Aspectos generales sobre desarrollo rural
1.2 Conceptualización del desarrollo rural, en clave de desarrollo te- te-rritorial
314. Acre vs. Yutiki (₵) September 27, 2007 – Sandoval-Gutierrez
Facts:
1. Sofranio and Acre (Petitioner) are married.
2. Sofranio left the conjugal dwelling because of marital disputes (1972) 3. Sofriano married Envangeline [Respondent] (May 1972)
4. The couple bought land and a car. 5. Sofriano died. (1996)
6. Acre claims the property obtained during her husband’s second marriage is hers because of Article 148 which demands co- ownership.
Issue: Does Sofranio’s legal wife have the right to the property purchased during Sofriano’s bigamous marriage? Held: No
Ruling:
1. The relationship is bigamous, however the property in dispute was not proved to have been conjugal.
2. Acre failed to present evidence to establish that the husband made actual contributions to acquiring the property. 3. The property was registered in the name of Evangeline Acre, married to Sofronio Acre BUT was later found out that the property was actually registered in the names of Evangeline Acre, married to Sofronio Acre.
4. The rule is well settled that the words “married to” preceding Sofronio Acre, are merely descriptive of the civil status 5. Said property was exclusively owned by Evangeline.
315. Signey vs. SSS (ɱ) January 28, 2008 – Tinga *The SSS benefits go to (drum roll)… the illegitimate children, 100%! Facts:
1. Rodolfo Signey, Sr., a member of the SSS, died on 21 May 2001.
2. In his member records, he had designated Yolanda Signey as primary beneficiary and his four children with her as secondary beneficiaries.
3. She filed a claim for death benefits with the public respondent SSS. She revealed in her SSS claim that the deceased had a common-law wife, Gina Servano (Gina), with whom he had two minor children namey, Ginalyn and Rodelyn.
4. Her declaration was confirmed when Gina herself filed a claim for the same death benefits in which she also declared that both she and petitioner were common-law wives of the deceased and that Editha Espinosa (Editha) was the legal wife.
5. In addition, in October 2001, Editha also filed an application for death benefits with the SSS stating that she was the legal wife of the deceased.
6. The SSS denied the death benefit claim of Yolanda.
7. However, it recognized Ginalyn and Rodelyn, the minor children of the deceased with Gina, as the primary beneficiaries under the SSS Law.
8. The SSS also found that the 20 March 1992 marriage between Yolanda and the deceased was null and void because of a prior subsisting marriage contracted on 29 October 1967 between the deceased and Editha, as confirmed with the Local Civil Registry of Cebu City.
Issue: Who is entitled to the SSS benefits of a member who was survived not only by his legal wife, but also by two common-law wives with whom he had six children?
1. The legal wife, Editha, waived her rights subsequently. However, this waiver cannot be a strong ground for Yolanda to claim. 2. Yolanda did not even try to allege and prove any infirmity in the marriage between the deceased and Editha.
3. Yolanda is disqualified to be a beneficiary and Rodolfo has no legitimate child, it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries.
4. The SSS Law is clear that for a minor child to qualify as a dependent,the only requirements are that he/she must be below 21 years of age, not married nor gainfully employed.
5. Had the legitimate child of the deceased and Editha survived and qualified as a dependent under the SSS Law, Ginalyn and Rodelyn would have been entitled to a share equivalent to only 50% of the share of the said legitimate child. Since the legitimate child of the deceased predeceased him.
6. Ginalyn and Rodelyn, as the only qualified primary beneficiaries of the deceased, are entitled to 100% of the benefits. 316. Borromeo vs. Descallar (€)
February 24, 2009 – Puno, CJ *German smitten by scheming waitress na ambisyosa Facts:
1. Willhelm Jambrich a German national working in the country was smitten by a Filipina waitress, Antonietta Descalar who was working in a hotel. He initially asked him to teach him English wherein he eventually fell for her. Willhelm helped her get through her hard life as they lived together and even adopting Anotnietta’s two children from previous marriage. 2. Willhelm bought three parcels of land that was named after Anotnietta because she told him that he couldn’t legally own
properties being an alien but his signature was put on it anyway. 3. Their relationship turned sour and both found new lovers.
4. To pay for his debt, Willhelm sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner for P250,000, as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment. Then he found out that titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject property has already been mortgaged.
5. Camilo Borromeo to whom Wilhelm is indebted, then filed a case for recovery of property. He alleged that Antonietta did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid for the properties using his exclusive funds. She claimed that she "solely and exclusively used her own personal funds to defray and pay for the purchase price of the subject lots in question
Issue: Does Antonietta have the right over the said property?
Held: No. They were not capacitated to cohabit as she had a previous subsisting marriage, Ruling:
1. The Court ruled that Jambrich was rightfully the owner of the said properties as it was clear that he had the means to pay for the properties while Antonietta was only a waitress and couldn’t have afforded to purchase the properties amounting to 700K. 2. Also the DSWD home report used for the adoption of her two children by Wilhelm showed that Antonietta who was miserable
and financially distressed at that time accepted the offer for the sake of the children .
3. The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not apply. In the instant case, respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties
4. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.
5. The transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner, Borromeo, who is a Filipino citizen.
317. Heirs of Maramag v Maramag (₱)
June 5, 2009 – Nachura “Illegitimate Insurance” Facts:
1. Loreto cohabited with Eva while he was still married to Vicenta (he had children with both), and it was during this time that he purchased insurance policies with Insular Life and Grepalife.
2. Loreto died, and to Vicenta’s disbelief, the policies were not added to his estate. Instead they were awarded to Loreto’s illegitimate children. She filed a case asking for the money to be transferred to Loreto’s estate, and she included everyone involved in the pleading.
3. The illegitimate family did not respond (as they were out of sight, perhaps enjoying Loreto’s money in the Bahamas or wherever), but the two companies were forced to. Insular Life claimed that they discovered Loreto’s assignment of Eva as being wrong, which is why they awarded the policy to the children. Grepalife said that the only recipients assigned were the illegitimate children.
4. Both companies claimed that the proceeds belong to the designated beneficiaries, and that nevertheless the rule on succession does not apply when the designation of beneficiaries is not clear.
5. The lower court ruled that the illegitimate children are off the hook, but that the two companies and Eva were not. Insular and Grepalife both moved for reconsideration again, and the petitioner-heirs just repeated their contentions.
6. The lower court granted the motion for reconsideration and basically ruled that the proceeds cannot go to the estate. The heirs appealed to the CA, which was dismissed, hence the present case.
Issue: Should the petition be denied?
Held: YES. The petition was DENIED for lack of merit. Ruling:
1. First and foremost, the civil code provides that insurance policies are to be governed by special laws. And the proper provision states that whoever is designated will get the proceeds.
2. The petitioners are only third parties to the case and are thus not entitled to the proceeds. 318. Atilde ALAVADO v. City of Tacloban (₳)
1985 – Cuevas *wife submits church document as proof of marital status to get husband’s death benefits Facts:
1. The late Ricardo Alavado was employed as a carpenter-foreman by the City Engineer's Office. His last day of service was on April 19, 1974 since he was on leave from April 23, 1974 to May 23, 1974.
2. On August 6, 1974 when he reported for work, he was no longer under the supervision of respondent city. He suffered severe headache when he was supervising laborers on a construction project in Tolosa, Leyte. He died the following day of CVA- Cerebral Hemorrhage.
3. Petitioner, the surviving spouse, filed a claim for death benefits in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children. 4. This was denied because of lack of marriage contract that petitioner could present. What was submitted by her is a mere copy
issued by the church authorities where the questioned marriage was solemnized. Issue: May a marriage certificate considered satisfactory proof of marital status? Held: Yes
Ruling:
1. Court didn’t mind because Alavado later on submitted a marriage certificate. The said document indubitably establishes claimant marriage to the deceased Alavado.
319. Gayon vs. Gayon (£)
26 Nov 1970 – Concepcion *brother-in-law not part of the “family” Facts:
1. On 31 Jul 1967, Pedro Gayon filed a complaint against spouses Silvestre and Genoveva Gayon. Silvestre is his brother. 2. Pedro alleged that on 1 Oct 1952, the spouses sold a land to Pedro Gelera for ₱500 subject to redemption within 5 years. They
did not exercise the right of redemption.
3. On 21 Mar 1961, Pedro Gelera sold the land to him for ₱614. He had since introduced improvements on the land worth ₱1,000. 4. He filed the suit to obtain a decree for the consolidation of the title to a land acquired through a conditional sale.
5. In Genoveva’s answer, she stated that Silvestre died on 6 Jan 1954. Also, she argued that being a brother of Silvestre, Pedro did not exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the case. She then filed a motion to dismiss.
6. On 16 Sep 1967, the lower court dismissed the case and held that Silvestre is the absolute owner of the land. Issue: Is Pedro required to exert efforts to amicably settle the case?
Held: No. Silvestre’s heirs are not included in the “family.” Ruling:
1. Since Genoveva (sister-in-law) and her children (nephews/nieces) were not included in the enumeration under Art. 217 included in the “family,” Pedro was not required to exert efforts to amicably settle the case.
2. The enumeration in Art. 217 should be construed strictly for Art. 222 to apply. Concept:
Civil Code, Article 217. Family relations shall include those: 1. Between husband and wife;
2. Between parent and child;
3. Among other ascendants and their descendants; 4. Among brothers and sisters.
Civil Code, Article 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035.
November 27, 1968 – Sanchez *Compromise for support was not alleged in the information, proper? Facts:
1. On March 4, 1964, a verified complaint for P1,500.00 monthly support, support in arrears, and damages, and custody of children, with a petition for support pendente lite was lodged against Jose Ma. Versoza by his wife, Margaret Ann Wainright Versoza, and their three minor children
2. Jose Versoza attacked the complaint on the claim that it is premature and/or that it states no cause of action.
3. the complaint which involves members of the same family does allege earnest efforts toward a compromise before the complaint was filed as set forth in the statute mentioned at the start of this opinion.
Issue: Should there be compromise made and alleged in the information before a complaint can be file for support? Held: No.
Ruling:
1. The text of Article 222 of the Civil Code is this: "No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035."
2. GENERAL RULE: The cumulative impact of the statute and the rule just adverted to is that earnest efforts to reach a compromise and failure must be alleged in the complaint. Attempt to compromise and inability to arrive thereat is a condition precedent to the filing of the suit
3. Future support operates outside the ambit 4. The right to support cannot be:
(1) renounced;
(2) transmitted to third persons; nor
(3) compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor.
5. Compensation may not even be set up against a creditor who has a claim for support due by gratuitous title.
6. Of course, support in arrears is a different thing altogether, may be compensated, renounced and transmitted by onerous or gratuitous title
7. Plaintiffs ask for support past, present and future. There is also the prayer for alimony pendente lite. Since the present action also revolves on the right to future support and because compromise on future support is prescribed then the conclusion is irresistible that an attempt at compromise of future support and failure thereof is not a condition precedent to the filing of the present suit.
Concept:
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts; (6) Future legitime.
321. Magbaleta vs. Gonong (₵)
Barredo—April 22, 1977 *Third party should not be made to depend on the bickering of family members Facts:
1. Rufino and Romana are married. (1st and 2nd petitioner) 2. Susan bought a parcel of land from the couple. (3rd petitioner) 3. The land is covered by a free patent title in the name of Rufino.
4. Private respondent is Rufino’s brother and claims ownership over the said land.
5. Petitioners say that the respondent did not state in his suit that “earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made before the case was filed.”
6. Respondent in this current case is the judge who ruled in favor of private respondent (brother of Rufino) Issue: Was it necessary to stipulate in the suit that there were earnest efforts were made to form a compromise? Held: No
Ruling:
1. It is neither practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of a stranger to the family who just happened to have innocently acquired some kind of interest in any right or property disputed among its members should be made to depend on the way the latter would settle their differences among themselves.
2. Since Susana is a stranger and a third party, the legal provision does not apply.
April 30, 1979 – Concepcion, Jr. *H enlisted the help of the Constabulary to reach a compromise, but failed Facts:
1. H & W: Aurelio Jutba and Jovencia de Guzman
2. H was seriously ill and hospitalized, W and her paramour left for Manila for unknown destination. 3. In 1974, W and her paramour were living as husband and wife in Davao City.
4. They were twice summoned by the Philippine Constabulary for confrontation and arrangement but refused to appear. 5. H filed a complaint against W and Federico Recario (paramour), for indemnification of damages incurred by him on account of
their adulterous acts and for his share in the fruits of the conjugal partnership properties during the time when the conjugal partnership was administered by his wife.
6. W and Federico filed their respective motions to dismiss based on: a) H has no cause of action since this is a suit between members of the same family and there is no allegation to show the earnest efforts towards a compromise, but that the same have failed, b) the venue is improperly laid, should have been filed where the properties are found.
7. The motion to dismiss was denied.
Issue: Is the contention of the wife correct, that there is no cause of action since the suit is between a husband and a wife without any allegation of earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed?
Held: NO. Ruling:
7. The husband has exerted efforts to meet his wife and even enlisted the help of the Philippine Constabulary who summoned his wife “for confrontation and arrangement”, but the wife refused to see him. There is substantial compliance with the law. 8. It is not necessary that Aurelio should expressly use the terms in the statute “that earnest efforts towards a compromise have
been made, but the same have failed” in his pleadings in order to comply with the requirement.
9. (Issue of venue) The action is purely personal and is for the recovery of damages. Although Aurelio had mentioned real
properties belonging to the conjugal partnership, he is not asking to be declared the rightful owner or lawful possessor of such, nor is he asking for its partition, in order to classify it as a real action.
10. The court lifts the TRO that Aurelio filed to restrain his wife from selling certain parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership.
323. Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank vs. Acuña (€)
August 31, 2006 – Austria Martinez *No way bank &others, 151 is exclusive for family only Facts:
Alberto Romulo filed a cancellation of mortgage against Hiyas Savings & Loan, his wife and spouses Owe, contending that he did not sign a contract of loan and mortgage that it was his wife in conspiracy with spouses Owe who made it appear that he signed it. He couldn’t have done so because he was working abroad.
The bank contends Art. 151 provides that a no suit may prosper between family members unless it appears on the verified complaint that an earnest effort towards a compromise has been made.
Issues: Could the Art. 151 be applicable in this case? Held: No, it is exclusive for family only.
Ruling:
The court ruled that once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that an earnest effort towards compromise before action can prosper.
The ruling in Magbeleta now prevails where the case involving brothers and a stranger to the family who claims ownership of the property that efforts to a compromise is not a jurisdictional pre-requisite when a stranger becomes a party. It is for reason that it would be inconvenient for the stranger and neither practical for him to depend on how the family members would settle it to themselves.
324. Intestate estate of Gonzales vs. People (₱)
February 11, 2010 – Corona "Mediatrix the Executrix VS William Sato the thieving Jap"