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The analysis of freedom (ttibbàna) and the happiness (sukba) associated with such freedom, independent of the problem of suffering discussed in the previous chapter, can lead to much misunderstanding. The first and second noble truths relate to the problem of suffering and its cause, respectively. Even though all dispositions are considered to be suffering or unsatisfactory (dukkha), they are not looked upon as the cause of suf­

fering. The cause of suffering is almost always referred to as lust (raga), craving (tankd), greed (lobha), attachment (àlaya), grasping (upàdâna), hatred (dosa), aversion (papgha), and other psychological tendencies.

Epistemological Freedom

The distinction between the first noble truth and the second is crucial. It has already been pointed out that the dispositions are necessary condi­

tions for human knowledge and understanding. Abandoning all disposi­

tional tendencies is tantam ount to committing epistemological suicide;

they are necessary not only for knowledge and understanding but also for the continuity of the life process that begins with birth. The reason is that dispositions are not purely mental (mano), they are physical (kdya) and verbal (vaci) as well, that is, habitual bodily behavior and similarly habit­

ual verbal behavior. Annihilation of these dispositional tendencies would eliminate the functioning of the physical organs and make it almost impossible for a human being to continue to respond to the world. The Jaina practice of not performing any new actions, except those mortifica­

tions intended to expiate for past actions,1 comes close to such an elimi­

nation of bodily and verbal responses. When such practices are carried to their conclusions, they can mean actual suicide.

Thus allowing the dispositions to have complete mastery over one’s knowledge and understanding results in dogmatism, while their annihila­

tion is equivalent to epistemological suicide. Similarly, allowing disposi­

tions to overwhelm one’s behavior can lead to bondage and suffering, whereas annihilating them means complete inaction or even suicide. The middle standpoint recommended by the Buddha is the appeasement of all

F R E E D O M A N D H A P P IN E S S 91

dispositions (sabbasafikharasamatha), which is equivalent to freedom (nibbana).1 Hence freedom pertains both to human knowledge and understanding and to human behavior. For the Buddha, the first form of freedom is a necessary condition for the second.

The term nibbdna (Skt. nirvana) conveys the same negative sense asso­

ciated with the conception of freedom whenever the latter is defined as

“absence of constraint.” Epistemologically, a view or a perspective becomes a constraint whenever it is elevated to the level of an absolute (parama) or viewed as embodying the ultimate truth.3 It is such abso­

lutizing of views that contributes to all the contention in the world, where one view is pitted against another, one perspective looked upon as superior and another as inferior.4 The Buddha carefully avoided formu­

lating any eternal truths (saccdni. . . niccani)5 and provided a definition of truth that is non-absolutistic, thereby leaving room for its modifica­

tion in the light of future possibilities (see Chapter in). Yet the body of knowledge or variety of perspectives that has remained functional is respected as the “ancient tradition” (sandtana dhamma)6 and is not dis­

carded altogether. The Buddha was emphatic in stating that one cannot hope to attain purity either by clinging to one view (dipfbi) or by having no-view (adiftbi).7 If he had assumed that there can be only one view that leads to freedom and purity, then only those who lived in India during the sixth century B .C . could have attained such freedom, for that one view could not be applied to any other context, where the content of human knowledge would be different. But since he did not believe that there is one absolutely true view, the Buddha could claim that his concep­

tion of truth is not confined to any particular time, i.e., that it is atem- poral (akalika).%

Freedom is sometimes referred to as a state of stability (accutarp padarp)9 and as a state in which there is no fear from any quarter (aku- tobhaya).10 These definitions have more epistemological than behavioral significance. How often is one’s stability disturbed by the shattering of a perspective cherished for a whole lifetime? W hat fear can be greater than that arising from thinking of the sun not rising tomorrow? Analytical knowledge intended to get rid of dogmatic views was symbolized in the form of a “diamond” (vajira)A1 The fear driven into the hearts of the dogmatic philosophers as a result of such analysis was symbolized as Vajrapáni, “the demon with the diamond (or thunderbolt) in hand.”12 Disruption of cherished views can bring instability and fear worse than what one experiences as a result of losing property or those who are near and dear. It is for this reason that freedom is considered to be release from excessive involvement (yogakkhema).13 With no such excessive involvement in perspectives, and being able to modify them in the light of new information or different interests, a person can remain at peace (khema) and without fear (appafibhaya).14 With fear gone, one can enjoy

unswerving happiness (acalarjt sukbarfi).15 It is a stable happiness, not one that fluctuates.

Behavioral Freedom

In terms of behavior, freedom as “absence of constraints” means the abil­

ity to act without being constrained by unwholesome psychological ten­

dencies such as greed and hatred. It is not the ability to function without regard for each and every principle of nature, physical, biological, or psychological. While those physical, biological, or psychological princi­

ples that are wholly determined by human dispositions (sankhata; see Chapter vm) can be brought under control as a result of an enlightened person’s appeasement of dispositions, he still has to function in a world where the principle of “dependent arising” (papiccasamuppada) prevails.

Thus he may be almost immune to disease because of his healthy way of living; indeed, the only ailments the historical Buddha suffered seem to have been aftereffects of the severe self-mortification he practiced before enlightenment. Yet even the Buddha was unable to prevent the onset of old age, decay, and, finally, death. The principle of dependent arising that brought about his death was initiated when he was born in this world, an occurrence over which he had no complete control. However, if a person’s desire for survival (bhava-tanha) is one of the contributory factors to such survival, with the elimination of such desire he can antici­

pate the possibility of overcoming future rebirth. Thus the overcoming of rebirth is the result of his spewing out craving in the present life. It is pri­

marily in this sense of not being reborn (a-punabbhava) that we can speak of immortality (amata) .16

Seen in this light, we must reconsider the implications of the famous discourse in the Udana used by almost every modern interpreter of Bud­

dhism as evidence for an absolutistic conception of freedom (nibbana).

The discourse reads:

M onks, there is a n o t-b o m , not-become, not-made, not-dispositionally- conditioned. M onks, if that not-born, not-become, not-made, not-disposi- tionally-conditioned were not, no escape from the born, become, made, dis- positionally-conditioned w ould be kn ow n here. But, monks, since there is a not-born, not-become, not-made, not-dispositionally-conditioned, there­

fore an escape from the born, become, made, dispositionally-conditioned is k n o w n .17

Note that the negations pertain to concepts referred to by the past parti­

ciples not-born (a-jata), not-become (a-bhuta), not-made (a-kata), and not-dispositionally-conditioned (a-sahkhata), indicating that they in­

volve events that have already occurred. Their nominal forms—birth

F R E E D O M A N D H A P P IN E S S 9 3

(jati), becoming {bhava), making or doing (kamma), and dispositions (sankhdra)—explain the world of bondage and suffering (see Chapter vm). Therefore, their negatlon *s simply a negation of the bondage and suffering that a person experiences as a result of the process that has already taken place. Since p art of that process involved human disposi­

tions, the opportunity to restrain that process by the appeasement of dis­

positions is also recognized. In other words, it is an explanation of the possibility of freedom, not in an absolutistic sense, but in a limited sense of “absence of constraint.” The fact that the passage refers only to those events which are predominantly conditioned by dispositions and not to those that are “dependently arisen” (paficcasamuppanna) seems to indi­

cate that this is a reference to the freedom and happiness one can attain in the present life, in contrast to its bondage and suffering.

Behaviorally, freedom finds expression most clearly in the attitude one adopts toward life in the world. This is best illustrated by the simile of the lotus (pundartka).18 Like a lotus that springs up in the muddy water, grows in it, and, rising above it, remains unsmeared by it, so one who has spewed out greed and hatred, though born in the world and remain­

ing in it, yet manages to be unsmeared by the world (lokena anupalitto).

This world of experience is sometimes described in couplets: gain and loss, good repute and disrepute, praise and blame, happiness and suffer­

ing.19 A person who has attained freedom is not overwhelmed by such experiences; hence he remains unsmeared by them, freed from sorrow, taintless and secure.20 This is not to say that he does not experience that world.

To remain unsmeared by the world of present experience (i.e., the third noble truth) by the elimination of the cause of suffering, which is greed or craving (the second noble truth), it is necessary to understand the problem of suffering (the first noble truth). Thus the behavior of the person who has attained freedom can be understood only in terms of the conception of suffering discussed earlier (see Chapter vm).

The Buddha’s discussion of suffering, as has been pointed out, focused on immediate experiences without ignoring the past and future. There­

fore his explanation of happiness should do likewise. The general ten­

dency is tc view the birth of a human being as a joyous event and death as a mournful one. The Buddha perceived both birth and death as suffering, yet the solution is neither to rejoice in both nor to bemoan them both.

The elimination of craving and appeasement of dispositions enabled the Buddha to adopt a more sober attitude toward death. This attitude is expressed in the words of one of his chief disciples:

Neither do I take delight in death nor do I rejoice in liře. I shall discard this body with awareness and mindfulness. Neither do I take delight in death nor do I rejoice in life. I shall discard this body, like a hireling his earnings.21

It is possible to interpret this attitude as one of reckless abandon border­

ing on pessimism, but the statement simply expresses the fruitlessness of any attempt to avoid death when birth has already occurred. If death is unavoidable by a human being who has come to be born, either as a result of a previous craving for survival or of circumstances beyond his control, he ought neither waste time worrying about death and trying to find a way out of it in the present life nor commit suicide, but rather deal with the problem of immediate suffering with compassion for himself as well as others.

This attitude is also reflected in the Buddha’s advocacy of fearlessness in the service of humanity. Yet it is necessary to distinguish this from con­

scious, deliberate self-immolation. Self-sacrifice or unrestrained altruism is neither a means nor a goal. However, if, in the process of helping one­

self and others attain happiness, one were to face unforeseen death due purely to circumstances (that is, to dependent arising), and if it is not something sought after (apariyiftha), the Buddha’s conception of life and death allows for that form of death to be hailed as noble.22 This qualifi­

cation necessarily rules out any decision to take a course of action know­

ing that it will certainly lead to death either for oneself or for others, in complete contrast to the ideal presented in the Bhagavadgita, as well as in some of the later Buddhist texts like the Jatakas23 and the Saddharma- pundarika-sutra.24

Thus it is not only the abandoning of greed (lobha) and hatred (dosa) that constitutes freedom, but also overcoming confusion (moha). A clear understanding of the nature of life, even according to the limited sources of knowledge available to human beings, is a necessary condition for freedom and happiness. An enlightened person is one who has overcome the perversions of knowledge and understanding (idpallasa).25 The four types of perversions pertain to perception (sahha), thought (citta), and views (difthi). They constitute the identification of (1) the impermanent with the permanent (anicce niccan ti), (2) the not unsatisfactory with the unsatisfactory (adukkhe dukkhan ti), (3) the non-substantial with the substantial (anattani atta ti), and (4) the not pleasant with the pleasant (asubhe subhan ti).

Here the subject represents the impermanent, the not unsatisfactory, the non-substantial, and the not pleasant about which permanence, unsatisfactoriness, substantiality, and pleasantness are predicated as a result of confusion. If the subject stands for what is experienced—and this would include the cognitive as well as the emotive aspects of experi­

ence, the so-called world of fact and value, bondage (sarpsara), and free­

dom (nibbdna)—then the predication that renders the identification a perversion (vipallasa) would make it impossible for freedom (nibbana) to be considered permanent, unsatisfactory, substantial, and pleasant.

F R E E D O M A N D H A P P IN E S S 95

Most interpreters of Buddhism would refrain from asserting nibbdna as a permanent and substantial entity, at least as far as its cognitive aspect is concerned. However, they often insist on the permanence and substan­

tiality of its emotive character. Thus, even if nibbdna is not an ultimate reality (paramattha) in an ontological sense, there is a tendency to regard it as ultimate reality in the sense of permanent and eternal happiness, and hence as a sort of transcendental emotional experience that has nothing to do with the feelings and sensations of ordinary human beings.

The evidence that nibbdna does not consititute a permanent and eter­

nal cognitive reality has been presented above. What remains to be dis­

cussed is the nature of the emotive experience—namely, the sort of hap­

piness—associated with the attainment of freedom or nibbdna.

Psychological Freedom

The term for happiness is sukha (etymologically explained as su-kha, meaning “having a good a x l e - h o l e t h a t is, a vehicle moving smoothly without constraints). The early discourses refer to two forms of happi­

ness. The first is worldly or material happiness (dmisa-sukha), the term amisa (derived from dma, meaning “raw ”) expressing the sense of raw, sensual appetite.26 The second is expressed by the negative term nir- amisa,27 understood as mental or spiritual happiness, which is contrasted with the happiness derived from satisfaction of the five physical senses.

For this reason there has been a general reluctance to associate this form of happiness with any feeling or sensation (vedana), which is inevitable in sense experience.28 The happiness of freedom is perceived as beyond the pale of sense experience, and therefore of any satisfaction relating to the senses. Thus so-called worldly or material happiness (dmisa-sukha) becomes identical with whatever happiness is derived from following one’s desires (kdma-sukha).

Yet the Buddha does not seem to have advocated the view that feelings (vedana), and even sense experience (sahha), are necessarily evil and con­

ducive to unhappiness. As pointed out earlier (Chapter i i i), the suppres­

sion of all perceptions and whatever is felt (sahhavedayitanirodha) was intended as a deconstructive method, never as a goal in itself. Once the deconstruction process has taken effect, feelings and perceptions can serve their proper functions without running the risk of reifying either their cognitive content or their emotive component.

The fact that the person who has attained freedom continues to expe­

rience through the same sense faculties he possessed before, and that he continues to have agreeable (manapa) and disagreeable (amanapa), plea­

surable (sukha) and painful (dukkha) experiences, is clearly admitted by the Buddha.29 This means that there is no qualitative difference between

the feelings of someone who is in bondage and someone who is freed. All that is asserted is that, in the case of a person who has attained freedom, there is an absence of the greed, hatred, and confusion that are generally consequent upon sense experience. For this reason the distinction nor­

mally made between material happiness (amisa-sukha) and spiritual hap­

piness (nirdmisa-sukba) needs to be reconsidered.

In fact, Buddha does not appear to be condemning so-called material happiness indiscriminately. The discussion of material inheritance (dmi- sa-dayada) and spiritual inheritance (dhamma-dayada) in the early dis­

courses seems to support this view.30 A disciple of the Buddha is repre­

sented as experiencing great physical discomfort as a result of fasting, and as refusing to eat some food left by the Buddha because he believes that a true disciple should not be heir to the Buddha’s material posses­

sions. The Buddha does not consider this to be appropriate behavior.

Material or physical comfort in itself is to be neither abandoned nor con­

demned. Physical deprivation, according to the Buddha, is as disruptive of moral and spiritual development as is indulgence in physical comfort.

Thus so-called spiritual happiness (nirdmisa-sukha) need not be quali­

tatively distinct from material comfort or happiness. It is the cognitive and emotional slavery to the objective world (see Chapter iv) that consti­

tutes suffering, and it is this slavery that is referred to as bondage, whereas freedom from such slavery constitutes the highest happiness (paramarp sukharp or niramisatp sukharp) that a human being can enjoy while alive.

To assume that this happiness is permanent and eternal would mean that there is a permanent and eternal person who continues to have such experience. This is to admit a Supreme Being who, even if he is not the creator and preserver of the universe, is at least present during the past, present, and future, for without him one cannot account for the experi­

ence of permanent and eternal happiness. The Buddha and his disciples cannot deny George Berkeley’s conception of God and continue to speak of permanent and eternal happiness. There cannot be the experience of such happiness unless one admits the existence of an experiencer who is permanent and eternal. All that can be asserted without contradiction is that if a person were to follow such and such a perspective and adopt such and such forms of behavior, he would be able to experience such and such a happiness, comparable to that experienced by the Buddha and his enlightened disciples. The concept of previous and future buddhas can be meaningful only in such a context. Thus non-substantiality (anatta) pertains not only to the world of bondage (samsdra) but also to freedom (nibbdna). The Buddhists were therefore prepared to admit that freedom as well as conception (pannatti) are undeniably non-substantial (anatta). 31 One of the discourses relating to freedom underscores this characteristic:

F R E E D O M A N D H A P P IN E S S 97

Non-substantiality is indeed difficult to see. Truth certainly is not easily per­

ceived. Craving is mastered by him who kn ow s, and for him w h o sees there exists no something (akincanaJ.32

Freedom is an experience. As such, it can find expression in language, as any other human experience does. Hence it is a truth (sacca) or, more specifically, a noble truth (ariyasacca), which also makes it a noble view (driyd dipphi).33 However, those who adopt a substantialist perspective regarding truth (see Chapter hi) are prone to distinguish freedom from the person who experiences it. Attributing ultimate objectivity to free­

dom, they create an elephant of enormous size for which they are unable to provide a reasonable description. Obsessed with their extremely restricted views and unable to touch the fringes, one person will explain

dom, they create an elephant of enormous size for which they are unable to provide a reasonable description. Obsessed with their extremely restricted views and unable to touch the fringes, one person will explain

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