Conceptos básicos del movimiento de los fluidos

because the Thais still controlled the Cambodian territories of Battambang, Sisiphon, and a considerable portion of Siemreap, these territories were, by and large, safe from direct French military interference. Lastly, by working with the Khmer resistance in Thailand, the Viet Minh would have access to the financial and military resources which the Vietnamese communities in Thailand and western Indochina could provide. From the outset, Giau said, Viet Minh leaders in Thailand had relied upon the Vietnam ese population in Thailand and Cambodia to support their efforts to build a stronger Cam bodian resistance m ovem ent.65 These communities provided money, supplies, recruits, and bases for the Vietnamese and Cambodian fighters who would come to work in the area.66 All of these factors combined to make Thailand a favourable location from which the Viet Minh could intensify their cooperation with Cambodian resistance fighters.

According to Vietnamese sources, sometime at the beginning of 1946, after meetings between DRV and Cambodian resistance representatives in Bangkok, the Khmer National Liberation Committee (Kana Cheat Mouta Keaha Mocchim Nokor Khmer, KNLC) was set up in Thai-controlled Battambang. With the assistance of the Viet Minh and "overseas Vietnamese resistance forces" operating in the area, the KNLC was designed to help the Cambodians organise an effective resistance force to fight the French in conjunction with the Viet M inh.67 The KNLC was reportedly led by Acan [professor] Duong, Son Ngoc Minh, a Khmer Issarak member, Me Muon, and possibly Dap Chhuon.68 Hoang Vän Hoan tells us in his memoir that when this Committee had consolidated its strength enough, it "brought its forces into Cam bodia to work in the areas of Tonle Sap, Battambang, and the area o f northwestern Cambodia."69 When it was actually active in Cambodia, it sought to develop links with the peasants in the countryside and in the mountaineous regions. However, it appears that until the Committee could stand on its

65

66

67

68 6 9

A 1950 Cambodian census estimated the Vietnamese in Cambodia to number 319,596 out of a total population o f 4,073,967. O f this, 15,923 were said to be in Battambang province; 9,649 in Pursat (including Tonle Sap province and Koh Kong); 2,278 in Siemreap (incl. Oudar Mean Chey); and 5,310 in Kompong Thom (incl. Preah Vihear prov). The total Vietnamese population for the north and western part o f Cambodia equalled 33,160. See: Peter A. Poole, T he Vietnamese in Cambodia and Thailand: Their Role in Interstate Relations,' Asian Survey, Vol. 14, No. 4, (April 1974), p. 328, fn. 6 and Table 1, p. 332.

'Kieu Minh,' p. 1M; 'Du Thko: Tun Hieu ve D ing CPC' [An Outline: A Study o f the Cambodian Communist Party], Hanoi, p. 8; and Interview with Tran Van Giku, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City. We shall return to this topic. From the evidence available, this was the first time the Vietnamese resistance movement in Thailand had relied upon overseas Vietnamese communities in Cambodia.

Sources for this fact are: Thanh Dam, op. ciL, p. 75; Nguyen Hao Hung, op. ciL, p. 144, especially fn. 2; and Tran Thanh Pön, Ngurori Khtrme Nam bo lk Cong Dan cua Ntirorc Cong Hba Xä Hoi Chü Nghla Viet Nam Gop Phan Vun Dap Truyen Thong Doan Ket Dau Tranh cho Doc Lap T u Do cua Hai Dan Toe Vietnam-Campuchia' [The Role o f the Khmer Citizens o f the Democratic Republic o f Vietnam in Nam Bö in Fostering a Spirit o f Mutual Resistance for the Independence and Freedom o f both the Vietnamese and Cambodian Peoples] in Hoi Nghi Khoa Hoc, p. 155; Hokng Van Hoan, op. ciL, p. 306; and Interview with Tran Van Giku, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City. These Vietnamese sources appear to imply that the Viet Minh presided over the creation o f the KNLC. While this may turn out to be the case, without access to Cambodian sources, it would be premature to accept the Vietnamese version as the last word on the KNLC. It appears that this KNLC is to be distinguished from the one o f the same name that was set up in 1948.

Interview with Tran Van Giau, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City. Hokng Van Hoan, op. ciL, p. 306.

own feet, it remained on Thai soil, probably in Thai-controlled Battambang or Siemreap.70

In Jure 1946, Vietnamese links with the Cambodians were further strengthened by the establishment of a Vietnamese communist party cell in Battambang province. According to Nguydn Thanh Scm, this cell was to play a part in the defence of the Vietnamese nation and to contribute to the "process of constructing the People's Revolutionary Party of Cambodia," although Scm does not tell us what this "Party" was.71 The Vietnamese sought to use the Battambang cell to contact the Khmer Issarak in an effort "to link together in the struggle against the French," suggesting that the Viet Minh had not won over the support of all Cambodian resistance activists. Step-by-step the Khmers were able to strengthen their positions in Siemreap, Trakotoum, and Ampil in western Cambodia, receiving assistance from the Viet Minh in the formation of combined Vietnamese-Cambodian military command.72 A Vietnamese source says the Mekong I and Mekong II combat units helped the Cambodian resistance through this joint military liaison.73 Hoang Vän Hoan seems to support this, writing in his memoir that overseas Vietnamese combat units went to Cambodia to conduct resistance activities and to assist the Cambodians in the fight against the French. These groups established bases in the mountaineous areas around Dangrech and along the Thai-Cambodian border, and were linked to one of the Viet Minh's Cambodian Working Bureaus (Ban Can Sir Mien)

under the direction of the Nam Bo Resistance Committee.74

Vietnamese and US sources confirm that in early August 1946, 300-400 fighters, a combination of Khmer Issarak, KNLC, and Viet Minh adherents, briefly occupied the French-administered town of Siemreap before being repulsed by French troops sent from Saigon (see chapter 3).75 Giau, who said he was directly involved in the Siemreap operation, explained that in this manoeuvre the attacking force was following behind the Viet Minh's Quang Trung group on a mission across Siemreap. The French were aware

7 0 71 7 2 73 7 4 75 T m H ieu ,' p. 11.

Nguyen Hao Hung, pp. 1 4546.

Nguyen Hao Hung, pp. 1 4 5 4 6 and Kieman, H ow Pot Pot, p. 53, citing French intelligence. Kieman hai written that in June 1946 a mixed Khmer-Vietnamese resistance command was formed in Baiambang. See: Kieman, 'Khmer Communism,' p. 164.

Nguyen Hao Hung, op. ciL, pp. 1 4 5 4 6 . Hbang Van Hoan, on p. 287, says that Mekong I and II were formed in 1947. It seems to this writer that if the Mekong I and II groups participated in the Siemreap attick (as w e shall see they did), then they must have been organised prior to 1947, or August 1946 for tha matter. Thanh Som, who was working directly with the Cambodians out o f Thailand in 1946, would be a more reliable source concerning this fact. Hoan, as we shall see, did not arrive in Thailand until m ii-1948.

Hcäng Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 306. A number o f Vietnamese from Thailand also travelled to Cambodia to disseminate propaganda among the overseas Vietnamese communities there.

US, DOS, 892.00/9-1746, Transmission o f Report Prepared by Colonel Law and Vice Consul Bulkley Regarding Siem Reap and Other Border Incidents,’ 17 September 1946, USNA; US, DOS, 892.00/9-546, 'Sunton to Secretary o f State: The Siem Reap Incident,' 5 September 1946, USNA; US, DOS, FW 892.014/8-1446, 'French Aide Memoire on the Siemreap Incident,' 14 August 1946, U SNA for the US sources. The L ivre N oir makes no mention o f this incident in its discussion o f the 1945-1954 period, pp.

of the Quang Trung operation and pursued it, evidently leaving the town of Siemreap vulnerable to combined Vietnamese—Khmer fighters.76 Nguydn Thanh San claims that the Mekong I and II units participated in this attack, marking what he sees as the first example of combined Viet Minh-Cambodian resistance efforts and the beginning of the Cambodian "armed uprising" against the French 77 However, this attack may not have been the success Son would have us believe. A Bangkok Post investigation revealed that many Khmer Issarak partisans failed to pull the pins out of their grenades when they attacked and did not know how to use the weapons at their disposal.78 Hoan says that the KNLC soon crumbled because of internal fighting, without making any mention of the state of Vietnamese-Cambodian relations.79