6.1 The Principal Agent Framework
Lane (2000) discusses the principal agent approach which models the interaction between two sets of people – the principal and the agent. The model is based on the assumption that the principal pays the agent for services according to the market-wise value of the output that the agent produces. The important aspect of the model is asymmetry of information skewed in favour of the agent. The interaction is supposed to take some time to evolve. Lane argues that the accountability in public organisations i.e., how public teams act as agents for their government (the principal) can be explained with the P-A framework.
This framework is used to examine organisational relationships as a ‘tension between the ‘principal’ who demands a service and the ‘agent’ who provides it (Batley, 2004, p.38). Analysing further the relationship Batley points out that the agents over a period of time could use their ‘superior knowledge’ to divert benefits in their own direction (ibid.). I share the critique held by Batley that the principal agent model offers only a one- dimensional view of interactional behaviour and ignores the cooperative aspects of social life.
When and as the multiple players enter into the game, it would lead to more probabilities of interactions between the principal and the chosen agents. Further, the P-A model might have to be developed further to understand a situation where the agents are collaborating with the principal towards delivery of service provision but all the agents have differential degree of information and different but interacting sets of responsibilities. How this impacts the mutuality of interactions and joint accountability is explored to some extent in this research.
The REI case might seem in the first instance a case of P-A framework where the state acts as the principal while the organisations supporting public education are agents. However, there is an intricate web of principals and agents in the case of
multilateral/multipartite collaborations. According to the stakeholder approach the managers are agents while the stakeholders are principals working towards the interest of the firm (Freeman, 2004). When managers outsource services, they are principals as well as agents at the same time. P-A model can accommodate contracting out of services in exchange of money but how to explain multi-stakeholder collaboration which are non- profit in spirit and not all aiming for delivery of services. The principals want the best service at lowest cost whilst profit agents want the best margins and highest prices for the least service. This can lead to conflict of interests not only between the principal and the agent. Also as discussed in the section on forms of partnerships, there can be inter-agent conflict and also conflict in the conceptualisation of stakeholders. The complexities of such interactions demand the development of a model having more explanatory capacity than the P-A model to explain the processes and outcomes.
6.2 Frameworks of Power
Partnerships entail inter-organisational relationships (see the section ‘Relationships and purposes of partnerships’ in this chapter). The sociology of organisations presupposes power in inter-organisational relationships (Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips, 2006, p.7). However what power is (Hobbesian mechanical foundations of power (Hobbes, 1651, cited in ibid., p.129) and how it operates (Machiavellian interpretation, ibid., p.218) are the questions which have been conceptualised in several ways (Clegg and Wilson, 1991). Power is a multilayered concept (Arts and Tatenhove, 2004) and essentially contested (Lukes, 2005). Broadly speaking, there is a social and political conceptualisation of power and there is a discursive conceptualisation. For state theorists, power is associated with state and formal political institutions (see Foucault, 2004b, cited in Jessop, 2007, p.35; Jessop, 1995). The capitalist power is yet another form of power situated outside the political institutions Mandel, 1969) and shaping the society through use of state power (Leys, 2001, p.2, cited in Ball, 2007, p.6).
government/power of the state, Physical Power, Supra-sovereign power, Social power, Infrastructural power, Consensual power, Global economic and political power, Resource power, Legal power, Charisma and symbolic power. I will use these categories of power during my analysis of REI partnerships.
In an empirical study Tappin (2000) has used five forms of power to analyse the interviews exploring relationship between government and NGOs following three years of international funding in a small island. These five forms of power suggested by French and Raven (1958, 1959, cited in Tappin, 2000, p.7) are: reward, coercive, referent, legitimate, and expert where reward is control of material resources; coercive is ability to punish by taking away reward; referent is personality related qualities and ability to influence others’ actions; legitimate is position power – authority – nature of position or status and expert is relevant experience or expertise, often acquired skills. This framework of power is derived from Dahl (1957, cited in ibid.).
Dahl defines power ‘as a relationship between social actors in which one social actor A (controlling unit) can get another social actor B (responsive unit) to do something that it, B, would otherwise not have done’ (ibid.; see also Power, Haugaard ed., 2002, p.12). This conceptualisation assumes a cause and effect relationship being an important dimension of power. Thus, social actor A becomes a causative agent of effecting a certain action by social actor B. This can be explained by the REI example where in the collaborative association between NGOs and government is enabling NGOs (Social actor A) to make the government (social actor B) address issues of infrastructure and provision of teachers in the areas where the NGO is supporting government schools. However, it may be argued that this kind of power is contingent upon the REI framework which provides the NGOs to assert and demand a certain action from their collaborating partner. As Dahl also explains that in the analysis of power, Resources, Skills, Motivations and Costs are important analytical-explanatory aspects to be considered to account for differences in power of social actors (Power, Haugaard ed., 2002, p. 14-15). This implies that besides Dahl’s agency based concept of power we also need to take into account the ‘structural conditions’ and the ‘systems of knowledge which make such an exercise of power possible’ (Haugaard, 2002, p.304).
The instance discussed above (Box 2.1) however has multiple layers which go beyond ‘social actor A making social actor B do something’ kind of power analysis as used by Dahl. That the NGO mentioned in this case was an REI partner, a programme which is highlighted by the state as well as media provides some legitimacy and charisma to the NGO as an assertive actor who is in an advantageous position to negotiate and involve stakeholders. This is besides the NGO’s long standing reputation for working closely with educationally deprived localities and poor communities, lack of dependence of the NGO on public funds and its ability to attract funding from international agencies.
Further, the political and economic interests of collaborating partners in impacting upon a process to achieve a certain outcome also need to be taken into consideration. Another example of power analysis by Dowding (1996, p.28, cited in Lukes and Haglund, 2005, p.2) is that of international funding agencies pushing NGOs to scale up their projects and/or to enter into partnerships with the governments. The NGOs might not have done so otherwise but the money power of the funding agency makes them scale up or attain new partnerships. The question arises why do the agencies want NGOs to scale up or to work with government? Because the scaling up of a programme funded by them or adopted by the state provides these agencies, visibility and legitimacy and enhances possibility of future alliances with the state.
Box 2.1 Going beyond Power of Actor A over Actor B
Another example which I came across during this research is the work of an REI partner NGO in an educationally deprived locality in the city of Jaipur in Rajasthan (discussed in chapter 7). The NGO involved the local leaders and the member legislative assembly (MLA) representing the area by initially apprising them of the school- building construction work undertaken by the NGO for a government school which had no building. The leaders could see the point that their support for the government school building would ensure them future electoral gain. The MLA responded proactively by announcing contribution of 100,000 INR (approx. 2222 USD @ 45 INR to the dollar) for each government school-building coming up in their constituency. Thus the NGO was able to make the leaders become responsive to an aspect necessary for the educational development of the region. The MLAs have area development fund for their constituency which was till now not used for any development related to children’s education. However, it may be difficult to identify an outcome and further attribute an outcome as an effect of a particular partnership/relation-ship. (Dowling et al., 2004).
Thus the question of why would A want B to do something which B would not have otherwise done, essentially points towards the aspect of intentionality in the exercise of power. This aspect has been included by Steven Lukes (2005) in his three dimensional analysis of power (Fig. 2.3). Lukes undertakes the analysis of the power within the Marxist tradition and the debates (whether the social relations are contingent or determined by structures) within to theorise power and structural constraints of an agent as opposite ends of a continuum (Haugaard, 2002, p.38). Lukes’ analysis focuses on firstly the role of intentionality in the exercise of power; Secondly, the meaning of ‘real’ or ‘true’ interests and thirdly the nature of relationship between power and responsibility. Thus power emerges as intentional. However, Lukes’ analysis has been critiqued to be limited as it does not concern itself with the ‘state’s capacity to act on and through its subjects and
Source: Lukes, 2005
aspects of ‘government’ and ‘governance’ within states is today ‘being conducted by public-private partnerships and by formal and informal networks involving a variety of state and non-state agencies’ (Hindess, 2006, p.119, cited in Lukes, 2006, p.164). In the analysis of MSPs in this research, while it might be difficult to evaluate true interests or intentions of the alliances, I am able to comment on the power of these alliances and inquire into the purpose of these partnerships. This is achieved through an analysis of stated objectives and claims regarding the development and outcomes of these alliances, observations of the processes in the field over a period to time alongside textual analysis,
Gaventa (2006) builds upon Lukes’ ideas to develop a framework for power analysis represented by the ‘power cube’ (see Fig. 2.4) which includes levels of power (from local to global) and spaces of engagement being created (as closed, invited and claimed/created) in addition to the forms of power (visible, hidden, invisible) as separate but interrelated dimensions. He differentiates between positive and negative conceptions of power-which include power to exercise control over others and power as a capacity or agency to effect positive action.
The power cube presents (see Fig 2.4) a model for alignment of strategies for social change by showing that those seeking to challenge power in all of its spaces, levels and forms need to search not for one solution, but to build , multiple, linked strategies and in different sequences, depending on the starting point in any given context (Gaventa, 2006). Further he emphasizes that the power cube cannot speculate which strategies and in what sequence would work rather it is a tool to reflect and analyze ‘how strategies for change in turn change power relations’ (p.31). The invited spaces are those in which users or beneficiaries are invited to participate by the government, super-national agencies or non- governmental organizations (Cornwall, 2002, cited in Gaventa, 2006, p.26). REI, however, is a different example where the businesses, their CSR groups and foundations and NGOs are invited to participate in the public sector. Moreover, we shall see in chapter 4 that the creation of the invited space for PPPs in Rajasthan was influenced by the advocacy alliances of the WEF on one hand, whilst the PPP strategies of the GoI also
provided the framework and space for platforms such as WEF to forge MSPs. Also, as the case of GeSCI suggests in chapter 4, strategic alliances with transnational linkages mobilise various forms of power to affect policy and practices at the national level as part of globalisation strategies (see also Bhanji, 2012).
If we agree with the idea of unequal agency in the exercise of power and also power being structural then the level of access and participation in decision making which comes with the invitation varies according to the participants in the invited spaces. Who invites? What is the nature of the invited space? Who are the invitees? What privileges do the invitees get? To what extent does the invitation allow them to participate thus creating closed spaces or spaces with limited possibility of participation even within the invited space?
Source: Gaventa, 2006 Fig. 2.4 The Power Cube
I have depicted core and peripheral invited spaces in the above figure (2.5). The innermost ellipse is the core of the invited space where many of the decisions impacting the policy and change take place (e.g., the core partners of the REI – see Chapter 4). Also the ellipses are not centred or symmetrically arranged because invited spaces could be created within (e.g. the case of QEP in Chapter 7) or outside the invited space (organisations forming an alliance; expert groups; curriculum committees), according to the strategic needs. Again the invited spaces can have dense/privileged participation in decision making towards the core and lesser responsibility for action.
The role of agencies and actors in defining and negotiating the spaces is important as well. Though the Governments dominate in the continuum of power relations, they incorporate agencies and actors that can impact the relationship by being cooperative or repressive (Coston, 1998, p.365). This argument of the power continuum, who dominates the continuum and for what purpose has been explored in this study. However, those involved in these power relations face broader opportunities, options, and constraints and these form the basis of the power relations (Allen, 2003). In the emerging institutional
to work with a variety of actors due to these emerging options and constraints. The organisations and the space as such is also impacted in the process. It thus emerges that power is highly differentiated. Global level organisations might have power to forge alliances or influence governments to launch programmes but how these alliances operate, what partnerships are organised and under what conditions and how the partners participate in the process will depend on various permutations and combinations of forms of power, organisations and spaces.
Multi-scalar, MSPs such as REI are aimed at educational issues of a particular region/geographical location. This complex setting has implications for theory, research and practice as MSPEs cannot be analysed on the basis of simple inter-organisational and institutional conceptualisations.
6.2.1 A Realist Account of Power
How do the different explanations and workings of power interact to bring to us the concept of power as an analytical tool for understanding MSPs? To this end, Andrew Sayer’s discussion on understanding the spatiality of power immanent in the social phenomena though interrogation of causal powers and emergent properties (Sayer, 2004) is a helpful analytical tool.
According to Sayer there are two kinds of power — power1 which is structural, relational and acquired causal power of ‘objects’ but not necessarily exercised and power2 which is the activated causal power. The objects could be persons, social institutions and relations with other objects. Further, the objects as well as structures are susceptible to influence. In the context of MSPs the policy of the national and state governments to forge PPPs could provide the causal power to the government institutions to enter into partnerships with the private sector and also change the focus from citizens and rights to customers and privatisation (see Srivastava, 2010). The Indian government’s PPP strategies in the tenth and eleventh five year plans are an example (ibid.). At the same time
an international thrust of businesses to enter into alliances with the governments is another form of causal power to launch PPPs. However there could be differences in interests and focus between the government and the businesses entering into partnerships. These differences serve as causal susceptibilities towards actualisation of the purposes.
The financial resources for launching an innovative programme by the private partners are yet another example of the role of causal power in the genesis, formalisation and operationalisation of PPPs.9 However, the private partners might not really have the vision and expertise to take forward the programme in the public domain (School adoption by the CII partner is an example discussed in Chapter 5; also see the analysis of extent of WEF’s role in REI in case study chapters 5, 6, 7, 8).
These causal susceptibilities affect the exercise of power. The example of acquired power could be the ability to weigh options, judge, speak. However in terms of, how these powers exist and affect we need to consider two points regarding each kind of power. Firstly, the activation of power1 of an object depends upon the power and ‘susceptibilities’ of other objects and structures in relation to one another. Secondly, the effects of activated causal power2 of an object depend upon the causal powers of other objects. Thus power of an object may be further toughened, overruled, stopped or modified. The ability of civil society organisations to somewhat counter the repressive forces of globalisation is an example in this regard (see Novelli, 2004). GeSCI’s example of influencing policy in Chapter 4 is yet another instance of how the activated causal power of the alliance was limited by the policy discussions nationally. I have tried to depict this in the following figure (2.6). Here the movement from causal power and susceptibilities to effect is not linear and does not mean actualisation of potential power, Sayer cautions. This is only a tendency and may not be necessarily achieved (Sayer, ibid., p.262). This movement involves, what Sayer calls ‘double contingency’. Thus the relation between power1 and power2 is contingent but also tendential.
Sayer further explains what entails from this double contingency of power. Firstly he says that power1 and susceptibilities of other objects constitute the context for power2 of an object. Still the same action can produce different effects and different actions can produce the same effect, which is to say that the causal relation between action and effect is neither linear nor is it unilateral. Thus on the basis of outcomes it is difficult to say whether they are cause of a purposeful action and also even when there is a purposeful action is exercised the outcome might be unintended. Also the same strategy and action may not continue to affect same outcomes over a period of time. This double contingency of power contests the prevalent notions of central power while discussing multinational corporations or international organisations. At the same time it emerges that though causal powers are