CONCLUSIONES

Consequently, it is the western inability to control the movement of ammunition that was responsible for the situation in Libya and series of uprising in Arab states otherwise known as Arab spring. It depicts nothing but a global conspiracy to unseat Gaddafi. From the above political angles discussed, it showed the spate of havoc inflicted on Libya which violated the spirit and letters of the fourth UN criteria on humanitarian intervention where the application of military action left the state worse than it was.

6.3 Abuse on the internal security and absoluteness of the sovereignty of

4. National Transitional Council

10,000 killed February 15 – April 12, 2011

5. UN-Human Rights Council 10,000 – 15,000 killed

February 15 – June 9, 2011 6. Aljazeera English 13,000 killed February 15 – June 18,

2011 7. National Transitional

Council

30,000 killed February 15 – Sept 18, 2011 8. National Transitional

Council

25,000 killed February 15 – Oct, 2011 Source: Casualties of Libyan Civil war 2012

A breakdown on the spate of death was also given to support the views of the table presented above. The position of the table came with definite locations and number of casualties suffered by the Libyans in the attack that was branded humanitarian intervention to save the lives of the people living in Benghazi.

Thus, table 5 attested to the depth of losses suffered by the inhabitants of Libya far above the genocide Gaddafi was accused of with the following stated;

Table 4: Civilian death in Libya in 2011 NA = Not Available

NR = Not Reported

Date Opposition

Fatalities

Government Fatalities

Civilian Fatalities

Details

February 6 1 N R NA Protest in Roujdane

February 17-20 332 – 479 163 ― First Battle of Benghazi February 17 -25 300 – 700 N R Tripoli Clashes

February 17 4-10 N R Protest in Ababiya

February 18 2 N R Protest Qubah

February 18-May 15

376 358 -545 Battle of Misrata

February 20 4 N R Protest in Tobruk

February 20 3 N R Protest in Zintan

February 21-22 N R 37 Revenge killings against

loyalist in Benghazi

February 21 15 3 Rebel capture of La Abraq

Airport in Bayda

February 22 -23 9 N R Protest in Gharyan

February 23 2 16 Captured and execution of loyalists fighter at Derna

February 18 –15 610 - 862 Battle of Misrata

February 16 22 N R N A Captured and Execution of

rebel fighters at Sirte

March 1-13 39 Shelling of Zuwara

March 1 – August 18

500 – 517 397 Nafusa mountains

campaign March 1 – July

20

27 N R Fighting at the Algerian –

Libyan border

March 2 14 2 – 10 First battle of Brega

March 4 – 12 71 – 81 4 – 27 Battle of Ra‘s lanuf

March 4 34 – 100 N R Explosion at an arms

depot in Benghazi

March 6 182 – 230 1 Battle of Bin Jewad

March 6 1 Shooting in Bayda

March 12 1 Killing of Aljazeera

camera man near Benghazi

March 13 – 15 7 25 Second battle of Brega

March 14 7 16 Government retaking of

Zuwara

March 15 – 26 136 41 25 – 30 Battle of Ajdabiya

March 15 1 N R Rebel fighter plane

clashed

March 17 NR 1-2 Bombing run on the

Benghazi military air base

March 18 3 NR 3 Fighting in Zuwetina

March 19 – 20 261 27 – 30 Second battle of Benghazi March 19 – July

13

1108 NATO bombing campaign

March 20 1 NR Killing of rebel activist in

Benghazi

March 22 – 24 N R 19-28 Coalition air strikes on Tripoli

March 26 – 30 12 7 First Gulf of Sidera

Offensive

March 28 1 N R Execution of rebels at

Sirte March 31 –

April 17

46 – 49 28 Third battle of Brega

Source: Casualties of Libyan Civil Way (2011)

Regrettably, what became the outcome of the intervention went far beyond the initial arrangement that came with the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) the lives of people living in Benghazi. The obvious was that what transpired was a monumental deviation from the main agenda to group interest and the manner with which it was pursued sent chill down the spine of nations lured into supporting and voting for the mission. The most important was that the intervention went contrary to the spirit and letter of UN panel document on humanitarian intervention. According to Kochler (1999) in Musiani (2008), the Human Right Watch (HRW) presented a set out criteria as found in World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) and other UN panel document for Humanitarian Intervention (H I). The basic Criteria include:

1. Military action must be the last reasonable option to halt or prevent slaughter and should not be used if effective alternative are available;

2. The intervention must be guided primarily by a humanitarian purpose;

humanitarian purpose must be the dominant reason for military action;

3. Every effort should be made to ensure that the means used to intervene (themselves) respect international human rights and humanitarian law, we do not subscribe to the view that some abuses can be countenanced in the name of stopping others;

4. It must be reasonably likely that military action will do more good than harm; Humanitarian Intervention should not be tried if it will cause more suffering.

Therefore, a look at the above states conditions shows that NATO violated all the preconditions and necessary conditions required for the application of the doctrine on humanitarian intervention. Based on the fact that it was stated that military actions should be last reasonable option to halt or prevent slaughter and should not be used if effective alternative are available poses strong indictment on NATO. The implication was that they failed did not

apply any other options in the intervention outside that of military. The manner the application of military action was carried out was not properly done as it suggested some ulterior intentions against the Libyan state.

In a similar note, the document suggested that the intervention must be guided primarily by a humanitarian purpose; humanitarian purpose must be the dominant reason for military action. At this point, it was not clearly stated the point at which humanitarian intervention must be carried out.

What was observed was a strict adherence to a motive driven by national interest of states to champion the course of subjugating Libyan hegemony.

Again, NATO was never interested in respecting the sovereignty of Libya as their interest was propelled by the desire to effect a regime change.

Furthermore, the document has it that every effort should be made to ensure that the means used to intervene (themselves) respect international human rights and humanitarian law. This study does not subscribe to the view that some abuses can be countenanced in the name of stopping others. Here, the whole world opined that NATO violated international standard and principles guiding humanitarian interventions. It formed the main reason for the various criticisms from many nations, especially third world states. This conforms to our position in the previous chapter where we argued that the UN Charter stated that willing nations that embarks on humanitarian intervention must report to the Secretary General of the body and that the office will be briefed on every stage of development in the course of the intervention. Unfortunately, not only that NATO was never anywhere near what the charter termed willing nation, still they failed to adhere to all the resolution of UN Charter and embarked on a fragrant abuse that sunk the political sovereignty of Libya.

Meanwhile, the document stated that the intervention must be reasonably likely that military action will do more good than harm; Humanitarian Intervention should not be tried if it will cause more suffering. This forms the basis of the argument as pictures and tabular representation on the destruction of lives and property of the Libyan state stand to confirm. See picture 2 and 3. It went further to question the support of the rebel and the provision of logistics that aided the removal the Libyan sovereign head. In other words, this section is not in any way suggesting abuse of rights which the Libyan suffered under Gaddafi but the role played by NATO in their application of the doctrine of necessity to save the inhabitants of Benghazi.

See picture 4 below. Humanitarian intervention is preferred when it receives the endorsement of the UNSC or other bodies with significant multilateral authority. Many of the UN resolution and reactions of states indicate a preference for interventions that abides with the norms of international law and charter of the UN. This is in consonance with the feeling that allowing any one state the privilege of the UN charter will be tantamount to allowing all, resulting to a state of global anarchy in which the weaken states will be at the mercy of the more powerful state. Thus, that is the contemporary condition of Libya.

Picture 4

Sources: Pictured: Libyan Islamist rebels pose with planes seized from Tripoli Airport

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2741428/Officials-warn-ELEVEN-missing-airplanes-Libya-used-carry-terrorist-attack-9-11-anniversary.html#ixzz4brFCFQTQ