R epublic, "This was a democratic re v o lu tio n smashed by the leading democracy in the w o rld "23), s u c c e s s fu lly restored the status quo an te.
The assumptions th a t p re va ile d in the r e la t iv e ly minor instance o f the Dominican Republic dominated American th in k in g in Vietnam. I t was "assumed th a t America's needs included worldwide s t a b ilit y and o rd e r, which in p ra c tic e meant the pre se rva tio n o f the status quo" . 24 The Johnson a d m in is tra tio n f a ile d to agree w ith Kennan th a t n a tiona lism could be a powerful fo rce against S o v ie t-in s p ire d communism. For a ll the high rh e to ric o f Presidents from Truman to Johnson, there was an underlying paradox in th a t " in tu rn in g to the m ilit a r y and others o f a conservative bent in the developing w orld, the United States was a lig n in g i t s e l f w ith those le a st predisposed to a w orld o f d iv e r s ity and social ju s t ic e " . 25 This paradox combined w ith s tra te g ic s tu p id ity to cause the f a ilu r e o f US p o lic y in Vietnam. There was never any c le a r notion o f the goal o f US p o lic y beyond the containment o f communism and, as has been shown, the s tra te g y th a t was follow ed a c tu a lly undermined containm ent. There was "a d is p ro p o rtio n a te fa s c in a tio n w ith means at the expense o f ends"25 in Vietnam, an assumption th a t the ends would somehow be an automatic consequence o f the means. Eisenhower had repeatedly argued th a t the processes o f defence should never be allowed to over-shadow the purposes o f defence, but t h is " s e n s it iv it y to the need to keep ends and means in balance was p re c is e ly what was la ckin g in the Kennedy and Johnson a d m in is tra tio n s ; there was instead a preoccupation
Ibi<jL, p.295.
I b id ., p.297.
Nathan and O liv e r, United States Foreign P o lic y , p.315. 26
9 7
with process at the expense of o b je ctive s . . . " , r e s u ltin g in a s tr a te g ic vacuum and a t o t a l collapse of p o lic y .
IV
Just as US s tr a te g ic p o lic y in Vietnam was f a t a l l y flawed, undermining the post-war fo re ig n p o lic y consensus based on containment o f communism, so too did global economic fa c to rs work to the detriment of American power and influ ence in the 1960s. The Truman Doctrine was c lo s e ly lin ke d to the Marshall Plan, the program of US-backed European economic recovery and re c o n s tru c tio n , and subsequent US economic p o lic ie s were geared to an assumption o f global US economic dominance. However, by the time of Johnson's Presidency Europe was emerging as a strong competitor f o r the US and the Japanese "economic m ira cle" was underway, threatening US economic hegemony in the A s ia -P a c ific region.
The impact of the Vietnam war served to exacerbate America's domestic economic problems, fu e l i n f l a t i o n both in the US and abroad, and reduce i t s in te rn a tio n a l economic competitiveness. In choosing to f i g h t the war without increasing taxes while simultaneously massively increasing defence expenditures, Johnson chose an economic path dominated by high i n f l a t i o n , high in t e r e s t rates and a growing budget d e f i c i t . These fa c to rs a l l flowed through to the in te rn a tio n a l economy, c le a r ly one of the most enduring legacies o f US involvement in Vietnam. The preoccupation o f the Johnson a d m in istra tio n with the war, while neglecting even the short-term economic e f f e c t s , blinded i t to wider global developments and trends.
27
European nations were becoming in c re a s in g ly a f f lu e n t by the mid-1960s and few o f them shared the US perception o f the th re a t posed to g lo b a l, or even re g io n a l, s e c u rity by the Vietnamese s it u a t io n . France had withdrawn from Indo-China in 1954 and was t o t a l l y u n w illin g to again become m i l i t a r i l y involved in the re gion . B r ita in was reducing i t s overseas commitments. The government of Harold Wilson was not disposed to new overseas deployments, instead choosing to t r y q u ie t diplomacy in an e f f o r t to encourage the two superpowers to impose a settlement on t h e i r respective Indo-Chinese a l l i e s . The re s t of Europe viewed the s itu a t io n with a sing ular lack o f enthusiasm and, in the end, the only countries which sent troops to Vietnam with America were A u s tr a lia , New Zealand, South Korea and the P h ilip p in e s - the
oo la s t two re ceiving a s ig n if ic a n t f in a n c ia l b e n e fit fo r doing so.
America's preoccupaton with Vietnam occurred at the same time as serious og
s tra in s emerged in the A tla n t ic A llia n c e . In 1966 French President Charles de Gaulle said th a t US p o lic ie s were in c re a s in g ly provocative to the Soviet Union and the PRC and were " in c re a s in g ly menacing the peace of the
30
w o rld ". In the same year he decided to remove France from the inte gra ted NATO s tru c tu re , re q u irin g NATO headquarters to move from Paris to Brussels and fo r c in g US bases from French s o i l . This, combined with B r i t a i n 's increasing is o la tio n is m , puzzled Washington at the time the US was looking to i t s old European a l l i e s f o r moral and materiel support. The r e s u lt was a f u r t h e r s tre tc h in g o f US m i l i t a r y resources as they attempted to
Mooney and Bown, Truman to C a rte r, p.161. 29
The a llia n c e , m i l i t a r i l y based on NATO, o f Western Europe and the US. 30
De Gaulle in Phnom Penh in September 1966, c ite d in Mooney and Bown, Truman to C arter, p .157.
counterbalance the withdrawals of France from NATO and B r it a in from east of Suez.
Just as America's preoccupation with Vietnam did not allow i t to give s u f f ic i e n t a tte n tio n to changing circumstances in Europe, so too Washington took inadequate account of the im p lic a tio n s of emergent nationalism throughout the Third World. I t had misjudged the strength and character of th a t nationalism , as in Vietnam, mistaking l e f t i s t n a t io n a lis t re v o lu tio n s f o r expressions o f pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese sentiment. Under Johnson the world was s t i l l seen in s t r i c t l y b ip o la r terms, and the e a r l i e r Sino-Soviet s p l i t was e ith e r not recognized at a l l or i t s im p lic a tio n s were not understood. In such a s itu a tio n , w ith ju s t two superpowers, only the Soviet Union stood to gain from United States myopia and a n a ly tic a l i n e r t i a . The Cold War had entered a new phase "rendering outmoded the assumptions o f the
31
p o lic y of containment", and the US was l e f t with in c o rre c t preconceptions, a f a i l i n g p o lic y , in cre a sin g ly independent and c r i t i c a l fr ie n d s , and a Cold War adversary of growing confidence and c a p a b ilit ie s .
The Soviet Union was very content to see the US bogged down in Vietnam, and was able to make "a dramatic recovery in world a f f a i r s between 1965 and 1971" , with the post-Khrushchev leadership anxious to reduce the s tr a te g ic gap with the US. "Moscow did nothing to mediate the war . . . because the c o n f l i c t - as long as i t remained lim ite d - drained the United States and
33
benefited the Soviet Union". Without Vietnam draining i t s resources, the
__
George C. Herring, "The War in Vietnam", in Exploring the Johnson Years, ed. Robert A. Divine (Austin: U n iv e rs ity of Texas Fress, 1981), p.29. 32
Lafeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, p.255.
US might well have chosen t o a t t e m p t t o m a i n t a i n t h e s t r a t e g i c s u p e r i o r i t y t h a t i t had a ch ie ve d under Kennedy and McNamara. By improving i t s s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n , t h e S o v i e t Union not only narrowed t h e gap between i t s e l f and t h e US b u t a l s o i n c r e a s e d i t s own ascendancy over China by, among o t h e r t h i n g s , e n s u r i n g t h a t t h e y were t h e primary o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e on Hanoi.
I n c r e a s e d S o v i e t c o n f i d e n c e and c a p a b i l i t i e s e v e n t u a l l y allowed i t t o extend i t s i n f l u e n c e i n t o A f r i c a and t h e Middle E a s t , a l b e i t with v a r y in g d e g re es of s u c c e s s . U l t i m a t e l y t h e y were t o gain a c c e s s t o t h e former US b a se s in Vietnam, g r e a t l y e x t e n d i n g t h e i r o p e r a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s i n t h e P a c i f i c and I ndi a n Oceans - i r o n i c and b i t t e r evi den ce of t h e f a i l u r e of Ame r ic a' s c on ta i nme nt p o l i c y .
V
By l a t e 1967 and i n t o e a r l y 1968 i t was i n c r e a s i n g l y c l e a r t h a t t h e US s t r a t e g y in Vietnam was not working. Over h a l f a m i l l i o n combat t r o o p s and more bombs t ha n had been dropped in t h e whole of World War I I 34 were not s t o p p i n g s u p p l i e s r e a c h i n g t h e North Vietnamese t r o o p s and V i e t Cong o p e r a t i n g i n South Vietnam. Perhaps more i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y in Saigon c o n t i n u e d t o worsen, a key f a c t of which US p o l i c y never seemed t o t a k e due a c c o u n t . D e s p i t e t h e overwhelming e v i d en c e t h a t US p o l i c y was f a i l i n g t o r e a l i z e i t s o b j e c t i v e s , t h e US m i l i t a r y commander in Vietnam, General Westmoreland, i n s i s t e d in l a t e 1967 t h a t America would win
35
" w i t h i n two y e a r s " . D e sp i t e mounting domestic c r i t i c i s m and p r o t e s t s t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e war would be won, t h u s denying t h e
Ambrose, Rise t o Glo ba li sm, p .291.
p o s s i b i l i t y of f a i l u r e f o r t h e ir p o lic ie s . Some o f f i c i a l s even claimed th a t China's reluctance to get involved on behalf of North Vietnam (and also the f a i l u r e in 1965 o f a communist coup in Indonesia) was "proof" th a t
36
containment was working. Although by la te 1967 Johnson was beginning to th in k of reducing troop le v e ls , the a d m in is tra tio n 's c r e d i b i l i t y was f i n a l l y destroyed by the V ie t Cong's "Tet o ffe n s iv e " in ea rly 1968.
The Tet offe n sive o f January and February 1968 involved an audacious push by the North Vietnamese army and the V ie t Cong deep in to US-controlled areas of South Vietnam, even to the grounds of the f o r t i f i e d US embassy in Saigon. Although the communists suffered heavy ca su alties and were eventually re p e lle d , the news o f t h e i r push had a devastating impact on American domestic opinion because i t contrasted so markedly w ith the confident p re d ictio n s which had always come out of Saigon and Washington. As Kissinger wrote l a t e r th a t year, "The Tet o ffe n sive marked the watershed of