Conclusión

The story of the construction of the Pantanal Stadium shows systematic corruption to Cuiabá based organisations. It first began with the drawings of the stadium and continued into paying construction workers, delivery of the seats and the accreditation of the stadium as environmentally friendly.

122 The architectural drawings of the stadium by Castro Mello were never produced and pressure from civil society including a local newspaper for the company to repay the state government R$500,000

(£117,361) developed. Castro Mello is reported to have released a statement reporting the money had been spent, and they could not return it even if they wanted to (Bess, 2013). Despite this, the state government did not pursue them and the Pantanal Stadium was eventually designed by GCP architects based in Sao Paulo who specialise in urban design. It was built by Santa Barbara and Mendes Junior, a Cuiabá based Construction Company. This was not the end of contractual problems.

The Pantanal Stadium was built on the same site as the replaced Estádio José Fragelli stadium, which had neither the facilities nor capacity to meet FIFA regulations. Construction started in 2010 by Santa Barbara and Mendes Junior Architects who won the bid to construct the stadium for R$342million (£80,274,961). The project was funded entirely through public funds: R$330 million (£77,458,296) by the Brazilian National Development Bank and R$12 million (£2,816,665) from the State Government. In November 2010 the construction of the stadium was temporarily suspended after Mato Grosso state auditors prevented funding from the state Government. They found irregularities in the project timetable and assessment of the foundations (Tavares, 2011). Construction recommenced in 2012 but was beset with problems. One worker, 32 year old Muhammad ‘Ali Maciel Afonso, died after he was electrocuted and fell from the upper tier. There was also a fire in the outer casing of the stadium which threatened the success of a safety inspection by FIFA. Nonetheless, the stadium was cleared to be used in the FIFA World Cup.

In line with global, FIFA and national environmental norms, the stadium was built to Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) standard. Gaining LEED accreditation was also part of the contract with the Brazilian National Development Bank which stipulated the State government would have to pay an annual fine of 1% of the total R$330 million (£77,458,296) if the LEED accreditation was not achieved (Globo, 2016a). LEED is an internationally recognised certificate for ‘green’ construction (Botta et al., 2011). These standards are based on technology and innovation and operate within the

123 ecological modernisation paradigm. The key elements included using materials from the previous stadium for the foundations, using recycled rainwater throughout the stadium and solar panel photovoltaics.

The seats at the Pantanal Stadium are another example of how the World Cup provided another opportunity for local elites to benefit financially from contracts. The contract to supply the seats was won in July 2013 by a Cuiabá based company, Kango. They were to supply 44,500 seats at a cost of R$19.4 million (£4,553,608) or R$436.50 (£102.46) each. An investigation by the civil prosecution service, advised Secopa to cancel the contract as they found Kango supplied the National Stadium in Brasilia at R$175 (£39.14) each. The contract with the Mato Grosso government meant they had to pay an extra R$700,000 (£164,305) for their seats. As a result of this investigation Kango lost the contract to another company, Desk, who quoted the state government R$150 (£35.21) per seat. On the 20th

October 2013, Desk officially expressed interest in supplying the Pantanal Stadium seats. But due to irregularities related to another contract in Sao Paulo, the company were not permitted to hold a contract with a government based enterprise for five years. At this point, the original company, Kango, had their contract reinstated after they offered their original contract at a 6% discount. A new contract was then drawn between Secopa and Kango which stated the seats would be installed by 2015. If Secopa wanted the seats delivered before this date they would have to pay a premium (Segalla, 2013). By the end of May 2014, the Pantanal Stadium was open to the public for the first time and held its first, and only, test match between Cuiabá based Mixto and Santos from Sao Paulo state. But, on match day only 20,000 tickets were available due to a failure in the delivery of seats. During the match, several of the installed seats became loose and broke off. The car park was also unfinished and spectators arriving by car had to park over 2km away, without a bus service transporting them to the arena (Birth, 2014). Despite these initial problems, the stadium was ready in time for the World Cup and was decorated with plants and posters for the four matches at the Pantanal Stadium.

124 During the duration of the World Cup the only reported problem was the leaking roof in the VIP section due to unfinished tiling (Fig. 14). On September 1st 2014, the Pantanal Stadium played host to Sao Paulo based team, Corinthians. The Pantanal Stadium was at full capacity for this match, with over 44,000 live spectators, more than ever achieved in the four World Cup matches.

Figure 10:VIP area at the Arena Pantanal during the World Cup. Unfinished roof led to leaking during match days, author photo 16/6/14

In addition to under use, problems with the construction have continued in the two years since the World Cup. The stadium was closed in January 2015 due to flooding caused by wet season rain. By October 2015 access to one upper tier stand was prohibited due to safety fears resulting from the 2014 fire and by 2016 the official capacity of the stadium was reduced to 10,000 (Pablo, 2016). On the 15th July 2016 the Mato Grosso government blocked R$28 million (£6,572,219) to the construction company Santa Barbara and Mendes Junior after they had not completed the agreed works and the stadium could

125 not be accredited the LEED certification (Pablo, 2016). The condition of the plants surrounding the pitch are symbolic of the environmental considerations for the stadium. They were full, green and healthy when the cameras were on during the World Cup, but brown and wilting just one year after (Fig 15).

Figure 11: Planted trees in the corners of the stadium. This was part of the theme of sustainability in the stadium, author photo

16/6/14 and 7/9/15

After the World Cup there was a fear that the stadium would become a ‘white elephant’ a term used to describe sporting stadiums that have little use after the event (Downie, 2010) and would become a burden on the state tax payer. The monthly cost to the state government for maintaining the stadium is reported at R$500,000 (£117,361), although this has increased as the state government paid for minor repairs (Pablo, 2016). The manager of the stadium described how ‘one year after the World Cup it is difficult to fill the stadium. We have been half full three times this year’ (interview C9). After the initial full stadium it appears that usage of the Pantanal Stadium has decreased.

In Salvador and Recife civil society pressure forced a FIFA law to change but the elites in Mato Grosso did nothing to help small-scale local traders. A FIFA commitment introduced at the state level gave FIFA control over the movement of people and goods within a 2km radius of each host venue. This particular commitment inspired a grass-roots movement led by local, and eventually, national media. One

126 Independent street vendors and local traders who usually trade within the zone would be prohibited from trading, during the tournament, resulting in the local economy losing custom to global brands (Fairclough, 2003, v-brazil.com, 2012). The movement gained significantly as the local organising committees in Salvador and Recife to allowed selected local vendors within the stadium. International football spectators in these cities were able to purchase the local dishes of Acarajé in Salvador and Tapioca in Recife (Sandy, 2014). Elites in Mato Grosso did not lobby for this change and no local vendors were available in Cuiabá .

Another commitment which changed some state laws, including Mato Grosso, was the sale of alcohol within the stadium. Alcohol within sporting arenas is banned in some states but this was relaxed to allow Budweiser and Brahma beer to be sold (Lopes and Verloni, 2012). It is important to note, that under these amendments the Federal Government would have been held accountable and assume civil liability over any safety related incident or accident at the tournament resulting from alcohol (Amaral and Viana, 2013). This commitment has many implications. FIFA have forced the Brazilian government to change laws which are designed to protect the Brazilian population. Yet, in the event that a change in these laws would cause an accident or incident, FIFA would not take responsibility. FIFA and their corporate partners colluded in their relations of dominance to lobby the Brazilian government. These relationships were able to ensure elite actors found preferable circumstances in which to conduct their business.

It was also claimed that the construction of the Pantanal Stadium would bring additional trading and recreational opportunities for the local community after the World Cup. Therefore delivering further social benefits. In the months following the World Cup small businesses had begun to operate within the Pantanal Stadium grounds. At dusk, residents could be seen to walk, skateboard and cycle around the stadium; businesses renting bikes and stakes as well as those selling refreshments had been created. However, the concrete surface surrounding the stadium had developed several dangerous sections

127 where it had disintegrated (Fig 16). This example illustrates that the Pantanal Stadium cannot be seen as a social benefit for the community.

Figure 12: The Arena Pantanal in 2016, businesses rent out skateboards, bikes and roller skates but the surface is beginning to

disintegrate, author photo 17/9/15

The Pantanal Stadium was only one element of the programme to improve the infrastructure in Cuiabá.