“My message to Trump, the puppet of the Jews, Allah has promised this victory and he has promised you for defeat… By the law of Allah we will have victory, so get ready for the fighting
has just begun”
--Yusuf, ten-year-old ISIS child soldier (Dearden 2017).
Pentagon officials recently declared the defeat of the physical Caliphate, citing ISIS’
substantial territorial losses in Iraq and Syria (Qiu 2018). In January 2015, the Islamic State controlled 35,000 square miles of land. As of January 2018, the group controls only 2,500 square miles (Ibid). However, territory does not tell the full story. The Pentagon’s statement was
premature and overly optimistic, as revealed by a New York Times article published just one month after the declaration (Qiu 2018). The article cited reactions of experts and officials to what was discovered in the aftermath of a U.S. airstrike on January 20th, 2018. The strike hit a major IS command center, which was found to be housing “a heavy concentration of ISIS fighters who appear to have been massing for movement…” (Schmitt 2018). U.S. officials were taken aback by how many ISIS fighters were there. Major General James B. Jarrard reflected on his surprise:
“ISIS continues to demonstrate the ability to mass large numbers in its attempt to retain a stronghold in Syria” (Ibid).
In the article, experts overwhelmingly disputed the Pentagon’s assertion that ISIS had been defeated. Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen stressed that ISIS fighters will not disappear, and that they are fleeing to other parts of the region to hide out underground, where they can safely plan attacks (Schmitt 2018). General Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs said: “The thought that these foreign fighters who have participated in this fight now for over
two years will quietly leave Syria and return to their jobs as shopkeepers in Paris, in Brussels, in Copenhagen, is ludicrous… That’s a very compelling problem” (Ibid).
In January 2018, Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis gave a speech emphasizing the threat ISIS poses even without territory (Mattis 2018). This view reflects that of many experts, who expect that ISIS’ violent extremist attacks overseas will increase before they decrease (IHS Markit 2017). The rationale behind this projection is that territorial losses are galvanizing ISIS to escalate its attacks to compensate (Ibid). ISIS leaders have lent support to this theory in the past.
Former War Minister of the Islamic State, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, expressed in 2008 that the Islamic State would compensate for events that undermine ISIS’ authority by increasing killings:
“Some have written fatwas calling for the dissolution of the [Islamic] State. They have claimed that it is a paper state, an Internet state. They have encouraged criminals to act against it. Blood has been shed on account of their fatwas” (al-Muhajir 2008). In addition to expecting that attacks abroad will increase as ISIS continues to lose territory, analysts have asserted that ISIS has already prepared its members for the loss of territory, and that neither military nor territorial conquest will change the beliefs of ISIS followers (IHS Markit 2017).
At the time of this writing, the Trump administration is contemplating options for moving ahead with the fight against ISIS. There are currently multiple possibilities on the table but no final decisions have been made. It is unknown what changes Trump will make to the current strategies for fighting ISIS, which mostly consist of supporting the Iraqi army and precision airstrikes. On one hand, Trump pledges “America First,” a position of non-interventionism and staying out of other countries. On the other hand, Trump has used aggressive rhetoric when asked about how he will defeat ISIS, such as promising to “bomb the hell” out of ISIS-controlled areas (Starr and Collinson 2017). In 2017, when asked about how the Trump administration
would change U.S. military tactics in Iraq and Syria, Secretary Mattis responded: “I think it’s getting there as rapidly as possible, where it would be a more accelerated campaign” (Starr and Collinson 2017). Albeit a vague statement, an “accelerated campaign” could involve eliminating the limit that Obama imposed on the number of U.S. troops permitted to be stationed in Iraq.
Obama set the cap at no more than 5,262 American soldiers (Starr and Collinson 2017).
The United States seems hesitant to put more troops on the ground, but multiple officials associated with the current administration believe it may be necessary to defeat ISIS. Michael Flynn admitted, “the sad fact is that we have to put troops on the ground. We won’t succeed against this enemy with air strikes alone… This won’t be possible quickly” (Flynn 2015).
General Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, revealed that the U.S. military is considering staying in Iraq for many years to stabilize it after the awaited defeat of ISIS (Starr and Collinson 2017). Most recently, Major General James Jarrard of Operation Inherent Resolve said that the fight to liberate Syria is far from over, indicating that American troops will remain in Syria indeterminately (Syeed 2018). Since deploying more troops to Syria and Iraq and intensifying the fight against ISIS on the ground is a possibility acknowledged by a number of U.S. officials, it is essential to prepare for what could follow as a result of that decision.
Many experts caution that sending more troops and thus escalating the war on the ground could strengthen ISIS. John Graham warns that deploying American troops to the region for the
“final battle” that ISIS is preparing for would be a mistake (Graham 2016). He believes that doing so would provide a boost to ISIS’ recruiting because the leadership could then claim that the prophecy is coming true (Ibid). Journalist Graeme Wood concurred with this statement after seeing a flurry of tweets in 2015: “After mujahideen reported having seen American soldiers in battle, Islamic State Twitter accounts erupted in spasms of pleasure, like overenthusiastic hosts
upon the arrival of the first guests at a party” (Wood 2015). Wood explains further what these celebratory Tweets indicate: “If the United States were to invade, the Islamic State’s obsession with battle at Dabiq suggests that it might send vast resources there, as if in a conventional battle… the risks of escalation are enormous… An invasion would be a huge propaganda victory for jihadists worldwide… another invasion and occupation would confirm that suspicion, and bolster recruitment. Add the incompetence of our previous efforts as occupiers, and we have reason for reluctance” (Wood 2015).