Concepciones de los actores en torno a la salud mental en Santiago de Cali

G.R. N

. 154106 | J

29, 2004

Proof of bad faith or malice in obtaining a writ of attachment need be proved only in the claim for damages on account of the issuance of the writ. However, the mere existence of malice and bad faith

would not per se warrant the award of actual or compensatory damages. To grant such damages, sufficient proof thereon is required.

Civil Law; When the terms of a contract are clear and readily understandable, there is no room for construction. Respondent argues that the stipulation in the sales contract is very clear that it should be

paid within fifteen (15) days without any qualifications and conditions. Under Article 1582 of the Civil Code, the buyer is obliged to pay the price of the thing sold at the time stipulated in the contract. Following the rule on interpretation of contracts, no other evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except when a party puts in issue in his pleading the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent of the parties.

IDOLOR V. CA

G.R. N

. 141853 | F

7, 2001

Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an

injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.

Hence the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Failure to establish either the existence of a clear and positive right which should be judicially protected through the writ of injunction or that the defendant has committed or has attempted to commit any act which has endangered or tends to endanger the existence of said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation.

Where the parties to the new obligation expressly recognize the continuing existence and validity of the old one, where, the parties expressly negated the lapsing of the old obligation, there can be no novation. The “Kasunduang Pag-aayos” which is quoted earlier does not support petitioner’s contention

that it novated the real estate mortgage since the will to novate did not appear by express agreement of the parties nor the old and the new contracts were incompatible in all points. In fact, petitioner expressly recognized in the Kasunduan the existence and the validity of the old obligation where she acknowledged her long overdue account since September 20, 1994 which was secured by a real estate mortgage and asked for a ninety (90) days grace period to settle her obligation on or before December 21, 1996 and that upon failure to do so, she will execute a deed of sale with a right to repurchase without interest within one year in favor of private respondents.

GUSTILO V. REAL

A.M. N

. MTJ-00-1250 | F

28, 2001

Guidelines for the issuance of an injunctive writ. Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is essential

that the following requisites be present: (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which injunction to be directed is a violation of such right. The onus probandi is on movant to show that there exists a right to be protected, which is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined. Further, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a serious damage.

In this case, complainant had been duly proclaimed as the winning candidate for punong barangay. He had taken his oath of office. Unless his election was annulled, he was entitled to all the rights of said office. We do not see how the complainants exercise of such rights would cause an irreparable injury or violate the right of the losing candidate so as to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order to maintain the status quo. We see no reason to disagree with the finding of the OCA that the evident purpose of the second TRO was to prevent complainant from participating in the election of the Liga ng mga Barangay. Respondent must be held liable for violating Rule 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that, In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion, or fear of criticism.

ALEMAR V. NLRC

Jurisprudence has established that a stay of execution may be warranted by the fact that a petitioner corporation has been placed under rehabilitation receivership. However, it is undisputed

that on March 5, 1997, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued an order approving the proposed rehabilitation plan of petitioner and placing it under liquidation pursuant to Presidential Decree 902-A.

Subject to the control of the SEC, the liquidator, Ledesma, Saludo & Associates, was ordered to "wind up the affairs of the corporation, continue to manage the corporation for purposes of liquidation in order to protect the interest of its creditors and avoid dissipation, loss, wastage, or destruction of the remaining assets and other properties of the corporation and to ensure orderly payment of claims against such corporation in accordance with applicable laws."

Thus, petitioner pointed out that the SEC's order suspending all claims against it pending before any other court, tribunal or body was pursuant to the rehabilitation receivership proceedings. Such order was necessary to enable the rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its powers free from any judicial or extra-judicial interference that might unduly hinder the rescue of the distressed company. Since receivership proceedings have ceased and petitioner's rehabilitation receiver and liquidator, Ledesma Saludo & Associates, has been given the imprimatur to proceed with corporate liquidation, the cited order of the Securities and Exchange Commission has been rendered functus officio. Thus, there is no legal impediment for the execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter for the payment of separation pay.