Hopetoun to Chamberlain, 17 December 1901. C.O. 418/10/ 44450,folio 559. Copy also in CP 78, series 9, folio 103,
C .A.0. 5.
Clearly, Barton had changed his mind. It has been suggested that this might have been due to the intervention of a
visiting British Member of Parliament, Henniker Heaton.'*' But, a more likely explanation is that Hopetoun himself persuaded the reluctant Barton to accept an earlier official request. The cable of 17 December, Hopetoun's speech to the Australian Natives Association and Barton's admission that he had
discussed the matter with Hopetoun prior to Cabinet meetings , suggest that one of the influences in the Prime Minister's change of mind was the Governor-General.
The extent to which a Governor-General could influence federal policy depended largely upon the personality and style of the man himself and the attitude of his chief
advisers, particularly the Prime Minister. H o p e t o u n 's warm, likeable character and Barton's inexperience and conviviality suggest that in the first years of the Commonwealth the
Governor-General's opinion, perhaps expressed over intimate 2
dinners at Government House, might have wielded some force. He was very much in the position of a benevolent and
experienced Imperial official supervising the early years of the Commonwealth.
1. Atkinson, Australian Defence P o l i c y , p. 115. Heaton was an ubiquitous Imperial busy-body whose chief hobby-horse was an Imperial penny post.
2. Barton's papers include frequent invitations from Hopetoun, to dine at Government House. E.G. Hopetoun to Barton, 21 October 1901. MS 51/433, A.N.L. 'You see we treat you as one of the family in thus asking you at a moments notice & I hope you will always feel yourself quite free to accept or r e f u s e '.
In the affair of the Commonwealth contingent for the South African war can be found an example of the dual role of the Representative of the Crown in the Commonwealth. As channel of communication between Australia and the British Government he was aware of the negotiations. As
representative of the British Government it was his duty to urge upon his local Ministers the view of the Colonial Office. Both Cook, in the House of Representatives, and the Daily
Telegraph recognized that it was a valid part of the
Governor-General's function to make representations on behalf of the home government. Their comments indicated that His Excellency's mistake lay in making those representations public. Hopetoun's successors learned from his blunder.
Thenceforth normal diplomatic secrecy surrounded the Governor- General's expression of British Governmental attitudes to
Australia.
One field of policy in which the Governor-General might be thought to have exercised some personal influence was the
selection of a Commandant for the newly amalgamated Australian Defence Forces. At first sight, Hopetoun's Sandhurst education, his acquaintance with others of the British ruling class as well as his position as representative of the British
Government in Australia, qualified him to be of some assistance to Barton in choosing a British Officer to command the Federal Military Forces. Yet, though he was not loath to proffer his
counsel, it seemed to have exercised only marginal influence. Australia's traditional reliance upon the Empire for defence, the inclination of her politicians and the need for
an experienced officer to co-ordinate hitherto scattered military forces, made it inevitable that the young
Commonwealth would look to Britain for her first federal Commandant. Asked to recommend a suitable officer for the position the Colonial Defence Committee had nominated General
Sir Reginald Pole-Carew.'*' The Governor-General was enthusiastic about the suggestion. He informed Barton that 'Polly' was
a personal friend of his, and 'one of the very best men ... that could be found for the job'. He trusted that the Australian Government would deal liberally with the matter of salary and allowances.
Emboldened by his acquaintance with Pole-Carew and perhaps inspired by an excessively grand vision of his own role in the Commonwealth, Hopetoun assumed the mantle of military expert himself. He urged that the choice of a Commander be expedited, as 'the manner of carrying on things in this State [New South Wales] and to some extent in Victoria leaves much to be desired'. He approved of Hoad, the Chief of Staff in Victoria, but regarded General Downer as 'antediluvian and quite unfit for his job'.
Mackenzie, the Chief of Staff in New South Wales, he
castigated as incompetent and though he liked General French personally he considered him to have lost 'that smartness of
1. See Who Was Who, 1916-1928, p. 173 for biographical details. Pole-Carew had been Private Secretary to Governor Robinson in New South Wales from 1876-1877. 2. Hopetoun to Barton, 6 June 1901. Barton papers, MS
initiative which we are wont to think inseparable from the professional soldier'.
In the succeeding months the Governor-General continued to urge that the Commonwealth settle this important matter. However his hope that the Government would deal liberally with Pole-Carew in the matter of salary and allowances
proved unfulfilled. In the face of the overwhelming pressures towards economy in Commonwealth administration and in
particular in defence expenditure the Cabinet was unable to increase its offer of £2,500 per annum, an offer which
Pole-Carew felt was inadequate. Negotiations continued between the Commonwealth Government and the British War Office, and as the correspondence passed through the medium of the Governor-General he concerned himself with its
outcome. On one occasion while forwarding a request made by his Ministers for Lord Roberts' opinion of General Hector
2
Macdonald he cabled secretly to Chamberlain to recommend that Lord Roberts discourage the appointment of Macdonald which,
3
in his opinion, would be 'most unsuitable'. In October 1901 he informed the Secretary of State that he was urging the Commonwealth Government to increase the salary offered to £3,000 in the hope of securing the services of General
4
Hillyard. But Cabinet was not to be persuaded. Eventually
1. Hopetoun to Barton, 6 June 1901. Barton papers, MS 51/405, A.N.L.
2. See Who Was Who, 1897-1915, p. 449 for biographical details.
3. Hopetoun to Chamberlain, cable, 7 August 1901. Copy in CP 78, series 9, folio 67, C.A.O.
4. Hopetoun to Chamberlain, secret, 10 October 1901. Copy in Ibid., folio 78.
the Governor-General cabled that he had reason to believe that the appointment of General Sir Edward Hutton would be well received by his Ministers.^
Officials at the Colonial Office were astonished that the Commonwealth Government should consider Hutton suitable to command its defence forces. Although he was an able man, his ideas of the responsibility of a Military Commander in a self-governing colony had led to a deal of friction during both his earlier tour of duty in New South Wales and his
2
term in Canada. Notwithstanding Hutton's reputation the Australian Cabinet agreed to his appointment as first
Commandant of the Australian Military forces in December 1901. Before the new Commander took up his duties, the Governor- General of Canada, Minto, wrote confidentially to Hopetoun to urge that rumours of earlier difficulties in Canada should not be allowed to prejudice Hutton's chances in Australia. But he conceded that Hutton was a difficult man, whose chief fault was an 'inclination to oratory' despite constant advice urging restraint. Minto advised Hopetoun to exercise whatever
3
influence he could upon Hutton to maintain peace. In his
1. Hopetoun to Chamberlain, secret, 12 November 1901,