vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, former 10th Division with HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ as chairman and HON. CANCIO C. GARCIA and HON. RAMON MABUTAS as members, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:p
Petitioner Wenefredo Calme appeals from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28883 dated 10 December 1993 and its
Court, Branch 12, Oroquieta City over the information for murder filed against him (Calme).
Petitioner and four other persons were accused of killing Edgardo Bernal by allegedly throwing him overboard the M/V "Cebu City," an interisland passenger ship owned and operated by William Lines, Inc., while the vessel was sailing from Ozamis City to Cebu City on the night of 12 May 1991. Petitioner impugned the Oroquieta RTC's jurisdiction over the offense charged through a motion to quash which, however, was denied by Judge Celso Conol of RTC, Branch 12, Oroquieta City. Petitioner Calme's petition for certiorari and prohibition was denied due course and dismissed by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated 10 December 1993. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said decision was denied in the Court of Appeals's resolution 14 July 1994. Hence, the present appeal wherein the only issue for resolution is whether or not the Oroquieta court has jurisdiction over the offense charged against petitioner.
Petitioner asserts that, although the alleged crime took place while the vessel was in transit, the general rule laid down in par. (a) of Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court is the applicable provision in determining the proper venue and jurisdiction and not Sec. 15(c) (now Section 14) thereof since the exact location where the alleged crime occurred was known. 1
Petitioner thus claims that the proper venue is Siquijor because, according to the Marine Protest filed by the vessel's captain, Elmer Magallanes, the ship was 8.0 miles off Minalonan Point, Siquijor Island, when he (Capt.
Magallanes) received the report that "a passenger jumped overboard." 2 Petitioner's contention is unmeritorious. The exact location where the alleged offense was committed was not duly established. The Marine protest simply adverted that the vessel was within the waters of Siquijor Island when the captain was informed 3 of the incident, which does not necessarily prove that the alleged murder took place in the same area. In any case, where the crime was actually committed is immaterial since it is undisputed that it occurred while the vessel was in transit. "In transit" simply means "on the way or passage; while passing from one person or place to another. In the course of transportation." 4 Hence, undoubtedly, the applicable provision is par. (c) of
Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 110 which provides that "(w)here an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage subject to the generally accepted principles of international law."
Petitioner further contends that even if Sec. 15(c), Rule 110 governs, Oroquieta City would still be excluded as a proper venue because the reckoning point for determining the venue under the aforementioned paragraph is the first port of entry or the municipalities/territories through which the ship passed after the discovery of the crime, relying on Act No. 400. 5
We disagree. Obviously, Act No. 400 was amended by Sec. 15(c), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court in that under the former law, jurisdiction was conferred to the CFI of any province into which the ship or water craft upon which the crime or offense was committed shall come after the commission thereof, while the present rule provides that jurisdiction is vested "in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage . . . ." This is the applicable provision and since it does not contain any qualification, we do not qualify the same. We fully concur with the findings of the Court of Appeals, thus:
To support his arguments, petitioner relies on Act 400, which according to him is the spirit behind the present Sec. 15(c), Rule 110. The said Act specifically provides, among other things, that for crimes committed within the navigable waters of the Philippine Archipelago, on board a ship or water craft of Philippine registry, jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province in which the vessel shall come after the commission of the crime.
Petitioner's reliance on Act 400 is erroneous. The provision of said Act vesting jurisdiction in the province where the vessel shall come after the commission of the crime is not carried in the present Rule.
It is a basic rule in statutory construction that where the provisions of the law or rule is clear and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined from the language employed. It must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. NLRC, 206 SCRA [7]01; Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 561).
The words of Sec. 15(c) being clear, there is no reason to rely on Act 400 in determining its true meaning, regardless of whether said Act was indeed the moving spirit behind it. In fact, it does not seem that
the provision of Act 400 was carried into the present rule, as it is now worded. 6
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO PANLILIO y FRANCISCO, defendant-appellant.
D E C I S I O N BELLOSILLO, J.:
Danilo Panlilio y Francisco was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, with kidnapping under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code (Crim. Case No. 235 1-V-93) and violation of P.D. 532 known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974 (Crim. Case No. 2352-V-93). In the first case, the Information alleged that on or about 17 March 1993 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the accused kidnapped Leah Marie Jordan y Villato and detained her for more than an hour. In the second case, the Information alleged that on the same occasion, with intent to gain and by means of force and intimidation, the accused took a pair of gold earrings worth P700.00 from the same complaining witness while they were walking along St. Jude St., Malinta, Valenzuela, a public highway.
Ranged against the denial and alibi of the accused, the trial court found the testimony of Leah Marie positive and convincing hence its joint decision of 15 June 1993 convicting the accused in both cases as charged. In the
kidnapping case the accused was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the costs, while in the highway robbery he was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to thirteen (13) years and two (2) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to pay
complainant the value of the pair of earrings and to pay the costs.[1]
The evidence shows that at about eleven-forty in the morning of 17 March 1993 Leah Marie Jordan y Villato, a 10-year old student, was waiting for her younger sister outside the premises of St. Jude School in Malinta,
Valenzuela. There she was approached by Danilo Panlilio who inquired if she knew a certain Aling Rosa. After she replied that she did not know her and that she was only there to fetch her younger sister, Danilo suddenly poked a knife, which was concealed inside a hat, at the right side of her neck, handed her an empty cigarette pack with a note and ordered her to give it to Aling Ester. When she told him that she did not know where to find Aling Ester, he said that he would lead her to the place where Aling Ester could be found. While Danilo and Leah Marie were walking side by side the former continued to poke his knife at the latters neck. He told her to be quiet otherwise he would kill her. Then they both boarded a passenger jeepney with the knife still effectively serving as a contrivance to keep her mute. Aside from the driver they were the only passengers on board the jeepney. While in the jeepney Danilo forcibly took Leah Maries pair of earrings.
Upon reaching Navotas Danilo and Leah Marie alighted from the
jeepney. He dragged her towards a vacant lot where, according to him, every girl he brought there was made to choose between rape and death. Upon hearing this, she struggled hard to free herself from his hold. Luckily, at this juncture, she saw policemen coming towards their direction so she shouted for help. One of the policemen fired a warning shot which prompted Danilo to run away. The policemen pursued him until they caught up with him and brought him together with Leah Marie to the Navotas Police Station for investigation.
Meanwhile, policemen from Valenzuela went to the house of Leah and informed her parents that their daughter was in the Navotas Police
Station. The couple then rushed to the Station where they saw Leah and brought her to the Valenzuela Police Station to file a complaint against Panlilio. The mother of Leah noticed that the earrings of Leah were missing. When asked about her earrings Leah told her mother that Panlilio forcibly took them from her.
The version of the appellant is that on the day of the incident he left his residence at Barrio Magdaragat, Tondo, Manila, at past ten oclock in the morning to go to Waywan Missionary atSan Rafael Village,
Tondo, Manila. However he defecated first on a vacant lot in Navotas before proceeding. Then he saw a young girl in the area and warned her not to pass through the garbage because she might sink. It was at this point when policemen arrived and readily accused him of being the rapist in the area. The accused contends in this appeal that the trial court erred (1) in not dismissing the case for highway robbery on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction; and, (2) in finding that for the crimes charged his guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant argues that the robbery, according to the complaining witness herself, was perpetrated in Navotas[2] so that the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela has no jurisdiction over the case. He also claims that the prosecution failed to present evidence that she indeed owned any pair of earrings. It is his thesis that it is simply incredible that a knife was
continually poked at her neck all the way from St. Jude School in Malinta to Navotas for an hour or so without anyone noticing, otherwise, she could have shouted and asked for help; but she did not.Furthermore, he claims that Leah Marie could have only been coached into testifying that she was alone outside the school premises in a feeble attempt to explain the puzzling situation that nobody came to her rescue when he allegedly abducted her at knifepoint in broad daylight during school dismissal time when parents, guardians and others usually converge to fetch their children or wards. Under the circumstances, we are urged to consider as more credible the version of the defense. -
Section 2, par. (e), of P.D. 532 defines the crime of highway
robbery/brigandage as the seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by
means of violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine Highway, and under Sec. 2, par. (c), of the same decree, Philippine Highway is any road, street, passage, highway and bridge or other parts thereof or railway or railroad within the Philippines used by persons, or vehicles, or locomotives or trains for the movement or circulation of persons or transportation of goods, articles, or property of both. We correlate these provisions with Sec. 15, par. (b), of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which provides that [w]here an offense is committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft, or in any other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip,the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such trip, including the place of departure and arrival (italics supplied). With the foregoing as guideposts we are now asked: Did the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela have jurisdiction over the highway robbery?
In her direct examination the complaining witness testified that when she and the accused alighted from the jeepney in Navotas he forcibly took her pair of earrings.[3] However, during the cross-examination she changed her testimony
thus -
Q. So you want to impress to the Court that even in front of St. Jude he already asked you to remove your earrings?
A. Not yet. When we were already aboard the jeep, that was the time when he told me to remove my earrings.[4] (italics supplied).
But thereafter she clung to the same statement for the entire course of her cross-examination which appears to be her correct narration of events - Q. And it was there that while you were already in the vacant lot that the accused told you to remove your earrings, is that it?
A. We were not yet there. Q. Where were you?
A. When we boarded the jeep, he instructed me to remove my earrings.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. And it was there in the Navotas area when he told you to remove your earrings?
A. I do not know, sir. Q. Where?
A. From the time we boarded the jeep.
Q. That was the time when you removed your earrings and gave it to him? A.. Yes, sir.[6] (italics supplied).
The most candid witnesses oftentimes make mistakes and fall into confused and inconsistent statements, but such honest lapses do not necessarily affect their credibility.[7] More importantly, ample margin of error and
understanding should be accorded to young witnesses who much more than adults would be gripped with tension due to the novelty of testifying before a court.[8]
But the testimony of complainant that upon boarding the jeepney the accused ordered her to remove her earrings and give them to him is material in determining whether the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela had jurisdiction over the highway robbery. Was Valenzuela their place of departure or the municipality where their jeepney passed during the trip? Here lies the problem. The complainant was uncertain of their place of departure - Q. If you will be requested to point to the place where you boarded, you could point the place where you boarded the jeepney?
A. No, sir, I cannot. I do not know that place because I was (just) instructed to board.[9]
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You want to impress the Court that you boarded a passenger jeepney and you do not know the place where you boarded the jeep?
A. No, sir.[10]
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When you were already traveling from the place, is (sic) that in Valenzuela where you boarded the jeep?
A. I do not know, sir.[11]
Neither did Leah Marie mention the place or places where their vehicle passed. We could have relied on the evidence that St. Jude School is in Malinta, Valenzuela, in order to establish the fact that they also boarded the jeepney in Valenzuela. Yet, her other testimony is damaging -
Q. So you want to impress that from St. Jude you were led by the accused to a place where there was a passenger jeepney?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You walked or you took a tricycle because that is the means of transportation available in the place?
A. We did not board a tricycle. We just walked. xxx xxx xxx
Q. And from St. Jude, how long did it take you to walk or negotiate the distance?
A. A long time because, as a matter of fact, I got tired. [12]
From the foregoing, it would seem that the prosecution failed to establish the precise place where the highway robbery was supposedly committed other than Navotas. Hence, we agree with the defense that the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela had no jurisdiction over the offense of highway robbery, although based on a different ground.
As regards the charge of kidnapping, Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides -Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: 1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made. 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances abovementioned were present in the commission of the offense.
The poking by appellant of a knife at the complainant could have indeed passed unnoticed because, as mentioned distinctly in her testimony, the knife was concealed in a hat,[13] and that she did not shout for help because all
along he was poking his knife at her[14] and telling her not to resist or shout
otherwise she would be killed.[15]
The testimony of Leah Marie that she was alone in the vicinity
of St. Jude School waiting for her sister is not hard to believe. It is highly
probable that she arrived there too early or way beyond dismissal time. Anyway, it is clear that the arguments raised by accused-appellant pertain to the credibility of the complainant, and the appraisal by the trial court of her credibility is entitled to great respect from the appellate courts which do not deal with live witnesses but only with the cold pages of a written record.[16] Hence the appellants denial and alibi were properly
rejected by the court a quo.
They were inherently weak and could not prevail over the positive testimony of complainant that the accused detained her and took her earrings against her will.[17]
WHEREFORE, the decision finding the accused-appellant Danilo Panlilio y Francisco guilty of kidnapping in Crim. Case No. 2351-V-93 and imposing upon him a prison term ofreclusion perpetua, and to pay the costs, is AFFIRMED.
As regards Crim. Case No. 2352-V-93 for highway robbery, the case is DISMISSED on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, without prejudice to its refiling with the court of proper jurisdiction.