Marines normally function as part of a multinational force. In COIN operations, U.S. forces usually operate with the security forces of the local populace or host nation. Each multinational participant provides capabilities and strengths that U.S forces may not have. Many other countries’ military forces bring cultural backgrounds, historical experiences, and other capabilities that can be particularly valuable to COIN efforts.

2-25. However, nations join coalitions for various reasons. Although the missions of multinational partners may appear similar to those of the United States, rules of engagement, home-country policies, and sensi- tivities may differ among partners. U.S. military leaders require a strong cultural and political awareness of HN and other multinational military partners.

N

C

P

2-26. Many nonmilitary organizations may support a host nation as it confronts an insurgency. Some of these organizations are discussed below. (JP 3-08, volume II, discusses nonmilitary organizations often as- sociated with joint operations.)

U.S. Government Organizations

2-27. Commanders’ situational awareness includes being familiar with other U.S. Government organiza- tions participating in the COIN effort and aware of their capabilities. Planning includes determining which organizations are supporting the force or operating in their area of operations (AO). Commanders and lead- ers of other U.S. Government organizations should collaboratively plan and coordinate actions to avoid conflict or duplication of effort. Within the U.S. Government, key organizations include—

z Department of State.

z U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). z Central Intelligence Agency.

z Department of Justice.

z Drug Enforcement Administration (under Department of Justice). z Department of the Treasury.

z Department of Homeland Security. z Department of Energy.

z Department of Agriculture. z Department of Commerce.

z Department of Transportation.

z U.S. Coast Guard (under Department of Homeland Security).

z Federal Bureau of Investigation (under Department of Justice).

z Immigration Customs Enforcement (under Department of Homeland Security). Other Governments’ Agencies

2-28. Agencies of other national governments (such as ministries of defense, foreign affairs, development, and justice) are likely to actively participate in COIN operations. The list of possible participants from

other countries is too long to list. Leaders of U.S. contingents must work closely with their multinational counterparts to become familiar with agencies that may operate in their AO. To the degree possible, mili- tary leaders should use U.S. civilian representatives to establish appropriate relationships and awareness of their multinational counterparts.

Nongovernmental Organizations

2-29. Joint doctrine defines a nongovernmental organization as a private, self-governing, not-for-profit or- ganization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the es- tablishment of democratic institutions and civil society (JP 1-02). There are several thousand NGOs of many different types. Their activities are governed by their organizing charters and their members’ motiva- tions. Some NGOs receive at least part of their funding from national governments or IGOs. Some may be- come implementing partners in accordance with grants or contracts. (For example, USAID provides some NGO funding.) In these cases, the funding organization often gains oversight and authority over how the funds are used.

2-30. Some NGOs maintain strict independence from governments and belligerents and do not want to be seen directly associating with military forces. Gaining the support of and coordinating operations with these NGOs can be difficult. Establishing basic awareness of these groups and their activities may be the most commanders can achieve. NGOs play important roles in resolving insurgencies, however. Many NGOs arrive before military forces and remain afterwards. They can support lasting stability. To the great- est extent possible, commanders try to complement and not override their capabilities. Building a comple- mentary, trust-based relationship is vital.

2-31. Examples of NGOs include—

z International Committee of the Red Cross.

z World Vision.

z Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders).

z Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE). z Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM).

z Save the Children. z Mercy Corps.

z Academy for Educational Development.

Intergovernmental Organizations

2-32. Joint doctrine defines an intergovernmental organization as an organization created by a formal agreement (for example, a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, re- gional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. IGOs are formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states (JP 1-02). The most notable IGO is the United Nations (UN). Regional organizations like the Organization of American States and European Union may be in- volved in some COIN operations. The UN in particular has many subordinate and affiliated agencies active worldwide. Depending on the situation and HN needs, any number of UN organizations may be present, such as the following:

z Office of the Chief of Humanitarian Affairs.

z Department of Peacekeeping Operations. z World Food Program.

z UN Refugee Agency (known as UNHCR, the acronym for its director, the UN High Commis-

sioner for Refugees).

z UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. z UN Development Program.

Multinational Corporations and Contractors

2-33. Multinational corporations often engage in reconstruction, economic development, and governance activities. At a minimum, commanders should know which companies are present in their AO and where those companies are conducting business. Such information can prevent fratricide and destruction of pri- vate property.

2-34. Recently, private contractors from firms providing military-related services have become more prominent in theaters of operations. This category includes armed contractors providing many different se- curity services to the U.S. Government, NGOs, and private businesses. Many businesses market expertise in areas related to supporting governance, economics, education, and other aspects of civil society as well. Providing capabilities similar to some NGOs, these firms often obtain contracts through government agencies. 2-35. When contractors or other businesses are being paid to support U.S. military or other government agencies, the principle of unity of command should apply. Commanders should be able to influence con- tractors’ performance through U.S. Government contract supervisors. When under contract to the United States, contractors should behave as an extension of the organizations or agencies for which they work. Commanders should identify contractors operating in their AO and determine the nature of their contract, existing accountability mechanisms, and appropriate coordination relationships.

Host-Nation Civil Authorities

2-36. Sovereignty issues are among the most difficult for commanders conducting COIN operations, both in regard to forces contributed by other nations and by the host nation. Often, commanders are required to lead through coordination, communication, and consensus, in addition to traditional command practices. Political sensitivities must be acknowledged. Commanders and subordinates often act as diplomats as well as warriors. Within military units, legal officers and their staffs are particularly valuable for clarifying legal arrangements with the host nation. To avoid adverse effects on operations, commanders should address all sovereignty issues through the chain of command to the U.S. Ambassador. As much as possible, sovereignty issues should be addressed before executing operations. Examples of key sovereignty issues include the following:

z Aerial ports of debarkation.

z Basing.

z Border crossings.

z Collecting and sharing information.

z Protection (tasks related to preserving the force).

z Jurisdiction over members of the U.S. and multinational forces. z Location and access.

z Operations in the territorial waters, both sea and internal. z Overflight rights.

z Police operations, including arrest, detention, penal, and justice authority and procedures. z Railheads.

z Seaports of debarkation.

2-37. Commanders create coordinating mechanisms, such as committees or liaison elements, to facilitate cooperation and build trust with HN authorities. HN military or nonmilitary representatives should have leading roles in such mechanisms. These organizations facilitate operations by reducing sensitivities and misunderstandings while removing impediments. Sovereignty issues can be formally resolved with the host nation by developing appropriate technical agreements to augment existing or recently developed status of forces agreements. In many cases, security assistance organizations, NGOs, and IGOs have detailed local knowledge and reservoirs of good will that can help establish a positive, constructive relationship with the host nation.

2-38. Coordination and support should exist down to local levels (such as villages and neighborhoods). Soldiers and Marines should be aware of the political and societal structures in their AOs. Political struc-

tures usually have designated leaders responsible to the government and people. However, the societal structure may include informal leaders who operate outside the political structure. These leaders may be—

z Economic (such as businessmen).

z Theological (such as clerics and lay leaders).

z Informational (such as newspaper publishers or journalists).

z Family based (such as elders or patriarchs).

Some societal leaders may emerge due to charisma or other intangible influences. Commanders should identify the key leaders and the manner in which they are likely to influence COIN efforts.