So far, this chapter has considered national totals and, where appropriate, examined them at a diocesan level. However, it is also necessary to consider other issues like age distribution, levels of fertility, gender, and ethnicity and country of birth. By attempting
34 Gary Bouma, Australian Soul: Religion and Spirituality in the Twenty-first Century, Melbourne:
Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 54.
35 Ibid.
36This percentage includes those who indicated ‘Object to state’ and ‘no clear answer’. 37Lineham, ‘It’s a New World’, p.65.
42
this, we are better able to construct a profile not only of those professing Anglican affiliation but also of those in other religious categories and for the nation as a whole.
Age38
Anglicans made up a third of the total population and until 1966 their age profile resembled that of the nation (fig. 2.21). However, as the Anglican component
diminished, it also aged. The extent of this became apparent in the 1976 census (tables 2.17 and 2.18). In 2006, the Anglican age profile bore little relationship to that of the population in general whereas the Roman Catholic profile did.39 The contrast was more pronounced when related to the Baptist and Pentecostal profiles, and even more so
when contrasted with the ‘No Religion’ grouping. When the overall Christian age profile was compared with that of the total population and with ‘No religion’ the contrast was stark. There were twice as many ‘No religion’ persons as ‘Christians’ among those younger than 44.
As Anglicans aged comparatively, the profile of other sectors began to differ (fig. 2.22). When the number of 5-14 year olds in the Anglican Church was compared with those in the nation as a whole, at each census between 1945 and 2006, the divergence became very evident. For each of the groups 5-14, 15-19, and 20-29, the rate of decline was similar (table 2.18) with the Anglican component plunging from around 37 percent to between six and ten percent. Wilson’s study of New Zealand patterns of religious affiliation with the same age cohorts over time concluded that those aged 15-24 were the key group in the decline or growth of any given religious grouping and that growth in affiliation in the 25-34 age group was associated with an overall growth in affiliation in the sect/church concerned. Furthermore, affiliation declined across all age-groups in mainstream churches while affiliation increased across virtually all age-groups in those sects/conservative churches showing growth and in the ‘No
Religion’ category.40
38 The age groupings used in the census reports have varied since 1945. Table 2.17 provides a summary
of the age groupings used in successive census reports.
39 The Presbyterian responses mirrored those of Anglicans. Because of that they are not referred to again
in this section.
40 John Wilson, "Religious Affiliation - Change over Time: An Analysis of Intercensal Change in
Religious Affiliation of 5 Yearly Age-Cohorts in Recent New Zealand Census[es]", New Zealand Sociology 8, no. 1 (1993), p.60.
43
Wilson asserted that ‘no church can afford, over the course of five years, to lose the affiliation of six percent of the population of New Zealand for one specific age-group.
But this is what happened … with cohort 341 of the Anglican Church between 1976 and 1981.’42 Lineham noted that, although there was some evidence of decline in the 1970s, there was still a high level of adherence among 5-19 year olds in 1971. ‘If these people had all retained their church links, there would be a high level of support in the 20-30 age group in the 1991 figures. [But] this is not the case: the churches clearly did not hold their teenagers.’43 However, those who were in their forties in 1971, and in their sixties two decades later, had maintained similar levels of affiliation since then.
Anglicans were less successful than other churches in retaining the affiliation of the younger age groups (fig. 2.23). Roman Catholics were more successful across all age groups while Baptists and Pentecostals reflected their commitment to ministry among the young. The comparatively recent upward trend in the Presbyterian and Methodist graphs reflected the inclusion of significant numbers of young Pacific Islanders.
Fertility
Overseas writers pointed to the significance of changing fertility patterns in relation to religious affiliation. Liberal, mainline Protestant denominations in the United States aged more rapidly than more evangelical, fundamentalist faiths (table 2.19) and this would continue until they replenished their ranks with younger members in their child- bearing years.44Roman Catholic birth rates were traditionally higher than Protestants,
‘blacks’ higher than ‘whites.’ Churches with frontier origins, like the Methodists, had more children than those with strong urban influences like the Episcopalians. Changes occurred when groups moved upward in the social structure: they then experienced declining fertility. 45Women in liberal denominations continued to have fewer children but there were fewer women of child-bearing ages in those churches. Thus numbers and fertility worked against a strong and sustained liberal mainline: the natural growth
41 The group aged 10-14 years in 1976, which became the 15-19 age group in 1981. 42 Wilson, ibid., p.75.
43 Peter Lineham, "The Condition of the Church", Bruce Patrick (ed.), New Vision New Zealand,.
Auckland: Vision New Zealand, 1993, p.104.
44 Roof and McKinney, p.154. 45 Ibid., pp.158-59.
44
potential for the liberal denominations was fairly weak, while the opposite was true for conservative bodies.46
Norms of family size also varied from one period to another. During the post- war baby boom birth rates were at an all-time high. Middle-class families with three or more children were not uncommon, and new parents followed their children to the Sunday schools and churches. 47The baby boom was followed by an extended period of declining or stabilised fertility and more effective birth control methods meant that
‘differences within Protestantism far transcend[ed] those between Protestants and Catholics’.48
New Zealand followed a similar pattern. The immediate post-war period saw the rapid development of suburbs and a focus on the nuclear family and on house and garden. Michael King wrote that ‘the nation bred at an unprecedented velocity’. The birth rate (the number of births per 100 population) rose from 16 in 1935-36 to over 26 in the late 1940s and stayed at that level until 1961. There was a massive expansion in the number of schools and teachers throughout the 1950s and 1960s.49The number of babies increased from 47,000 in 1946 to 56,351 in 1956, and peaked at 65,390 in 1961. The average number of births to each woman went from 2.3 in the 1930s to 4.3 in 1961.50 By 1961 children constituted 33 percent of the country’s population and nearly half the population was under 25.
Scholars disagree on the dates of the baby boom, but there is no doubt that it had a major impact on post-war New Zealand society.51
The Baby Boom has become something more than a population trend … [it] represents an era in which particular family and other social behaviours, attitudes, norms and values were dominant; the generation born at that time has gained the aura and legitimacy of a
culture … a body of people having shared values. In the same vein, the Baby Boom period itself has captured the popular imagination …52.
46 Ibid., pp.160-61.
47 Ibid., p.160. 48 Ibid., p.161.
49 Michael King, The Penguin History of New Zealand, Auckland: Penguin, 2003, p.412.
50 Bronwyn Dalley and Gavin McLean (eds), Frontier of Dreams: The Story of New Zealand, Auckland:
Hodder Moa, 2005, p.309.
51 King, ibid., p.432 includes those born between 1946 and 1961. Belich, Paradise Reforged, p.489 opts
for 1945 to 1970. Ian Pool, Arunachalam Dharmalingam, and Janet Sceats. The New Zealand Family from 1840: A Demographic History. Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2007, pp.166ff argue for the years 1945 to 1973.
45
The post-war baby boomers viewed religious affiliation differently from other generations; clear trends were discerned in the post-war period. 53 Between 1945 and 1961 the fertility ratio54for the total population rose from 51 to 74, then declined rapidly to 60 in 1971 and 50 in 1976, but between 1981 and 2006 stabilised at around 40. Anglican fertility ratios followed the same general trend line. This was the same as the pattern prior to 1945 in which Anglican and Presbyterian families had fertility ratios close to the national level, not surprising given that together they comprised almost 60 percent of the population.55However, after the baby boom, ‘the subsequent sharp decline in fertility, increased longevity, and movement of the baby boomers into working ages’ changed the demographic profile. Between 1976 and 2001, the median age of the population rose from 26 to 35. Children under the age of 15 made up 30 percent of the population in 1976; by 2001 only 23 percent.56 By 2006, it had fallen to 21 percent.
A comparison of fertility ratios in 2006 for all religious groupings confirmed that affiliates of the mainline churches did not reproduce as fast as other groups. In 1971 the Anglican fertility rate was slightly lower than the national figure (55 compared with 60), but the gap widened after 1981 (table 2.20). In 2006, it was 29 compared with the national rate of 39 (table 2.21; fig. 2.24). A comparison of fertility ratios in 2006 confirmed that affiliates of the mainline churches did not reproduce as fast as other groups.57
Gender
Even a random observation of Anglican congregations indicates that women outnumber men. Grace Davie asks: ‘Why are women more religious than men?’ or, more
53 Wilson, ibid., p.69. Wilson acknowledges H. Mol, The Fixed and the Fickle: Religion and Identity in
New Zealand, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: University Press, 1982, p.79.
54 The number of children in the 0-4 age category to every 100 women aged 15-39. 55 Pool et al., ibid., p.150.
56New Zealand Official Yearbook, 2004, p. 93.
57 The Roman Catholic rate was considerably higher until 1981 but in 2006 fell below the national ratio
and at 32.7 was only moderately higher than the Anglican ratio, compared with a gap of 20 at the height
of the baby boom. Those of ‘no religion’, from the Evangelical and Pentecostal traditions, or of high Pasefika and Maori affiliation, had higher fertility ratios, but these reflected their younger age profiles rather than a greater inclination to reproduce. The Methodist ratio (similar to Anglicans until 1991) increased at the end of the period, because of increased Pasefika and sharply reduced European membership.
46
accurately, ‘Why are women’s religious sensitivities different from those of men?’58 She argues that gender is the most significant variable with respect to ‘how many individuals do or do not practise, do or do not believe’, irrespective of age group.59 There is no really convincing explanation for this, and the questions remain curiously under-studied. Davie believes that women researchers have been distracted by the
women’s ordination issue –‘Why do men dominate in the chancel?’ and maybe they now need to address the other question: ‘Why do women predominate in the pews?’ The evidence is overwhelming. Women’s church attendance far surpasses men’s. However, this is partly explained in demographic terms – churchgoing has a particular appeal for older women and they outnumber older men.
There was also a noticeable difference in men’s and women’s responses to questions of belief as 84 percent of women but only 67 percent of men said they believed in God; 16 percent of men did not believe in God, compared with only nine percent of women. Women described their God as the God of love, comfort and
forgiveness; men as the God of power, planning and control. Davie argues that women have been drawn more closely to the practice of religion because of their closer
proximity to birth and death.60
In 1945, there was a close relationship between the gender distribution of the national population and that of the major churches in every age group (table 2.22; figs. 2.25 and 2.26). The profile of the ‘No religion’ group, on the contrary, was very different; non-affiliation was a male phenomenon.
By 1976, levels of male affiliation declined in the 15-45 age groups and, by 2006, only 40 percent of Anglicans aged 25-40 were male, compared with 47 percent of the general population. The gap narrowed from age 40 upwards, reflecting the higher levels of Anglican affiliation in older age groups. Another development was the increased number of females opting for ‘No religion’, resulting in a closer relationship between the ‘No religion’ and national gender profiles.
58 Grace Davie, Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994,
p.118.
59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. p.120.
47 Ethnicity
The Anglican Church had the highest percentage of people of European ethnicity (80 percent) compared with Presbyterians (73), Roman Catholics (67) and Methodists (55) (table 2.23 and fig. 2.27).
Each major denomination had a distinct ethnic profile (fig. 2.28). Anglicans were the least diverse denomination in the 4MD grouping: they accounted for 17 percent of the European population (but only 14 percent of the population as a whole) but were heavily outnumbered in the growing Pasefika and Asian communities. Only 16 percent of Anglicans were non-European, considerably lower than the other 4MD.61 When Maori were removed from the equation, the contrast was even more remarkable: less than three percent were Anglican (fig. 2.29).62
Anglican Europeanism was reinforced in the ‘country of birth’ statistics (tables 2.24 and 2.25; fig. 2.30) as 80 percent of Anglicans were born in New Zealand,
compared with 73 percent of the national population and 76 percent of the Christian population. Furthermore, 13 percent of Anglicans were born in the British Isles, double that of the other 4MD.
Anglicans represented 13 percent of the Maori population, and Roman Catholics 12 percent63but only three percent of the Pasefika population was Anglican: most had origins in islands where other traditions were strong.64 Among those of the various Asian ethnicities only 7,000 were Anglicans (compared with 41,000 Roman Catholics and 16,000 Presbyterians). They represented only seven percent of the Asian Christian population.
Thus, Anglicanism remained as a predominantly European church in New Zealand, despite its Maori missionary history and recent initiatives directed at achieving
61 Roman Catholics (27), Presbyterians (21), and Methodists (44). 62 Roman Catholics (13), Presbyterians (16), and Methodists (31).
63 Presbyterian affiliation among Maori remained low except in part of the Bay of Plenty. The earliest
mission activity among Maori was initiated by the Anglican, Wesleyan and Roman Catholic Churches.
64 Compared with Presbyterians (18), Methodists (12), and Roman Catholics (7).This reflected the fact
that most Pacific Islanders who settled in New Zealand came from Samoa, Tonga and the Cook Islands, where the Methodist, Congregationalist (since largely absorbed into the Presbyterian Church) and Roman Catholic churches were the principal denominations. Anglicans were a small minority in Fiji, Tonga and Samoa but had a much stronger presence in the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea, countries which provided few immigrants. There was a comity agreement between Anglican and Protestant churches in the Pacific that discouraged competition in the same geographical areas. Thus Methodists were dominant in Fiji and Tonga and the London Missionary Society in Samoa and the Cook Islands. Similar arrangements were adopted in Papua, the Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides, areas in which Anglican missions operated.
48
a greater sense of partnership. Although Anglicanism remained the largest denomination among Maori, Pakeha Anglicans outnumbered Maori six to one.
After 1986 the ethnic composition of New Zealand changed radically. By 2006,
68 percent of the population identified itself as ‘European’ (although another 11 percent described themselves as ‘New Zealander’), compared with Maori (15) ‘Pacific Peoples’ (7), ‘Asian’ (9) and various ‘Other’ categories (1).
The changes were more pronounced in Auckland. In 2006 only 56 percent of its population was European (compared with around 80 percent in the South Island) (table 2.26 and fig. 2.31) and only 11 percent Maori, both well below the national percentages.
‘Pacific Peoples’ represented 14 percent of the Auckland population and Asian peoples 19 percent. Two out of every three Pasefika and Asian people in New Zealand lived in Auckland (table 2.27 and fig. 2.32).