In his explication of the subject of metaphysics, Suárez applies the traditional criterion of ontological abstraction from matter. “In this regard one can define, that metaphysics is the science which considers being insofar as it is being or insofar as it really abstracts from matter.”61 What is the sense of this definition?
Does it entail a restriction of the subject to immaterial being, and consequently a reduction of the ontological concept of metaphysics to the theological one?62 To address this question, it is helpful to recall the origin of this formula in the context of the Aristotelian doctrine of science.
63 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, 6.1.1026a 18–25.
64 Boethius, Quomodo Trinitas unus Deus ac non tres Dii, cap. 2, in Patrologiae cursus comple-tus Series Latina, ed. Jacques-Paul Migne (mpl), 64, p. 1250.
65 Thomas Aquinas, Super Boetium De Trinitate q. 5, a. 4 c, ed. Leonine, vol. 50 (1992), p. 154:
“Sic ergo theologia sive scientia diuina est duplex. una in qua considerantur res diuinae non tamquam subiectum scientie, sed tamquam principia subiecti, et talis est theologia quam philosophi prosequntur, que alio nomine ‘metaphysica’ dicitur; alia vero que ipsas res divinas considerat propter se ipsas ut subiectum scientie, et hec est theologia que in sacra Scriptura traditur.” In Metaph., prol., ed. Marietti (Turin, 1964), p. 1: “Dicitur […]
‘metaphysica’, in quantum considerat ens et ea quae consequuntur ipsum.” See Jan Aertsen, “Was heißt Metaphysik bei Thomas von Aquin?” in Scientia und ars im Hoch- und Spätmittelalter, ed. Ingrid Craemer-Ruegenberg and Andreas Speer, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 22 (Berlin, 1994), pp. 217–239, esp. pp. 226–228.
In the sixth book of the Metaphysics, Aristotle distinguishes between three theoretic sciences—philosophy of nature, mathematics, and first philosophy (‘theology’)—with respect to the manner in which their respective object is related to matter and motion.63 In the Latin west, these considerations were already well known prior to the complete reception of the Metaphysics, for Boethius summarizes them in his treatise on Trinity (ca. 519)—frequently commented upon until the twelfth century—in order to elucidate the scien-tific position and methodological characteristic of his inquiry.64 According to his exposition, it is peculiar to theology to deal with what is unmoved, abstracted, and separable (sine motu abstracta atque separabilis), “since the substance of God is without matter and motion.” First philosophy here is inter-preted as science of the immaterial divine being, that is, theology. Boethius, unverified, presupposes that it is possible to get insight into the Christian doc-trine of the Trinity by means of this (philosophical) theology; he does not yet discriminate between knowledge based on reason alone and knowledge based on revelation.
Both kinds of knowledge, which Boethius considers to be one, are sepa-rated by Latin authors of the thirteenth century. Thomas Aquinas, in his commentary on Boethius’s treatise on the Trinity, introduces a second ‘divine science’ (scientia divina), namely, Christian theology (Theologia sacrae scriptu-rae), which differs in principle from philosophical theology.65 According to Aquinas, this kind of theology, founded upon revelation, is appropriate to the issue of Boethius’s treatise. The introduction of Christian theology, however, has consequences for metaphysics. It leads to a shift in the focus of metaphysi-cal inquiry, from transmateriality to the highest universality (transcendental-ity) of its objects. Even then, metaphysics deals with the divine not as its
66 See above, n. 31.
67 See Thomas Aquinas, Super Boetium De Trinitate q. 5, a. 1 c (ed. Leonine, vol. 50, p. 138).
68 Ibid.: “[…] siue numquam sint in materia, sicut Deus et angelus, siue in quibusdam sint in materia et in quibusdam non, ut substantia, qualitas, ens, potentia, actus, unum et multa et huiusmodi.”
69 Ibid., q. 5, a. 4c, p. 154: “Theologia ergo philosophica determinat de separatis secundo modo sicut de subiectis, de separatis autem primo modo sicut de principiis subiecti.” In this sense, see also In Metaph., prol., ed. Marietti, p. 2: “Quamvis autem subiectum huius scientiae sit ens commune, dicitur tamen tota de his quae sunt separata a materia secun-dum esse et rationem. Quia secunsecun-dum esse et rationem separari dicuntur, non solum illa quae numquam in materia esse possunt, sicut Deus et intellectuales substantiae, sed etiam illa quae possunt sine materia esse, sicut ens commune.”
70 dm 1.2.14 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 17): “…recte notavit D. Thomas in prolog. Metaphysicae, non solum dicuntur abstrahere a materia secundum esse illae rationes entium, quae nunquam sunt in materia, sed eiam illae quae possunt esse in rebus sine materia, quia hoc satis est ut in sua ratione formali materiam non includant, neque illam per se requirant.”
subject, but as the principle of its subject, namely, being in general.66 Aquinas finally expresses this result in terms of ontological abstraction from matter in order to integrate the traditional view.67 To this end, he introduces a differen-tiation. The real abstraction from matter may be understood in two ways: first, in the sense of absolute immateriality, as is the case with God and purely spiri-tual substances, and second, in the sense of not-being-necessarily-in-matter, as is the case “for instance [with] substance, quality, being (ens), potency, act, one and many and suchlike.”68 Metaphysics, or philosophical theology, deals with what is really abstracted from matter in such a way that it considers as its subject abstractions in the second sense, namely, being qua being, while it seeks what is abstracted in the first way, the divine, as the principle of its subject.69
Suárez refers directly to this interpretation,70 however he makes different use of it. It serves him not only in order to reconcile the ontological concept of metaphysics with the traditional theological concept, but also to delimit the subject area of first philosophy in order that it may ensure the autonomy of the other theoretical sciences. According to his view, this delimitation of areas is indispensable, since first philosophy, by explicating being qua being, also includes the diversity of the particular forms of being, especially the categori-cal forms in which the ratio of being is realized. For within the context of the determination of the subject of metaphysics, this ratio is not conceived for-mally by a complete abstraction from the particular forms of being, but is attained by a sort of total abstraction, as a potential whole that somehow
includes these inferior forms.71 The Aristotelian doctrine of science rejects the Platonic model of a unified science, insisting instead on a plurality of sciences, each of which is methodically autonomous. Thus, the metaphysical field of vision has to be delimitated in such a way that other scientific approaches to the categorical forms of being remain possible. Since concrete things, by some kind of abstraction, formally become objects of a theoretical consideration, this delimitation can be performed only by a distinction of the formal aspects—thus, by a separation of the different modes of abstraction—accord-ing to which the various types of theoretical science formally relate to thabstraction—accord-ings as their objects of knowledge.
According to the traditional view, the more a thing is separated from matter, the more it is understandable, and similarly, the more immaterial or abstracted from matter the object of an intellectual cognition is, the more certain this cognition is. Therefore, according to Suárez, the know-able objects—and, as a consequence, the theoretical sciences—distin-guish themselves from each other through their respective degrees of abstraction from matter. Now the highest degree of abstraction, and accordingly, the highest possible certainty of knowledge, is due to the first and fundamental scientific discipline, assigned to first philosophy only insofar as the formal aspect by which being in general is constituted as an object of knowledge of first philosophy implies a real ontological abstrac-tion from matter, in the sense of “being-never-or-not-necessarily in mat-ter.”72 By explicating the nature of being qua being, first philosophy keeps itself—even if it applies attention to particular categorical forms of being—within the limits of this abstraction, “and it does not transcend them, for everything else belongs to philosophy of nature and to mathe-matics.”73 Within the limits of this abstraction, it is concerned, for instance, with the particular rationes of created and uncreated being as such, of con-tingent and necessary being, of substance and accident, quality, action, operation, dependency, living being, perceiving, and understanding being, as well as with some rationes proper to immaterial beings, as for instance
71 Ibid., 1.2.12 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 16): “…cum metaphysica dicitur versari circa ens in quan-tum ens, non est existimandum sumi ens omnino ac formaliter praecisum, ita ut excludantur omnia inferiora, secundum proprias rationes, quia haec scientia non sistit in sola consideratione illius rationis formalis actualis; sumenda ergo est illa ratio, prout includit aliquo modo inferiora.”
72 Ibid., 1.2.13 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 16).
73 Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 17): “…ultra non progreditur, nam caetera ad physicam vel math-ematicam spectant.”
74 See ibid., 1.2.16 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 17–18). However, an investigation of the human soul is not found in the Disputationes metaphysicae. Following Aristotle, Suárez rele-gates this investigation to the last part of natural philosophy; see dm 1.2.20 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 19).
75 Ibid., 2.Prol. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 64): “In posteriori [principali parti] praecipuam eius [i.e., subiecti huius scientiae] partitionem proponemus, atque ita res omnes, quae sub ente continentur, et illius rationem includunt, ut sub obiectiva ratione huius scientiae cadunt, et a materia in suo esse abstrahunt, […] investigabimus et explanabimus.” The unity of metaphysics is the object of detailed reflections in ibid., 1.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 22–25).
76 Ibid., 1.1.23 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 10): “…simpliciter verius est dari conceptum obiectivum entis, secundum rationem abstrahibilem a substantia et accidenti, circa quem per se, et ut sic, potest aliqua scientia versari, eius rationem et unitatem explicando et nonnulla attributa de illo demonstrando; hoc autem fit in hoc scientia [i.e., metaphysica].” Ibid., 2.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 65): “…intendimus explicare conceptum obiectivum entis ut sic, secundum totam abstractionem suam, secundum quam diximus esse metaphysicae obiectum.”
the ratio of immaterial substance.74 Furthermore, it is concerned with the rationes of cause, of causality, of effect as such, and of different types of causality, and last but not least, with the ratio of the first cause and of its universal (transcendental) causality. The investigation of these particular forms and modes of being is carried out following the investigation of being in general and its necessary attributes (up to Disp. 11). In both parts, the Disputationes intend nothing other than to explain the subject of meta-physics: being qua being.75