While, according to prototype semantics, prototypes in no way define concepts or categories but simply try to explain how such concepts are actually used, a different perspective has been taken by (the otherwise somewhat similar) stereotype semantics.166 The latter upholds the prototype semantics criticism of the traditional theories, especially with regard to the notion of concepts as being checklists of features, and its idea that within the potential scope of listemes and concepts there are a core area, where the prototypical denotata are located, and a peripheral area, where non-prototypical items are situated, some of which could be considered outside the scope of the relevant listemes (or concepts) by some members of the community.
On the other hand, stereotype semantics maintains that these observations on how people actually interact with listemes are to be taken into account in order to create a better theory of what concepts are. On this basis the idea of stereotypes, intended as mental images having the features of the typical denotata, has been developed. Stereotypes are conceived as models for attributing intension to listemes167 and are
165 Examples taken from K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 312. 166 On the slightly different concept of gestalt see M. Wertheimer, Productive Thinking (New York: Harper, 1959).
167 K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 339; K. Allan, “Stereotype Semantics”, in K. Allan (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 939 et seq., at 942.
presumed to include the prototypes thereof.168
In this perspective, each concept is generally presumed to have all the attributes common to the typical denotata of the corresponding listeme. However, this presumption is not an absolute one; it simply reflects the expectations within a community and, as such, it holds true until evidence to the contrary is given.
For instance, such evidence may result from the presence of a qualifying adjective,169 or from elements of the context such as certain features of the potential referent which differ from those of the stereotype although reasonably within the scope of the listeme. In this perspective, the position upheld by Putnam, according to which the meaning of a language expression is a minimum set of stereotypical facts about the typical denotatum thereof,170 seems to better match the idea that concepts have a hard core and elastic peripherals.
The issue becomes therefore to distinguish between (i) the minimum set of stereotypical facts that are necessarily to be present in order for a item to be considered within the scope of a certain concept and (ii) the other characteristics that are expected to be present in the items in order for them to be included within the scope of the concept, but which may be missing in the specific case without preventing such an inclusion (e.g. the capability to fly for a bird).171
Such characteristics (both compulsory or merely expected), however, correspond in turn to concepts to which the same analysis in terms of stereotypical characteristics may be applied. In addition, the above-mentioned features may be characterized by vagueness. Therefore, even with regard to the minimum set of stereotypical features of a concept, the issue may arise of whether they are in fact present in the specific item under analysis. This is typically the case with reference to the features that identify a certain range of values within a larger graduate scale (e.g. “red” within the graduate scale of color, or “big” within the graduate scale of dimensions), since the edges of the range are generally blurred and vanish into the edges of neighboring ranges (e.g. the borderline between red and orange, if it exists at all, is blurred for human perception).
Finally, it cannot be forgotten that the intension of a listeme is an abstract and theoretical
168 Allan gives the example of the listeme “vehicle”, whose stereotype includes the prototypical car, as well as the peripheral horse-drawn wagon (see K. Allan, “Stereotype Semantics”, in K. Allan (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 939 et seq., at 942).
169 Allan gives the example of the expression “blue tomato”, where the stereotype of the listeme tomato is probably ”red”, but the specification introduced by the adjective “blue” makes clear that the concept corresponding to the expression “blue tomato” is characterized by the color blue matched with the other attributes of the items typically denoted by the listeme “tomato” (excluding the color) (see K. Allan,
“Stereotype Semantics”, in K. Allan (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 939 et seq., at 942).
170 H. Putnam, “The meaning of “meaning”, in K. Gunderson (ed.), Language, mind, and knowledge (Minneapolis: University on Minnesota Press, 1975), 131 et seq. A comment of Putnam’s view is found in K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp. 333 et seq.
171 These characteristics have also been called “quantity implicatures” by those linguists that rethought the traditional theories on concepts in light of the criticism made by prototype and stereotype semantics (see K. Allan, Natural Language Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 321).
construction and that, in reality, the meaning attributed to a specific listeme may be different for different people: as previously mentioned, the correspondence between the theoretical intension of a listeme and the intended referent may be perfect, very good, good, pretty good, somewhat good, pretty bad, bad, non-existing and may depend upon what one knows about the referent.172