número 3 año 2010 Public space and social peace
5. Conclusiones: En busca de una ciudadanía republicana
Youth participation policies therefore, cannot be taken at face value. It is not always self evident who the policies are aimed at, what the desired outcomes are, what
notions of citizenship underpin policies and what the role of implementing authorities are.
2.4.1 What kinds of citizens?
Few evaluations have been undertaken on the impact of youth participation in public and programmatic decision-making (Cavet & Sloper, 2004). Where these do exist there is evidence that a critical factor affecting outcomes is the way that power operates. In the literature this is usually focused on the degree of control that young people have in decision-making processes (Kirby & Bryson, 2002: 37; Wierenga, 2003: 68). In this way, power is typically treated as ‘control’ and existing literature tends to explore power from a ‘one dimensional’ (Lukes, 2005) view. A notable exception is the work of Tisdall & Davis (2004) who have shown that the policy network literature can help to evaluate the influence that young people have on public decision-making through policy networks. Importantly they find that through participation policies, young people can leverage a range of resources, including information and knowledge required by policy-makers and networks that can be mobilised for action, which mean that, even as ‘outsiders’ they can have influence over decision-making processes (Tisdall & Davis, 2004: 140). Furthermore, they find that the role of adults and organisations is a significant one, and whilst they do not draw conclusions on the implications of their research for youth citizenship, it is clear that the relationship between participation policies, implementing bodies (such as organisations) and youth political identity deserves further attention.
The limited empirical evidence of young people’s experience of policies, and weak frameworks for analysing power, have resulted in this being a neglected area of research. Consequently, there is limited evidence of the outcomes of participation policies, either for policy-making or young people themselves (Matthews, 2001;
Cavet & Sloper, 2004; Tisdall & Davis, 2004; Bell et.al., 2008).
Whether drawing on the youth development or youth involvement tradition, the literature tends to look at adult-led and designed strategies to link young people into adult-led institutions and organisations. The few studies which have examined youth-led initiatives find they present more participatory approaches to citizenship, but that because young people are operating in adult-dominated societies, they struggle to exercise influence or power beyond their initiative or group (Douglas, 2006). Scholars
have argued that as such, some youth participation policies deliver mechanisms that enable young people to influence decision-makers, but most are highly controlled and extend only to structured consultations (White & Wyn, 2008: 112). Others are more scathing in their assessment, arguing that youth participation policies have little to do with democracy and are designed to control young people (Bessant, 2003). Here the key question and one which is frequently overlooked in the youth participation literature (though significantly more consideration has been given to this question by scholars of education) is what kind of citizenship is promoted by participation policies?
Recent studies of online strategies for youth participation have paid attention to the kind of citizenship being promoted. For instance, Montgomery et.al., (2004) drew on the typology of youth citizenship promoted in educational settings developed by Westheimer & Kahne (2004) to examine the kinds of citizenship promoted by online participation initiatives in the United States of America. By analysing over 400 websites, they categorised e(participation) initiatives as either fostering ‘personally responsible citizenship’ (legalistic, norm-consistent, rights and duties-based),
‘participatory citizenship’ (focused on reaching and mobilising citizens in direct action) and ‘structural change agents’ (focused on structural change to achieve social justice) (Montgomery et.al., 2004: 108-109). In addition to these categories, Montgomery and colleagues (2004) also found that many e-participation initiatives were aimed at educating young people for citizenship and were targeted at those deemed ‘pre-engagement’ (Montgomery, 2004: 110). They acknowledge that a limitation of their study is that they make assessments about the intention of the initiative based on publically available content and not on the views and visions of those behind the sites. Vromen (2008) has addressed this by examining the role of distinctive online spaces for democratic participation by looking at both the internet-based practices (site and level of activity) and the processes of initiatives (discussions with creators of the site and external commentary through media) (Vromen, 2008:
83). She has assessed the forms of citizenship promoted by three Australian participation initiatives as either: liberal, communitarian or deliberative. Both Vromen (2008) and Montgomery et.al. (2004) found that assessments of youth participation online reveal a diverse range of activity but that liberal (or personally responsible) and communitarian (participatory) forms of participation are more common than
deliberation or direct action online. From Vromen’s research we can see that the role of the individuals and organisations behind participation initiatives play a key role in determining the form of citizenship promoted.
Similarly, Coleman has assessed online initiatives for participation in the United Kingdom by interviewing key managers of online initiatives. He argues that participation policies tend to promote either ‘managed’ or ‘autonomous’ forms of citizenship. His approach is particularly relevant to my study as he provides a framework for exploring the policy intent and the practical outcomes of participation initiatives in terms of the kind of citizenship being promoted for young people. I spend some time here exploring his work before using it in my analytical framework in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
2.4.2 Managed and Autonomous citizenship: Coleman (2008)
Coleman (2008) provides a useful framework for examining the role of organisations in promoting youth participation policies. Though the empirical work he has undertaken in developing a theory of forms of participation as promoted by through both government and non-government organisations is focused on the use of technology and is, therefore, concerned with the potential for youth e-citizenship, I argue that it is a useful framework for examining participation policies both on and offline. Here I have left in all references to the internet and online participation because I will return to look explicitly at the role of the internet for participation in Chapter 7.
Coleman has undertaken many studies on the role of digital media and information communication technologies (particularly the internet) for citizenship and democracy and he has look specifically at young people’s use of digital media and citizenship (Coleman & Rowe, 2005; Coleman, 2007, 2008). The work in which I am most interested is a recent chapter in which Coleman develops the idea of ‘managed’ and
‘autonomous’ forms of citizenship (Coleman, 2008). He argues that that the policy of
‘targeting young people’ (specifically in relation to e-democracy) can be read as either
‘a spur to youth activism or an attempt to manage it’ (Coleman, 2008: 191). He distinguishes between these two policy goals in terms of organisations that aim to promote ‘managed’ or ‘autonomous’ citizenship. To illustrate this binary model, Coleman examines six youth civic engagement online initiatives in the United
Kingdom. Two were government funded, one was auspiced by a national charity and three did not receive any external funding. In analysing interviews with key actors involved in these initiatives, Coleman explores:
- their political objectives
- their use of digital technologies
- the extent to which they sought to control the discourse on politics and democracy on their websites
- their views towards government and other political institutions.
Through this analysis he identifies tendencies of ‘autonomous’ and ‘managed’ e-citizenship projects, described below in Table 1.
Table 1 Forms of e-citizenship (Coleman, 2007)
Managed Citizenship Democratic Citizenship Autonomous Citizenship Receive external funding from
governments or charities.
Government funded but independently managed.
Young people are ‘free’ to express themselves and having too close a relationship with the state. the terms of their own political debate and
Promote ‘habits of civility’ and empowering young people to
Less interested in ‘having say’
than actually taking action.
Whilst Coleman does not define them as such, I suggest that his definition of
‘managed’ citizenship reflects a rights-based conception of citizenship, while
‘autonomous’ citizenship reflects a participatory approach.
Coleman observes that the projects he has examined define ‘the political’ in traditional ways and that they are either reacting against, or in support for traditional democratic structures and actors (politicians, governments, trade unions) (Coleman, 2008: 203). He also acknowledges that his typology should be viewed with caution:
Although these two faces of e-citizenship represent ideal types, and should perhaps be understood as opposing points on a spectrum rather than mutually exclusive positions, they differ sufficiently in their contrasting conceptions of the status of young people, the affordances of digital technologies and the authenticity of “actually existing democracy” to provide a useful theoretical context…
(Coleman, 2008:191) Coleman goes onto suggest that a ‘productive convergence’ of these two empirically tested models is possible (Coleman, 2008: 202). This would form the basis of a contested or, perhaps difference-centred democracy in which deliberation and debate are fostered as described in Table 1. This productive convergence could be encouraged through the adoption of six policy principles on e-citizenship:
1. Government is willing to fund, but not directly manage or interfere with, common online spaces in which young people are free to express themselves as citizens, and about the terms of citizenship.
2. Online democratic spaces for young people shall include horizontal channels of interaction, through which networks and collective associations can be formed, as well as vertical channels, providing dialogical links to various institutions that have power and authority over them.
3. It is up to young people to set the terms of their own political debate, without any external censorship.
4. E-citizenship involves both free expression and consequential political engagement. Young people are not to be expected to participate unless the scope and terms of their influence is explicitly outlined.
5. Among other aspects of e-citizenship, opportunities and resources will be provided to ensure that young people encounter others with whom they might disagree strongly, within various kinds of deliberative settings.
6. Young people are encouraged to mobilize online to counter social injustices and broaden the political agenda in any way that they see fit.
(Coleman, 2008: 202) By drawing into question the role of e-participation policies for ‘autonomous’ or
‘managed’ youth citizenship Coleman presents a framework for considering the role of e-participation policies for youth citizenship in my study. I therefore employ Coleman’s framework to examine other case studies in an attempt to identify what other forms of citizenship may exist along the spectrum, of which ‘managed’ and
‘autonomous’ types form the extremities.
One weakness in Coleman’s framework is that he doesn’t consider who these policies are aimed at. As is often the case in the youth participation literature, young people are treated as a homogenous group and it is assumed that participation policies implemented through organisations are aimed at and received by all young people equally. Bang’s work is useful here as he indicates that new forms of ‘expert activism’ may in fact produce patterns of inclusion and exclusion.
2.3.3 Participation policies and issues of inclusion and exclusion
The literature on youth participation quite consistently identifies concerning patterns of exclusion. There appear to be two areas of concern. First, that participation policies are being interpreted in a way that creates relatively few opportunities for a small minority of young people and that this minority tends to be made up of young people with good access to social, cultural and economic capital (as discussed in Marsh et.al., 2007: 131 – 132). The second concern is that participation policies as top-down, adult managed processes have the effect of legitimising some forms of youth participation and de-legitimising others.
Wierenga and colleagues find that young people in Australia perceive participation policies to engage with a small, privileged minority (Wierenga et. al., 2003: 24-25).
This is a perception echoed by young people in the United Kingdom (Matthews, 2001: 316). Other studies question the representativeness of formal youth participation mechanisms such as roundtables (Bessant 2004: 400; Bo’sher, 2006: 343 - 344; Bridgland Sorenson, 2007), though they do not explore in detail which young people are mobilised and what processes influence who gets involved and why.
Recent studies that have explored structured approaches to youth participation - such as youth advisory boards – found that they tend to facilitate the participation of high achieving young people who are well educated and employed (Singer & Chandra-Shekeran 2006: 50). This has been attributed to the fact that these policies often reproduce the processes and hierarchies of participation found in formal and traditional settings which require young people to understand these processes and have the skills and knowledge to contribute in a structured way (Mattews, 2001;
Saggers, et.al. 2004: 106). Research has found that particular groups, such as young people from new and emerging communities and young people with disabilities are regularly excluded from discussions on participation (Badham, 2004; Francis and Cornfoot, 2007: 8-9). These young people are consequently less likely to know about opportunities to participate or see themselves as potential participants (Olliff, 2006;
Bell et.al. 2008: 133). The emerging picture is that participation policies are not engaging with young people from a range of backgrounds and therefore are contributing to processes of exclusion.
This leads to the second, related concern about what is considered legitimate youth participation – who it is defined by, undertaken by and whether or not it is recognised.
Some scholars express concern at the top-down nature of participation policies suggesting that it stifles bottom-up participation of young people (Hart, quoted in Badham, 2004: 4). From another perspective, some warn that network governance contributes to patterns of civil society appropriation by setting up, funding and managing civil society group whose autonomy is then seriously compromised (Maddison et.al., 2004; Marsh, 2008). This suggests that, as representatives of their peers or non-government organisations, young people may be coopted into managed processes which limit, rather than open up opportunities to contribute to policy making. For Coleman (2008), the concern is that participation policies push particular
notions of citizenship – for example dutiful citizenship – where conventional activities are emphasised (such as voting and dialoguing with elected representative in managed forums). Where this occurs, there is potential for activities that take place outside these normative activities are de-legitimised or not recognised.
In his work, Bang (2005) argues that the emergence of the Expert Citizen has the effect of producing a republican elite by requiring citizens to have ‘professional’ skills and competencies, therefore creating a bias towards those with the greatest advantage within the social structure. Whilst Bang accepts that Expert Citizens may be a necessary response to the growing complexity and reflexivity of society, he argues that this republican elitism further alienates ‘lay-people’ from the political process, creating a more serious problem of exclusion. On this note, Hendriks (2008) has argued that inclusion has received too little attention from network scholars given the central importance of inclusion to democracy, but also because, along with Bang, she is concerned about what she has found to be exclusionary tendencies in network processes (Hendriks, 2008).