abilities of tribal farmers in the irrigation project. This section highlights such attitudes of lower level engineers in the project towards the tribal beneficiaries of the irrigation project and presents data to support this argument.
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Figure 3.3: Schematic Layout of a Typical Canal System in India. DM1= Direct Minor #1; DM2 =Direct Minor #2;
SM1= Sub Minor #1; SM2= Sub Minor # 2; OL= Outlet
This junior level cadre in the department had more interactions with the farmers and also had day-to-day knowledge of the social profile of irrigation beneficiaries. This placed them in a somewhat advantageous position as far as their knowledge of the politics and society of the area was concerned too. Most engineers (irrespective of rank), were unanimous in their view that Konkan tribal farmers did not deserve a large dam and canal project because they had little experience with modern, canal-irrigated agriculture. According to one Section Engineer, ‘the Ghat area (canal-irrigated western Maharashtra) farmers are better at using canal water, the tribal farmers in the Konkan are inept.’ Though there was cynicism and prejudice exhibited towards tribal farmers, engineers also displayed ambivalence towards tribal users of the project by viewing them as victims of the machinations of the political class who ultimately controlled allocation of water in the command area of the dam. “All this water,” remarked a
Section Engineer, “will end up in Mumbai because of the wastage in the canal system. These tribals don’t deserve water because they waste it. They have no experience in using canal water. They are fortunate to have access to water, but they excel in wasting it.” Gaikwad, a Section Engineer further remarked:
We have had some successful farmers in the project area. They are all horticulturists and have been engaged in this occupation because their caste is a caste of gardeners and horticulturists. They are from the coast and are using modern sprinkler and drip irrigation techniques (that optimize the use of water) and they brought this technology to the project area from periodic trips to Israel and Oakland, California. The tribals, on the other hand, do not know how to utilize the water. They waste the water and do not know its value. Moreover, they do not know how to cultivate anything other than rice. Agreed that this is a project that was designed to cultivate rice, but you just have to compare the sheer ingenuity of the horticulturists with the lack of initiative and risk taking of the tribals. (Interview: February, 2008)
The skill and enterprise of horticulturists was contrasted with the supposed lack of ingenuity of tribal farmers. However, engineers seldom discussed the influence of social relations or the state of the canal system. That was perplexing, since my understanding from field research in a horticultural belt benefiting from the Surya project was the opposite. Most tribal farmers on the middle reaches of the minor canal system complained of the widespread theft of water by horticulturists who fenced off
entire canal minors and sub-minors, and that Section Engineers did nothing to stop the illegal practice (see Fig. 3.4, below and Paper Three, section 5.6.2 for how unfair water allocation entailed large farmers taking siphoning water from canals). Tribal farmers and their families were typically employed on the farms of horticulturists, and their labour was crucial to the profitability of such operations. Paradoxically, the vegetables and fruits grown on such farms did not require a lot of water and, for that reason, sprinkler and drip irrigation served the purpose.
Figure 3.4: Photo of large horticultural farm. This photo was taken at a large agricultural farm near Sakhare Village served by the canal. The outlet on the canal minor was choked by a gunny bag to restrict flow to smaller, tribal farms downstream. Further, the canal itself was fenced off so tribal farmers could not access it.
The large farmers simply wanted to make sure they got their adequate share of water, and dumped the rest into the natural drainage system in the Command Area. At first, I never confronted engineers about the unfairness of arrangements as I knew of a nexus between large horticulturists and the bureaucracy. That changed later towards the end of fieldwork when I developed a better understanding of the canal rotations and schedule for releasing water. While my field observations of the canal system began in
January, 2008, the irrigation season started in December, 2007. One village where I conducted interviews and a sample survey was located near a small downstream reservoir where the main canal system branched into two canals (see Figure 3.5, below).
Figure 3.5: Map of the Horticultural Belt in Dahanu that provides the larger geographical context for this case study. Parts of the canal network (in red) intersect with natural drainage features (in blue) of the area. It was at the intersection of the main canal system at Sakhare Village where I observed the sluice gates to the rivulets being kept open illegally.
Fig. 3.6: 'Waste' canal water being released into Khadkhada River in midsummer (May 2008). Khadkhada River is a non-perennial stream that forms part of the natural drainage of the Surya Project command area. The river meets the Arabian Sea less than half a km. from this spot. See Index Map 1.4 for more detailed view of natural drainage system for this area.
That reservoir met the water needs of a small local town. Perplexed by the vast quantity of canal water in the rivulets and natural drainage system leading to the Arabian Sea during irrigation season, I investigated the operation of the main canal system. From January to May, 2008 sluice gates leading to a natural rivulet (Dehene Nalla) were kept open by engineers. Those gates were clearly meant for the contingency of excess rainfall and floods in the main reservoir areas. That channel led to a small river near the Mumbai-Ahmedabad railway line that joined the sea (see Khadkhada River in Figures 3.5 and 3.6). On inquiring about this in the department with Gaikwad, who flatly denied it, I was brusquely told that I was spending too much time in the tribal villages and should check facts better. Yet on inquiring with tribal farmers I was told that those gates were basically always kept open during irrigation season. That water (categorized as ‘wastage’) was picked up by horticulturists via pumps, said the farmers. Moreover, ‘waste’ water from Surya project was referenced to weave a local discourse
asserting tribal backwardness (Lankford, 2013). As such, it also fuelled much resentment in a rapidly growing, nearby town bordering the command area, given the apparent paradox of a tribal region constantly contesting Mumbai’s right to that water, which at the same time seemed to be wasting it. In this context, tribal farmers' lack of knowledge and experience regarding operational rules of canals also stood out starkly.
With some engineers, prejudice also gave way to sympathy. On one occasion, for instance, in an oblique reference to social relations in the area, the engineers remarked, ‘the large horticultural farmers do not want the small tribal farmers to succeed. We brought in modern pipeline technology to this area and set up water user groups for the tribal farmers through the World Bank funded Command Area Development Program.’ A Section Engineer vividly described what had happened:
The large farmers subverted the entire program by periodically
destroying the infrastructure with the help of their goons. This would happen at night, but we wondered who the beneficiaries were, it was indeed the large farmers who wanted agricultural labour on their farms and much of it comes from tribal families in the area. Most of the
horticultural farmers are interested in enhancing their own wealth, even if it comes at the expense of the poor tribal farmers. (Interview: June 2008)
The Command Area Development Programme was thus a failure in its efforts to re-engineer the water conveyance system in Surya Command Area. Some engineers pointed out to how social relations in the area worked against making the irrigation
project work for small and marginal tribal farmers. Others pointed out to the lack of cooperation amongst tribal farmers who would not contribute to the maintenance of the new pipeline conveyance system. Employees in the Surya Irrigation Department who were not engineers also pointed to graft in management of the Command Area Development Programme as being a major factor behind its lack of success.