Central-Eastern Tarai Total (Country-wide)
196 central-eastern tarai peaked in March 2008191 before they declined to their lowest point in June. Reported abductions rose slowly between July and December. The general trend of IED explosions in the central-eastern tarai in 2008 shows a downward trend.
However, since OCHA tracks only those incidents that are reported, there is the possibility that these numbers are not representative of the levels of violence occurring. For example, individuals often select not to report certain incidents; in the case of abductions, individuals and families might prefer to negotiate with captors rather than report those cases to the local police (author interviews 2008-2009; IDA et al 2011). As an international security analyst explained, “We’ve tried to look at statistics but they’re very unreliable. Not all offences are reported to authorities and the police may be keen to downplay or under-report incidents that have political implications” (ICG 2010a: 29).
While the data presented in four through nine are important in expressing the frequency of reported physical violence in Nepal, they do not necessarily capture the sociality of that violence. In other words, what have been the impacts of such violence on the community? The sections below present local civilians’ experiences and perceptions of violence in the central-eastern tarai.
Experiences of Violence
Madhesh Andolan
Two months after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, in January 2007, the Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance (SPA-M) unveiled the Interim Constitution and announced
191
197 their intention to hold Constituent Assembly elections. Immediately following this announcement an unexpected turn of events occurred: a small, heretofore unknown group calling itself the Madheshi People’s Rights Forum (MPRF)192 launched a protest against the Interim Constitution. From January 16th to February 8th, 2007 MPRF activists took to the streets in opposition to an SPA-led peace process that they perceived as exclusive of Madheshi interests; the MPRF and Madheshi activists voiced concern over their exclusion from participation in the peace process and their place in the Interim Constitution193. Constitutions provide credibility and, when building an institutional framework the process counts, especially where trust- building is concerned (Hale 2008). When regional leaders were left out of the process of drafting the Interim Constitution, their faith in such institution building was undermined. Upendra Yadav, leader of the MPRF, and nearly 30 other members burned the Interim Constitution in the streets of Kathmandu194. In this way, the Madhesh Andolan was a landmark event in bringing about regional based ethno-nationalism “as one of the most prominent issues in the national discourse on restructuring the Nepali state” (Hachhethu 2007: 2).
192
The MPRF is the English translation of “Madheshi People’s Rights Forum” and is used interchangeably with MJF which is the acronym for the Nepali name “Madheshi Janadhikar Forum”, meaning “Madheshi People’s Rights Forum”. Interviews with local people also indicated that “Forum” was used pejoratively to describe Madheshis (author interview 2008-2009). It was also used as an assessment of a person, for example, before one local woman’s child could be admitted to hospital she had to answer the question “are you Forum or Congress?” (author interview July 2009). MPRF, or MJF, grew from a registered NGO to a political party. It was supported by the Maoists and had ties to the CPN-M until at least 2004 (ICG 2007d; Rinck 2008).
193
According to ICG: “The MJF identifies internal colonisation as well as regional and racial discrimination against the Madhes as its key concerns. Its demands include declaration of a federal democratic republic with an undivided, autonomous Madhes, secularism, a proportional electoral system, citizenship certificates for all Madhesis, inclusion of Madhesis in all state organs, special schemes for Dalits and other oppressed Madhesi castes, local promotion and use of Maithili, Bhojpuri and Awadhi languages, recognition of Hindi as a lingua franca, end to internal migration of
pahadis to Madhes, investment in Madhes of a substantial portion of taxes raised in the region, an end of
discrimination against Nepali Muslims and official recognition for madrasas.78 MJF has also tied Madhesi politics to larger national developments. It opposed the king’s rule and Maoist violence and called for elections to the constituent assembly based on equitable population representation under UN supervision” (2007d: 9).
194
These members were arrested and later released. Upendra Yadav went on to become the Foreign Minister under the Maoist-led government in 2008-2009.
198 The president of the district committee of the MPRF in Morang explained to me, “in the peace process there was no mention of Madeshi rights….during the [Maoist] 10 year revolution Maoists always raised ethnic issues but in the peace process they did not mention any of these things….the Madhesh Andolan195 raised other Madheshi-based parties” (author interview February 2009). For example, after Jana Andolan II the transitional government offered benefits, such as reservation, to excluded groups, including women, dalits, and indigenous nationalities, however, Madheshis were excluded from such reservation policies (Hachhethu 2007). The MPRF therefore launched the strikes in an effort to bring the government’s attention to the region, gain greater autonomy, increase representation of Madheshis in government, and increase citizenship rights for Madheshis196 (IDA et al 2011).
On January 19, 2007 a leader of the Maoist Party shot dead a 16 year-old boy, an MPRF supporter, in Lahan, in the eastern tarai district of Siraha. This incident sparked massive protests in the tarai districts, particularly in the central-eastern region. Protestors destroyed government buildings and property, party offices of the ruling SPA-M, called for an indefinite bandh, and continued rallies in the region. In response, the state security forces shot dead more than 30 people and wounded over 800 (ICG 2007d). According to the International Crisis Group,
The protests initially centered around Lahan and Janakpur but soon spread to all other major Tarai towns. The MJF organised some demonstrations but others were spontaneous or organised by local groups.These mobilised people, provided support to the injured and helped coordinate protests.Malangwa, Birgunj, Lahan and Biratnagar saw major clashes. In some cases, agitators turned their ire on journalists, blaming them for not covering the movement sufficiently” (2007d: 12).
195
The protests are now widely recognized as the Madhesh Andolan. For a more on this see Kantha 2009.
196
According to SAS (2011), “in 2007 only 15 percent of the 330 Nepali parliamentarians were Madhesi. Following the 2008 election Madhesi parties held 87 seats in total: MJF (54), Terai Madhes Loktrantrik Party – TMLP (21), Nepal Sadbhavana Party (9), Nepal Sadbhavana Party-Ananda Devi (3). At the beginning of the strikes more than 40 percent of the Madhesi [did] not have citizenship or voting rights”.
199 Meanwhile, Maoist-Madheshi violence continued. Following incidents in Bhairahawa and Nepalganj in February 2007197, Maoist and MPRF supporters clashed in a deadly meeting in the town of Gaur. Violence ensued198 when both parties had announced public meetings at the same venue for the same day, leaving a reported 27 Maoist supporters dead199 (Kantha 2009; OHCHR 2007).
Cycles of local violence continued between Maoist supporters, especially the YCL, and Madheshi political party supporters. However, such violence was not necessarily concerned with specific ideology or party politics. Madhesi armed groups pointed to the fact that most Maoist leaders are largely of pahadi origin and speak Nepali as their mother tongue. They perceived that Maoists represented pahadi interests and hypothesized that Maoists would continue to marginalize them in “new Nepal”. After the Constituent Assembly elections, where Maoists won well over one-third of contested seats, Madheshi activists interpreted Maoists as representatives of the new government and targeted them as such. Armed group leaders such as Jai Krishna Goit of JTMM actively campaigned against the Maoists arguing that their pro-Madheshi rhetoric was disingenuous (Hachhethu 2007). According to the Nepal Democracy Survey 2007, the majority of respondents belonging to Madheshi castes “distrusted” the Maoists and did not believe that the Maoists were committed to multiparty democracy (in Hachehhthu 2007: 7). According to an
197
On February 23, 2007 Maoists were reported to have intervened in an MPRF mass meeting in the town of Bhairahawa where they took supporters and their vehicles into custody (Kantha 2009). On February 25, 2007 in Nepalganj, Maoists again intervened in an MPRF mass meeting (Kantha 2009). Anti-Madheshi violence was caught on tape and the tape was widely distributed, flaring tensions further (ICG 2007d).
198
Some human rights activists allege that five women were raped (ICG 2007d), however the “Findings of OHCHR- Nepal’s Investigations into the 21March killings in Gaur and Surrounding Villages”, maintains that there were no rapes.
199
ICG’s 2007 report notes, “Several victims were summarily executed. There may have been a caste component to the clash, for Gaur has sizeable Rajput and Yadav populations. Angry with the Maoists for mobilising lower castes, they used this as an opportunity to assert local dominance” (2007d14).